Ramon H. Myers 

When President Clinton declared his administration's guidelines toward Taiwan - no "one China and Taiwan" or "two Chinas"; no entry into international organizations for Taiwan; and no Taiwan independence - he was intervening in the divided China issue in a way that no previous president and administration had done before. Mr. Clinton's three no's suggest that the U.S. government might cooperate with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to deny the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC), a former ally and sovereign state, its right to join international organizations, establish diplomatic ties with other states, and purchase weapons to protect its national security.

U.S. policy toward the PRC has always been crafted according to the principle that Taiwan and the United States share mutual interests and are friendly nations. In the Feb. 28, 1972, Shanghai communiqué, the U.S. side "acknowledg{ed} that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." That meant the United States recognized a divided China, beginning in 1949, when the two sovereign Chinese states competed for the hearts and minds of the Chinese people and for world affirmation.

In the Sino-American communiqué of Jan. 1, 1979, the United States and the PRC formalized their diplomatic ties, with each side repeating its "one-China" position. But on that same day, the U.S. Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act, committing the U.S. government to new objectives: maintaining existing laws and relations with Taiwan except formal recognition of its government; supplying defensive weapons to Taiwan and maintaining U.S. capabilities to resist any use of force or forms of coercion by outsiders to jeopardize Taiwan's security and its social and economic system; preserving and enhancing the human rights of Taiwan's people.

But Mr. Clinton's three no's invalidate the Taiwan Relations Act and ignore the new realities on Taiwan. The authoritarian government that once ruled by martial law no longer exists. The Taiwanese now elect their president and vice president and enjoy full human rights. Protected by a strong, free press, they can participate in regular, free, open, fair and democratic elections for leaders and representatives. In December 1998, the ROC will elect a new parliament and mayors and councils for Taipei and Kaohsiung cities. In spring 2000 there will be a second presidential election.

That election could influence how the issue of a divided China will be resolved. Taiwan's people might elect a new ruling party and president who will subject the one-China principle to public polling and even a national referendum. Such a development could not come at a more dangerous time. In the last few years the Taiwanese people have become more distrustful of the PRC because of its inability to protect Taiwan citizens traveling in China. The Taiwanese are not hopeful that Beijing's leaders can reduce corruption, promote democracy or carry out successful socioeconomic reforms. And they resent the Communist Party's bullying other nations to isolate Taiwan and prevent it from expanding its foreign relations. Growing Taiwan nationalism and Beijing's failure to win the friendship and confidence of Taiwan's leaders and people could converge in a dramatic Taiwanese declaration soundly rejecting the one-China principle.

That action would anger the PRC and force America's leaders to decide whether they can abandon a democracy of 22 million people to avoid enraging Beijing or risk being dragged into a conflict to uphold the U.S. goal of promoting democracy and free markets around the world. The divided China issue is a time bomb waiting to explode. Mr. Clinton's ill-advised three no's only strengthen those forces in Taiwan society that could reject the one-China principle, in effect telling both Beijing and Washington that Taiwan's people can also say no - thus creating a profound dilemma for America's leaders.

Ramon H. Myers, senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, is coauthor with Linda Chao of "The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan" (Johns Hopkins University Press).