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Multilateral Diplomacy and International Participation:

Canada's Asia-Pacific Policy and Implications for Taiwan

Philip Y. M. Yang

Assistant Professor

Department of Political Science

National Taiwan University

Multilateral diplomacy has always been the cornerstone of Canada's foreign policy. The major reason for Canada's capacity to remain a highly engaged international actor is its continued participation in a multitude of multilateral institutions and international organizations. Beginning with the "Pacific 2000 Strategy," adopted in 1989 by the Mulroney cabinet, the Canadian government started to dedicate significant resources and effort to Asia-Pacific policies and initiatives which were not confined to trade only.

The purpose of this paper is to examine Canada's Asia-Pacific policy, with the focus on Canada's economic and security multilateral engagement in the region. The paper will first discuss the concept of multilateralism and Canada's practice of multilateral diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Then, Canada's approaches to Asia-Pacific economic and security multilateral institutions will be examined in two sections. The final part of the paper will try to draw from Canada's approaches and experiences some implications for Taiwan's participation in the growing multilateral interaction in the Asia Pacific region.

I. Multilateralism and Canada's Asia-Pacific Policy

Many scholars have provided definitions of multilateralism, each adding generative, reproductive, or expansionary qualities to the term. John Ruggie asserts that "institutional arrangements of the multilateral form have adaptive and even reproductive capacities which other institutional forms may lack and which may, therefore, help explain the roles the multilateral arrangements play in stabilizing the current international transformation." <1>Ernst Haas states that "multilateralism implies quiet leadership, guidance by means of continuous consultation, and patience for producing an adequately signed coalition. It means accepting compromises that fall short of the immediate goals. It also means not overloading international organizations with tasks that are likely to discredit them. The true mark of a multilaterally involved superpower is its knowledge that there is no rule requiring it to lead all the time, and perhaps not even most of the time."<2>

In this paper, therefore, multilateralism indicates long-term cooperation and institutionalized methods among three or more countries to draw up common norms of behavior to be used in the joint cooperation on or resolution of a given regional or international issue. Thus multilateralism and regionalism do not necessarily conflict with one another, nor is multilateralism necessarily synonymous with globalism.

Canada plays a major role in shaping and developing international and regional issues through its initiation of and participation in international organizations and multilateral mechanisms. Canada has been central in initiating, developing, agenda-setting, and rule-making in areas such as UN peacekeeping, multilateral economic and trade organizations (G7, OECD, GATT/WTO, APEC), non-proliferation, de-mining, and sustainable development.

Canada has also played a major role in multilateral institutions in the Asia Pacific region. Both economic and security issues have led to the development of multilateral institutions -- Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the realm of economic and trade liberalization, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) for regional security issues -- for countries in the region to engage each other in structured dialogue on broad-ranging economic and security issues.

Since the "Pacific 2000 Strategy" was adopted in 1989 by the Mulroney cabinet, the Canadian government has focused an increasing level of resources on developing Asia-Pacific policies and initiatives which were not confined to trade issues. Canada's main policy towards Asia-Pacific is to gain a greater share in the economic growth in the region while promoting regional peace and stability through multilateral diplomacy and participation. According to Frank Langdon, Canada hopes to attain this objective through a policy of middle power multilateralism, in which Canada will support Asia-Pacific groups like the ARF and APEC, and actively participate in regional economic development and security through multilateral organizations. <3>Canada's motivations are three-fold: (i) Canada's economic future depends on its participation in East Asian economic development; (ii) Canada, a medium-sized country, lack the influence of major powers and must cooperate with others to reach its goals; (iii) Trans-Pacific organizations help moderate the crash of interests between developed and developing states. <4>

With its skills and reputation as a multilateral institution-builder, Canada has helped shape the formation of Asia-Pacific multilateral organizations, including APEC, ARF and CSCAP. Canada also actively participates in the processes of these multilateral institutions and leads the discussion and consensus-building. By continuing to interact with all of its Pacific Rim partners through multilateral institutions, Canada is able to maintain its presence in the region and, in doing so, continue to maximize its national economic interests there.

II. Canada's Approaches to Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum has evolved into the key agenda-setting body for regional trade liberalization and economic cooperation. APEC members are in the process of eliminating formal barriers, such as tariffs, and informal barriers, such as differing customs procedures, to achieve free and open trade in the region by the year 2010 for developed economies (2020 for developing ones).

Canada sees APEC as providing a window for directly advancing Canada's interests in the region. Not only does APEC allow Canada to pursue the sort of policy agenda with which it has the most experience and feels the most comfortable, but it ALSO affords Canada the opportunity to play an important role, given its size, in planting the seeds of multilateral cooperation in a region where multilateralism has very shallow historical roots. Moreover, Canada not only helped shape APEC in its formative stages, but also continues to play a major role in pushing multilateral compromises on economic cooperation, lowering trade/investment barriers, promoting technology flows, and non-discrimination norms in order to participate in regional growth. Canada also tries to moderate conflicts between developing and developed countries.

Like most economies in APEC, Canada realizes the benefit of global liberalization and seeks to use APEC as a foundation for globalism and specifically to turn APEC into "a WTO caucus for faster liberalization." <5>In addition, though trade and investment liberalization and facilitation (TILF) is the major theme in APEC, members all agree that, in order to have sustainable growth and economic development, economic and technical cooperation (ECOTECH) has equal importance in the APEC process. Canada's initiative in supporting economic and technical cooperation in the APEC process has captured a great deal of attention since 1994 and has become one of the two major parts of the Osaka Action Agenda.

The creation of the APEC Economic Committee in 1993 was also pushed strongly by Canada. Some economies had suspicions about establishing an economic committee in APEC for fears it might lead to a regime of macro-economic surveillance. However, Canada was able to convince those economies of the need for deeper analysis of the economic trends and issues affecting economic development in the region. APEC's Economic Committee was therefore successfully established in 1995, with a Canadian as its first chair.<6>

Canada was also the chair of the APEC proceedings in 1997, and host to the fifth summit meeting of APEC leaders. The Canadian government therefore designated 1997 as "Canada's Year of Asia Pacific" in order to increase economic engagement of Canadians in the region. More than 600 events were held in 1997 across Canada to stimulate greater involvement in the region. The broad outlines of APEC in 1997 included issues such as implementation of trade and investment liberalization, economic and technical cooperation, dealing with medium-term blockages affecting population, food and energy supply and environmental sustainability, and business/government dialogue and so on. Under Canada's chairmanship in 1997, APEC achieved several objectives: first, APEC advanced by two years an ambitious plan to liberalize trade in 15 different sectors; second, APEC approved an ambitious and far-reaching trade facilitation program centered around a common commitment to simplify and standardize customs procedures by the year 2000; third, leaders adopted the Vancouver Framework for infrastructure development; fourth, Canada advanced cooperative action on sustainable development; and finally, Canada helped APEC evolve institutionally.<7>

Canada's manner and style of hosting the APEC process and leaders' summit reflect its skills and experiences in promoting multilateral diplomacy and participation. Conferences and events for APEC activities in 1997 were not limited to officials of APEC economies; other levels of government, the private sector, cultural organizations and other non-governmental organizations added new dimensions to the proceedings. Dialogue with the private sector was another major achievement where Canada helped advance and improve the APEC dialogue process. Canada has also led initiatives to expand APEC's scope to embrace other constituencies relevant to economic development, including women and youth.

Furthermore, in discussing Canada's role in multilateral institutions, it is important not to lose sight of the growing involvement and importance of Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in regional affairs and Canadian foreign policy. The participation of NGOs in regional and international affairs and the democratization of foreign policy, the two emerging factors of the Canadian foreign policy-making process, further contributes to Canada's role in multilateral diplomacy and international participation.<8> For instance, Canadian participation and activities in PECC, PBEC, PAFTAD, and ABAC (APEC Business Advisory Council) has helped to encourage regional economic and trade liberalization.<9>

III. Canada's Approaches to Asia-Pacific Security

Unlike Europe and the Atlantic community, the Asia Pacific region has scarcely begun to organize multilateral institutions or mechanisms for preventing conflicts and maintaining regional stability. In the Asia Pacific, there are multiple risks of internal and cross-boundary conflicts and little institutional experience of multilateral dialogue or cooperation in the region. Throughout the Cold War, a series of bilateral security arrangements provided a framework for maintaining peace and security in East Asia. It was widely accepted that the lack of a multilateral security forum or organization in the region was because of the region’s vast size and heterogeneity. With the end of the Cold War, however, uncertainty over stability and security has driven countries in the Asia-Pacific region together to establish multilateral organizations for regional dialogue. It is believed that institutionalized dialogue among all of the participants from the region can serve as a mechanism for discussing certain important problems and managing some of the uncertainty in the region.

This type of multilateral security cooperation points to an important principle: stability is more than the absence of use of force across borders. It requires a positive effort to establish the conditions in which peace is likely to endure. True and lasting stability requires an open and transparent dialogue on security issues. Multilateralism enhances the appeal and legitimacy of preventive diplomacy. A multilateral security system increases the political and military costs of aggression.

Canada's security role in the Asia Pacific region reflects its position and policy preference in the region. According to Professor Acharya, Canada's security engagement in the region may be divided into two major areas. <10>First, as a middle power and newcomer to regional security issues, Canada acts as "a provider of ideas." Second, Canada plays a major role in leading participation in and promoting regional security dialogues and institutions. Canada is also very active in many areas of regional security issues, such as confidence-building measures (CBM), conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and second track diplomacy.

The Clark initiative, that is, the idea of cooperative security, was proposed in 1990 by the then External Affairs Minister Joe Clark. <11>According to the proposal, Canada would try to promote a possible application of the European experience in the Council for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process to security issues in the Asia-Pacific region, even though the implementation would require significant modifications. <12>The idea of cooperative security refers to a multilateral framework with three attributes: (a) It must be geared toward reassurance, rather than deterrence; (b) It must at best replace or at least co-exist with bilateral alliances; (c) It must promote both military and non-military security. <13>Ideally, the expression "cooperative security'' itself encourages an open and constructive mindset, one less likely to be inhibited by familiar disciplinary boundaries and traditional state-centered security thinking. The term tends to connote consultation rather than confrontation, reassurance rather than deterrence, transparency rather than secrecy, prevention rather than correction, and multilateralism rather than unilateralism. <14>

In the Asia Pacific region, the US military presence and bilateral defensive alliances are currently the two major structural factors for maintaining regional peace and stability. The Canadian idea of cooperative security, that is, multilateral security cooperation and dialogue, is to supplement these two dominant approaches to maintaining regional peace and security. The idea of cooperative security has gradually received firm support by other countries in the region, including ASEAN countries and Australia, another middle power in the region. All have come up with different but related concepts of multilateral security mechanisms.

Multilateral security cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region has meant developing at the same time two “tracks” of communication. The First Track indicates fora for discussion of regional security issues among officials, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), established in 1994. The Second Track indicates discussion of such issues among scholars, government individuals (not in their official capacity), private think tanks, and other individuals and organizations. The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is an important example of a Second Track mechanism.

The first ARF meeting was held in 1994 and its membership now stands at 21. The ARF is the only inter-governmental security forum in this region where nations can come together, through dialogue and confidence building measures, to resolve tensions before they lead to conflict. The ARF is characterized by minimal institutionalization, consensus-based decision making, and the use of both first- and second-track diplomacy. The ARF therefore has an evolving first track (official) work program. During the 1996-97 intersessional year, there were meetings on Confidence Building Measures, Search and Rescue, and Disaster Relief, as well as workshops under the umbrella of Peacekeeping.

ARF’S primary ojectives are to keep the US military presence in Asia Pacific as a tool for maintaining regional stability, and also to keep the PRC engaged with other countries in the region. Middle powers like Canada provide a significant voice on regional security issues in the presence of powerful and small states and a chance to influence the contending countries. However, when the idea of cooperative security was first proposed, Canada wished to promote a CSCE-type model as a multilateral security mechanism in the Asia Pacific region. This was not accepted by ASEAN and other Asian countries who favored an informal and consensus-building process to address regional security issues. Nevertheless, Canada still views ARF as "a highly useful instrument of regional stability." <15>Therefore, in ARF, Canada's initiative in CBM, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping contribute greatly to the promotion of the dialogue and discussion of security issues.

As a track two process of security dialogue, CSCAP mirrors the ARF. CSCAP tries to produce high quality security dialogue so that it can affect policy output. The most important function of CSCAP, however, is to “filter” ideas from academic research and other track two discussions, through its working groups discussions, and relay them to diplomats and security officials of member countries in the region. <16>

As to the role of NGOs and second or third track diplomacy, Canadian experiences reveal that this is not only an emerging development in regional multilateral cooperation and dialogue, but also that NGOs are often more capable of addressing sensitive issues because of their status and backgrounds. Canadian academics and policy-makers play an active role in the process of CSCAP. The Canadian government is increasingly turning to NGOs to carry out tasks previously performed by governments. The Mulroney Government in 1990 launched the North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, which was viewed as the prelude of second track dialogue and mechanism in the Asia Pacific region. Canada is currently the co-chair of CSCAP’s Northeast Asian security working group.

The United States has affirmed its military commitment to the region and expressed its endorsement of multilteralism as a means of interaction in the region. The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, published by the U.S. Defense Department in February 1995, called for new multilateral security initiatives to explore multilateral methods to complement existing security relationships. Because of Canada's initiative and participation in building up regional security dialogue and cooperation programs, the United States felt more comfortable in changing its attitude toward multilateral security dialogue in the region. As to the PRC, in 1996, its approach to multilateral dialogues changed from reluctant and defensive to constructive and active. This is evidenced by PRC’s entrance into the CSCAP as a full member in 1996.<17>

IV. Conclusion: Some Implications for Taiwan

Prof. Acharya identifies four major ways in which Canada's multilateral approach serves Taiwan's interests: (i) Multilateralism can be beneficial to Taiwan by increasing the diplomatic and political costs of any Chinese aggression against Taiwan; (ii) One of the clearer goals of multilateralism in the Asia Pacific is to co-opt China into a system of regional order which constrains Beijing's military options; (iii) Canada's security role in Asia Pacific may support the development of norms concerning the non-use of force, and of concrete measures of military transparency, preventive diplomacy and measures for pacific settlement of disputes; (iv) Canada may share ideas and proposals aimed at strengthening multilateralism and promoting war-avoidance in the Asia Pacific region. <18>

Taiwan has participated in most institutions of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan has taken part in PBEC and PECC activities and meetings, though these are unofficial in nature. Taiwan also joined APEC in 1991, together with the PRC and Hong Kong, under the name of "Chinese Taipei." APEC is the most important intergovernmental organization where Taiwan is accepted as a full member. In APEC, Taiwan can participate in, as an equal member, the negotiation process of economic cooperation in the region.

Though APEC is an economic organization, its importance for Taiwan has many layers. Taiwan's approach to APEC, therefore, can be viewed in three dimensions: economic cooperation, political significance, and international participation. concerning economic cooperation, first, Taiwan supports the APEC commitment to "open regionalism." Second, through APEC activities and membership, Taiwan may develop closer economic ties and relations with other APEC members, including the PRC. And third, as a member of APEC, which emphasizes its unique decision-making process and the diversity of members, Taiwan learns to cooperate with other like-minded countries.<19>

As far as regional security mechanisms are concerned, Taiwan for the time being cannot formally participate in multilateral security organizations in the region, such as ARF and CSCAP, due to the sovereignty problem. Instead, it can only send individual participants to CSCAP working group meetings. For the last several years, the China-Taiwan membership issue has dominated discussion at the steering committee of the CSCAP. Not until December 1996 was a formula agreed upon under which China entered as a full member and individual experts from Taiwan were invited to participate in working group meetings. However, in order to guarantee comprehensive cooperation on regional security issues, it is essential to include all members of the region in multilateral dialogue and in the resolution of major or critical regional security issues. The limited involvement and participation of Taiwan in the Asia-Pacific security dialogue process serves as a significant obstacle to fully-functional multilateral security cooperation in the region.

One example is the fact that several cases of territorial disputes in East Asia all involve Taiwan. Cross-Strait relations between Taipei and Beijing are one of most dangerous flashpoints in the region, especially since the Beijing government refuses to denounce the use and threat of force against Taiwan. Yet neither in the ARF nor the CSCAP have the security problems of the Taiwan Strait been seriously addressed and discussed. It is both unrealistic contrary to modern principles of international relations not to include Taiwan in discussions about security issues related to Taiwan.

It is widely accepted that the ultimate resolution of the “Taiwan issue” is up to the two governments across the Taiwan Strait. However, the process and outcome of any such resolution of the issue will affect all the other countries’ direct interests in the region. This gives them a legitimate reason to invite Taiwan to be involved in the process of multilateral security dialogue. Therefore, other countries in the region should at least conduct more meaningful bilateral and multilateral security dialogues, either first or second track, with Taiwan, so that Taiwan’s voice can be heard and other countries’ concerns can also be conveyed to Taiwan’s decision-makers.

Examination of Canada's multilateral diplomacy and international participation in the Asia Pacific region leads us to a preliminary theory of participation in international organizations, with which Taiwan’s participation in regional multilateral institutions might be evaluated. Participation in the activities of international organizations can be divided into four levels: applying, passive, active, and leading participation. The last three levels of participation may refer to the participation in a given issue area of an international organization, not necessarily the overall participation or performance in that organization.

According to this theory, “Applying participation” refers to the activities of countries applying for membership to participate in the activities of any given organization, regardless of whether those countries qualify for membership or not. Taiwan and some other newly independent countries may have to go through, or remain at, this stage before they can be a member of an organization.

“Passive participation” indicates that the level of involvement and participation in the organization is inactive. This might include the time period when a country is given observer status yet cannot participate fully in the activities of the organization. “Active participation” is the deep involvement and participation in the process and activities of a given organization. Indicators to distinguish passive and active participation include the involvement in activities, role in policy making, proposal, expression of opposite or different opinions, an attitude toward cooperation, and so on.

The final stage, “Leading participation,” denotes a country's leading role in the agenda setting, policy-making, or implementation of a given organization or issue of that organization. For example, Taiwan's aggressive pursuance of agricultural technical cooperation and Canada's strong initiative and commitment in many regional issues can be viewed as leading participation. Taiwan's participation in APEC is another important example. An analysis of the 174 Reports of Attending APEC Conference, from March 1992 to July 1997, reveals that Taiwan’s participation in issues such as agricultural technical cooperation, small and medium enterprises, and activities in the Economic Committee and the Working Group of Human Resources Development has indeed been active. Most of the reports describe the proceeding of the meeting, issues discussed in the meeting, and proposals and different opinions expressed by members. Taiwan’s participation in the above four issue areas demonstrates Taiwan’s efforts and ability to contribute to regional development in these areas and Taiwan’s determination to earn respect and status in the APEC grouping.

Asia-Pacific multilateral institutions are crucial for Taiwan for many obvious reasons, ranging from dialogue on economic and security cooperation, to confidence-building, political importance, and international participation. Canada's experiences provide important lessons for Taiwan in its quest toward integration into regional and international agenda and activities. Taiwan must now take it upon itself to move from the applying and passive phase of take it upon itself to move from the applying and passive phases of participation to a more active stance.

Endnotes

<1>John Ruggie, "The Anatomy of an Institution," in John Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), Chapter 1, p. 8.

<2>Ernst B. Haas, "Collective Conflict Management: Evidence for a New World Order," in Thomas G. Weiss (ed.), Collective Security in a Changing World (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 98.

<3>Frank Langdon, "Canada's Goal in the Asia Pacific," The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1995, pp. 383-300.

<4>Ibid.

<5>Yoichi Funabashi, Asia Pacific Fusion (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economies, 1995), p. 128.

<6>See James M. Lambert, "Institution-Building in the Pacific -- Canada in APEC," Pacific Affair, Vol. 70, No. 2, 1997, pp. 195-202. And Paul Evans, "The Emergence of Eastern Asia and its implications for Canada" International Journal, Vol. XLVII, No. 3 (Summer 1992), p. 520.

<7>Highlights of APEC 1997. See http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~apec.

<8>Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, "Being Heard and the Role of Leadership," Fen Osler Hampson and Maureen Appel Molot, eds., Canada Among Nations: Big Enough to be Heard (Canada: Carleton University Press, 1996), pp. 3-22.

<9>See Lawrence T. Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: Nongovernmental Organizations and International Relations (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), pp. 66-125

<10>See Amitav Acharya, "Canada's Engagement in Asia Pacific Security: Some Implications for Taiwan" International Conference on Taiwan-Canada Relations in the 1990s, November 14-15, 1997

<11>Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers, Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993), p. 152.

<12>For Canada's role in the CSCE process, see Cathal J. Nolan, "The Evolution of Cooperative Security: Canada and the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 1973-1994," March 1995 at http://www.iir.ubc.ca/nolan.htm.

<13>Amitav Acharya, "Canada's Engagement in Asia Pacific Security: Some Implications for Taiwan" op cit.

<14>See Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Inter-State Conflict," Foreign Policy, Fall, 1994.

<15>Amitav Acharya, "Canada's Engagement in Asia Pacific Security: Some Implications for Taiwan" op cit.

<16>Paul M. Evans, “Assessing the ARF and CSCAP,” paper presented at the Asia-Pacific Security Forum, September 1-3, 1997, Taipei, Taiwan.

<17>Ibid.

<18>Amitav Acharya, "Canada's Engagement in Asia Pacific Security: Some Implications for Taiwan" op cit.

<19>Philip Yang, " Taiwan's Approaches to APEC: Economic Cooperation, Political Significance, and International Participation," paper presented on the International Conference on Canada-Taiwan Relations in the 1990s, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, November 14, 1997.