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Assistant Professor

Department of Political Science

National Taiwan University

Paper presented at the Conference on "U.S. and Its Allies”

Tel Aviv, Israel, November 9-11, 1998

The Taiwan Strait relationship is one of East Asia’s flashpoints. Due to the complexity and sensitivity of the issue, resolution of the problem will not only affect the governments involved, China (the People’s Republic of China, PRC) and Taiwan (officially, the Republic of China, ROC), it will also have a great impact on regional and global economics and security. Currently, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan and refuses to renounce its threat to use military force against Taiwan to reunite it with the mainland under PRC control. For its part, Taiwan insists that in reality there are two parts of China, each under the jurisdiction of a separate political entity. Taipei advocates peaceful national reunification at some time in the future under a democratic political system.

This paper will examine the developments of U.S. policy toward Taiwan security. We will first address the U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward Taiwan security, established by the Shanghai Communique and the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). This will be followed with the discussion of the developments of security-related developments in recent years and the influence of the TRA in these cases. The discussion will then turn to the new "three noes" policy announced by President Clinton when he visited China this June. The final part of this chapter will focus on the most recent new developments in terms of the change and continuity of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Taiwan security.

The United States’ policy toward Taiwan can be described as “strategic ambiguity,” which means the U.S. has not committed itself to any particular solution to Taiwan's security dilemma or policy goals regarding Taiwan's security and future. This policy cannot succeed without the ambiguous and flexible nature of U.S. policy toward Taiwan constructed by the TRA and the Shanghai Communiqués. Understandably, the U.S. can neither encourage Taiwan to pursue independence nor allow China to pursue reunification by any means. Either of these alternatives would very likely result in immediate regional instability, whereas an ambiguous and flexible stance on the part of the U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan helps to maintain the status quo. Therefore, its policy of maintaining current peace and stability can also be called the “status quo policy.”

The strategic ambiguity framework set up by the Shanghai Communiqué and the TRA, known as “strategic ambiguity,” contains two major parts regarding U.S. policy toward Taiwan: Taiwan’s future and Taiwan’s security. Regarding the future of Taiwan, the policy “acknowledges” Beijing's position on Taiwan’s status, but does not necessarily “accept” it. The U.S. understands that the issue has to be settled by Taipei and Beijing and the U.S. will not intervene or mediate the cross-strait issue. The U.S. only insists that the question should be resolved by peaceful means because any instability or military confrontation in the Taiwan Strait would affect the peace and security of East Asia and thereby affect U.S. interests in the region.

The second and major part of the policy of strategic ambiguity involves the security of Taiwan. The TRA only makes it clear that the stability and security of Taiwan are of grave concern of the United States and that the U.S. will provide defensive weapons for Taiwan to defend itself from any possible military threat or invasion. The U.S. position on defending Taiwan is not clearly stated, the TRA only provides an option for Washington to defend Taiwan. The unspecified action that would be taken by the United States if Taiwan were attacked by the PRC is a strategic design to deter the possibility of a real military conflict happening in the Taiwan Strait.

The bedrock of U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan has always been the Shanghai Communiqué, issued in 1972. In this document the U.S. declared that it “acknowledges that all Chinese on either part of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.” The language in the Shanghai Communiqué was carefully ambiguous.

There are three major elements, however, in the Shanghai Communiqué that constitute the basic principles of U.S. policy toward the PRC and Taiwan: first, one China policy; second, peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question; and third, cross-strait problem should be solved by the Chinese themselves. These three principles are the cornerstones of U.S. policy toward the cross-strait issue and Taiwan question. With respect to the “one China” policy, in the Shanghai Communiqué the U.S. declared that it “acknowledges that all Chinese on either part of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.” The term “acknowledge” was carefully chosen to maintain ambiguity, for example, in not dealing with the possibility that what the U.S. acknowledged might someday no longer be true.

While the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972 serves as the foundation for American policy regarding Taiwan's security, since 1979 that policy has also governed by the Taiwan Relations Act. In the Act, the United States promises to retain its unofficial, though robust, relationship with the people of Taiwan. In addition, there are three other major principle components of the Act. First, the peace and security of Taiwan is declared to be of grave concern to the United States. Second, the United States remains committed to sell whatever defensive means are necessary for guaranteeing the security of the people of Taiwan. Third, the future of Taiwan is to be determined by peaceful means.

First, regarding security concerns and policy, Section 2(b)(4) of the TRA states that it is the policy of the United States “to consider any attempt to resolve the Taiwan issue by other than peaceful means, including boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” In the case of “any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan” or “any danger to the interests of the United States,” according to the Sec 3(c) of the TRA, the United States shall determine “appropriate action” in response to any such danger.

Second, regarding the issue of arms sales and transfers, Section 3 (a) of the TRA promises that the United States will “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Furthermore, if Taiwan is threatened, Section 3(c) of the TRA states:

It is clear that the TRA mandates the United States to provide Taiwan with such weapons as may be necessary for it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. And the nature and quantity of such defensive weapons should be decided by a judgment of Taiwan’s needs for maintaining its peace and security.

Third, regarding the future of Taiwan, the TRA adopted the “peaceful resolution” model in response to the PRC’s persistent refusals to rule out the use of military force to attack Taiwan. Section 2(b)(3) of the TRA states that it is the policy of the United States “to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means.” This “expectation,” in fact, very consistently appears in all the three joint communiqués between the PRC and the U.S. For instance, the 1972 Shanghai communiqué, the United States stated that it “reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question.” In the 1979 U.S.-PRC normalization communiqué, the U.S. stated that it “continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue.” And, in the August 17, 1982 joint communiqué, the United States declared that it “understands and appreciates the Chinese policy of striving for a peaceful resolution for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question.”

Even though peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue is the policy expectation of the United States, however, the U.S. emphasizes that the cross-strait question should be resolved by Taipei and Beijing. The policy that the Taiwan issue should be resolved by Chinese themselves is also stressed in each of the three communiqués. <1> The United States therefore will not be a mediator in negotiating or resolving the any issues related to the cross-strait debate. The policy of non-involvement in the cross-strait question has been emphasized and observed by every U.S. administration. The United States has scrupulously avoided stating any favored direction except that it has to be peaceful means for ultimately resolving the future of Taiwan. In fact, one U.S. high official testifying before the Congress about the future of Taiwan stated that U.S. policy toward the Taiwan issue is based on two fundamental principles: “one, the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese themselves to decide and, two, the United States has an interest in having that resolution be peaceful.” <2>

As mentioned before, the Shanghai Communiqué is the basis for the US’s “one China” policy, while the TRA provides guiding principles for U.S. policy on Taiwan security. Achieving a balanced policy that is consistent with the one China policy and which can also maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is difficult. Furthermore, with Taiwan’s democratic development and growing desire for a higher international profile, managing the one China policy without risking Taiwan’s security and dignity requires greater political wisdom than ever. The Taiwan Relations Act provides the United States and Taiwan with a strategy of deterrence. By legalizing this security commitment as domestic law, the TRA gives the U.S. an option to defend Taiwan that deters any possible threat or invasion of the island. The TRA also helps to bolster Taiwan’s self-defense military capability, which serves to further deter PRC aggression.

It is important to note that the TRA is not a mutual defense treaty, such as the security treaty between Japan and the U.S. Therefore, the TRA is not a true guarantee for Taiwan’s security. It only provides an option for the United States to defend Taiwan, which the U.S. does not necessarily have to exercise. <3> The United States’ military response to a PRC threat or use of force against Taiwan might vary from military intervention, the provision of arms, or just a military gesture such as dispatching some warships—in other words, any response which might help to preserve its interests in the region. The TRA is a domestic law that provides legal basis for this kind of military or non-military action.

During the missile test crisis, the Clinton administration adhered to the policy of strategic ambiguity regarding the defense of Taiwan. U.S. officials all cited the TRA as the basis of the US’s commitment to Taiwan security, but refused to comment on specific actions the United States would take. This is the policy of “strategic ambiguity”—a deliberate ambiguity about a possible response to military conflict between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait.

Former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker endorsed the Clinton administration’s policy of strategic ambiguity on Taiwan. He said, “should we say we will or will not defend Taiwan unequivocally? No. Is the policy of strategic ambiguity the right policy? Yes.” He explained that, “If we said we would come to the defense of Taiwan under any and all circumstances, she would declare independence and China would move—no doubt about that in my mind. If we said we wouldn’t, China would move. And so we shouldn’t say under what circumstances and to what extent we will aid Taiwan, but we should make it clear that we would view with the gravest concern any resort to the use of force.” <4> Even after President Clinton announced his "three noes" policy during his visit to China in 1998, Baker published an article, “Blueprint for a China Policy,” in the Washington Post commenting on Clinton’s visit to China. In the article, Baker supported the policy of strategic ambiguity regarding Taiwan’s security by considering “unspecified actions in the event of an attack by China on Taiwan, all as called for in the Taiwan Relations Act.” <5>

The rationale behind the policy of strategic ambiguity can be best understood from Joseph Nye’s speech in December 1995, during the missile crisis. According to Nye, “We pointed out equally that we are committed to peaceful resolution and the avoidance of the use of force. And when the question came about what would we do, one of the things that I said, which I will say today—it's no surprise—is: Nobody knows. If you go back to 1950 and you look at what the American government said, which is that Korea is outside our defense perimeter, and then realize that six months later, we were at war to defend South Korea, it shows that you cannot know the answer to these things. Therefore, actions which escalate in the Taiwan Straits, are actions which pose an enormous risk of some larger thing, of which we don’t know the answer.” <6>

Under the broad strategic framework, peace and security in the Taiwan Strait has been preserved over the past 25 years and Taiwan has been able to maintain a significant military deterrent against military attack from the PRC. However, critics of this policy warn that miscalculation and mistrust are the inherent danger of this approach. For instance, Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew warned that the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan could lead to disaster if China or Taiwan misread the U.S. position. <7>

Some cases and crises with an important influence on U.S.-Taiwan, U.S.-China and cross-strait relations have occurred since 1979, when the United States withdrew diplomatic recognition of the ROC on Taiwan and the U.S. Congress passed, and President Carter signed, the Taiwan Relations Act. These developments also can be viewed as tests of United States commitment to the security and arms transfer provisions of the TRA.

According the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. security policy in the Western Pacific is to maintain the order of peace and security, in which a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue constitutes an important premise of the policy. A policy of continuing arms sales to Taiwan, therefore, becomes an indispensable means for the U.S. to maintain Taiwan’s security, especially in the face of Beijing’s refusal to renounce the use of force to solve the cross-strait issue.

From the perspective of the PRC, however, the TRA, and arms sales to Taiwan in particular, violates Chinese sovereignty, for the PRC regards the so-called “Taiwan question” as China’s internal affair. According to Beijing, the TRA violates the terms of the Shanghai Communiqué and the Recognition Communiqué, both of which the PRC regards as having the force of treaties under the terms of 1969 Vienna Convention on Treaties. <8> Therefore, the PRC regards the TRA as a source of problems in Sino-U.S. relations and sought to change the act. <9> Between 1981 and 1982, the decision made by the Reagan administration to sell arms to Taiwan provoked a strong reaction from the Beijing government which reacted strongly to the arms sales issue. The issue then became even more seriously threatening to relations between the United States and the PRC. Later the issue was resolved when the two countries signed a joint communiqué on August 17, 1982, which was known as the August 17 Communiqué or 1982 Communiqué. <10> In the communique, U.S. intentions regarding arms sales are stated in paragraph six:

Even though in the 1982 communiqué, the US promised to reduce gradually the amount of arms sales sold to Taiwan “leading over a period of time to a final resolution.” It never specified the exact meaning of the term's "final resolution." The U.S. instead expressed appreciation for the PRC’s “peaceful resolution” policy for solving the cross-strait issue, in return, and in return agreed that arms sales to Taiwan would not exceed past levels in either quantitative or qualitative terms.

There is some controversy over the wording of and relationship between the TRA and the 1982 Joint Communiqué. In the TRA, the U.S. is to continue to sell Taiwan the weapons required to defend itself, and will do so solely on the basis of Taiwan’s need. The wording of the 1982 Joint Communiqué, however, was contrary to the spirit and wording of the Taiwan Relations Act. It mandated a gradual reduction of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, regardless of Taiwan’s military capability to maintain a sufficient self-defense or the threat of PRC military development. Therefore, a strict implementation of the principles in the communiqué could come into conflict with the arms sales and transfer provisions of the TRA.

However, these principles in the communiqué were broadly drawn and have been subject to serious debates as to their precise meaning. Furthermore, legally speaking, the communiqué is not an international treaty and thus imposes no legal obligations on either party under international law. It is a policy statement by the President, however, indicating a policy that the administration intends to pursue.

In order to assure to Taiwan and the Congress that the implementation of the Communiqué would not affect Taiwan security, the Reagan administration made a formal declaration of the Six Assurances, to Taiwan. They were:

1. The US has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to the ROC.
2. The US has not agreed to hold prior consultation with the Chinese Communists on arms sales to the ROC.
3. The US will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing.
4. The US has not agreed to revise the TRA.
5. The US has not altered its position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan.
6. The US will not exert pressure on the ROC to enter into negotiations with the PRC. <11>

The Six Assurances did not allay the fears of those concerned that the quantitative and qualitative restrictions of the 1982 Communiqué might create a limitation on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. But succeeding U.S. administrations have supported these assurances and the spirit of the TRA by providing Taiwan with self-defense weapons. Though there are contradictions between the TRA and the 1982 Communiqué, maintaining proper quality and quantity of arms sales to Taiwan is critical for preserving peace and stability of Taiwan and for securing American interests in the Western Pacific, so the U.S. has continued to sell weapons of a defensive nature to Taiwan. Arms sales to Taiwan have included F-16 fighter planes, helicopters, early warning reconnaissance planes, and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. Most recently, the Clinton administration agreed to sell several Knox-class frigates, along with rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.

In January 1993 the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a “white paper” about Taiwan’s foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. In the document, three directions for enhancing Taiwan-U.S. ties: asking the U.S. to increase arms sales to Taiwan, strengthening economic ties between the two countries, and promoting mutual visits of high-level officials. <12> With regard to arms sales, the white paper stated that “[t]he ROC has to maintain a steady supply of arms, military materials, military technologies and spare parts necessary to preserve its security.” <13>

The document also provides explanation of the decision made by President Bush to sell 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan. It is because of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, “together with concerns over a shifting balance of military power across the Taiwan Strait, led former President George Bush to announce on Sep. 2, 1992, that the United States would sell 150 F-16 A/B fighter planes to the ROC.” <14> The paper also noted that Taiwan’s resolve to purchase U.S. arms has been encouraged by President Bill Clinton, who expressed his support for the F-16 sale while he was still running for president.

In a letter sending from some U.S. Congressmen to President Bush to urge the administration to sell F-16 to Taiwan noted that: <15>

As for the PRC’s view on the TRA and arms sales to Taiwan, Beijing regards the TRA as interference in China’s internal affairs. In a 1993 document called “The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China,” PRC government noted that “[I]nvoking this legislation [Taiwan Relations Act], the U.S. Government has continued its arms sales to Taiwan, interfering in China’s internal affairs, and obstructing Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland.” <16> Beijing criticized the U.S. for contravening the August 17, 1982 Joint Communiqué in which the PRC thought that the United States promised to end its arms sales. “The Taiwan Question” white paper noted, however, that “in the past dozen or more years the U.S. Government has not only failed to implement the communiqué in earnest, it has repeatedly contravened it. In September 1992 the U.S. Government even decided to sell 150 F-16 high-performance fighter aircraft to Taiwan. This action of the U.S. Government has placed an additional stumbling block in the way of the development of Sino-U.S. relations and settlement of the Taiwan question.” <17> After the sale of F-16s to Taiwan, the PRC reiterated its view that the U.S. government is blocking the national reunification of China. The arms sales to Taiwan from the U.S. encourage the authorities in Taiwan to reject the PRC’s reunification overtures. <18>

After President Lee Teng-hui made a private visit to the United States, in June 1995, Beijing called off the ongoing cross-strait talks and adopted an offensive strategy combining campaigns of invective in the media with intimidating military threats toward Taiwan. The PRC government launched two sets of highly publicized missile tests close to the northern coast of Taiwan during July and August of 1995. In March of 1996, while Taiwan was holding its first-ever direct presidential election, Beijing conducted a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, including a missile test with a target area just thirty to forty miles away from Keelung and Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s two largest ports. When cross-strait tensions mounted in March 1996, the United States dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups, the USS Independence and Nimitz, to patrol international waters outside Taiwan to “monitor” Beijing’s missile tests. Clinton’s national security advisor also warned that any military attack on Taiwan would lead to “grave consequences.” <19>

The decision to send the two carrier groups to the region came primarily because the TRA provides the United States with a possibility of military involvement or intervention when Taiwan security is seriously threatened. As cross-strait relations deteriorated in early 1996, U.S. authorities drew parallels between U.S. action in Korea in 1950 and in Taiwan in 1996. The first U.S. comment was made by State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns. He stated that, according to the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States had committed itself to Taiwan’s security and would consider any effort to determine Taiwan’s future by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States. He reminded the government in Beijing of the longstanding U.S. stance that the differences between Taipei and Beijing must be solved peacefully. <20>

US Senator Paul Simon suggested on February 6 that the United States should use air power to defend Taiwan if it were attacked by the PRC. However, Secretary of Defense William Perry kept to the policy of strategic ambiguity, saying that he could not be more specific than the commitment spelled out in the TRA. <21> Winston Lord, testifying before the Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also stressed that “having examined all of the available evidence, we cannot conclude that there is an imminent military threat to Taiwan.” He then cited U.S. security commitments to Taiwan under the TRA, but refrained from saying what specific actions the United States would take should Beijing attack Taiwan. <22>

The U.S. response in the 1996 crisis in the Taiwan Strait was probably the clearest demonstration of Washington’s commitment to the TRA. The dispatch of the U.S. carriers to the waters of Taiwan, however, did not mean an unconditional U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security. Glyn Davis, the State Department spokesman, when asked to comment on Chinese remarks that the U.S. actions were “playing with fire,” stated that “Our interest is simply underscoring that we’re a Pacific power and that we have an interest in a peaceful resolution of the dispute between Taiwan and China. Our intent, certainly, is not to play with fire.”

It is important to underline the fact that the TRA does not guarantee U.S. military intervention if Taiwan is attacked by the PRC, it only provides for the option of the United States defending Taiwan. During the missile test crisis, however, U.S. officials all cited the TRA as the basis for the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, yet refused to comment on specific actions the United States would take. This is the policy of “strategic ambiguity,” a deliberate posture of ambiguity over any possible response to a military conflict between China and Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait. Dispatching the Nimitz and Independence to the Taiwan Strait, therefore, did not necessary mean that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan security had shifted from a position of “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity.” <23> As Joseph Nye pointed out “the Americans do not want to give Taiwan a 100 percent guarantee that no matter what Taiwan does, the Americans will come to their defense, because that would encourage Taiwan to take actions that would be risky.” <24>

Before Bill Clinton became president, U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait issue emphasized peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question but did not offer any preference for how the question should be solved. Together with the insistence on peaceful resolution, the U.S. also maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity regarding the defense of Taiwan and the acknowledgment of a One-China policy. In the first half of his first term, President Clinton’s policy toward Taiwan remained unchanged. During his campaign for president, Clinton agreed with President Bush’s decision to sell F-16s to Taiwan and promised to implement the policy if elected. Clinton also proclaimed that he would support the U.S. commitment to help Taiwan defend itself under the TRA. In 1994, the Clinton administration released its Taiwan strategy and policy, called the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, in which the Clinton Administration allowed top-level officials enter the U.S. for transit purpose.

After 1994, however, series of events took place among U.S., China, and Taiwan altered the ambiguous nature of the previous Taiwan policy. These major events and changes finally led to the Missile Crisis of March 1996 and the “Three Noes” pronouncement of July 1998. First, Taiwan’s bid to reenter the United Nations and its pursuit of a higher international profile, and the U.S. reaction to and sympathy for Taiwan’s initiatives raised Beijing’s suspicions about whether Taiwan was really working to achieve a “one China, one Taiwan” or “two Chinas” arrangement. Second, strong congressional support for a private visit by President Lee to the United States led the Clinton administration to grant Lee a visa. President Lee then visited Cornell University between 7-12 June 1995. Third, while tensions were high between the PRC and Taiwan, Taiwan held its first Presidential election on March 23, 1996, which President Lee won. And last but not the least, the United States adopted a policy of constructive engagement with the PRC, hoping to persuade the government in Beijing to follow the rules of the international order. President Clinton therefore met with President Jiang in New York during the 50^th anniversary of the United Nations to patch up relations. The combination of these developments triggered some major changes in relations between the U.S., China, and Taiwan.

The changes started in 1995. To further engage its relations with the PRC and to avoid possible involvement in the military confrontation with the PRC due to the tension over the cross-strait issue, the Clinton administration decided to abandon the policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan. The new approach was constructed by some "China experts" in the Clinton administration, who focus on enhancing "strategic partnership" with the PRC as the core of the U.S. East Asia policy. In order to consolidate the constructive strategic relationship, therefore, in October 1997 and June 1998, President Jiang Zemin and President Clinton each undertook reciprocal state visits.

On June 9, 1995, Christine Shelly, the State Department Spokeswoman, first stated in the daily briefing that: “We do not have any intention whatsoever of pursuing what some have called a ‘two-Chinas’ or a ‘one-China/one-Taiwan’ policy. Quite to the contrary, it is our unshakable intention to conduct official ties with China and unofficial ties with the people of Taiwan according to the consistent policy we have followed since U.S.-China normalization of relations in 1979.”

This viewpoint was reaffirmed by Kent Wiedemann, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, while testifying before the House International Relations Committee in August, 1995, on why the U.S. should not support Taiwan’s return to the United Nations. Reflecting the Clinton administration’s Taiwan policy, he said: <25>

The U.S. government wanted to send a clear message to Taiwan that U.S. commitment to Taiwan security has to be within the boundary of the One China policy. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, stated this in his speech, “American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship,” to the Asia Society, the Council on Foreign Relations and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations on May 17, 1996: “To the leadership in Taiwan, we have reiterated our commitment to robust unofficial relations, including helping Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. We have stressed that Taiwan has prospered under the One China policy. And we have made clear our view that as Taiwan seeks an international role, it should pursue that objective in a way that is consistent with One China policy.”

Before President Clinton went to visit China, Deputy Assistant Secretary Susan Shirk of the State Department testified before the House International Relations Committee that “over the course of the past year, the United States has made significant progress in many aspects of its relationship with the PRC…. We have made significant, if uneven, progress with the PRC on (several) fronts, and we are optimistic that in the run-up to the summit we will continue to build on that progress.… The progress has not and will not be achieved at Taiwan’s expense.” <26>

With respect to Taiwan’s peace and security, Shirk added the assurance that “this Administration remains firmly committed to fulfilling the security and arms transfer provisions of the Taiwan Relations Act.” She also emphasized that arms transfers serve one of the key objectives of the United States in the region: to maintain and enhance peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Therefore, according to Shirk, U.S. commitment to the TRA, both the security provisions and arms sales provisions of the TRA, remains the same, because the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait serves U.S. interests in the Western Pacific region. Shirk first pointed out that “the future of Taiwan is a matter for the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to resolve themselves. No Administrations has taken a position on how or when they should do so.” This is clearly a reiteration of the strategic ambiguity policy supported by the past five Republican and Democratic Administrations.

However, Shirk then declared the new position of the Clinton Administration on Taiwan’s future: “[T]he United States has an abiding interest and concern that any resolution be peaceful. We will continue to pursue a ‘one China’ policy. Consistent with this policy, we do not support ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan,’ Taiwan independence, or Taiwan’s membership in the UN.” <27> This was the first version of the “three noes” policy, only the third “no” was about Taiwan’s bid for the United Nations, not President Clinton’s expended version that Taiwan should not be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.

Following this, in his first state visit to China in June 1998, President Clinton spelled out in detail for the first time in public the official U.S. policy toward Taiwan. In Shanghai before a round-table discussion, President Clinton said that “we don’t support independence for Taiwan; or two Chinas; or one Taiwan, one China. And we don’t believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement.”

It is clear now that the Clinton administration's policy toward Taiwan is different from the policy strategic ambiguity. The new policy toward Taiwan can be addressed as an “engaging-China” approach or “accommodationist” approach, <28> for the proponents of this approach emphasize that engaging China accords with the long-term interests of the US in the region and that it is better to accommodate Beijing’s wishes over the Taiwan question. This approach asserts that minimizing the impact of the Taiwan question is crucial for a constructive relationship with China.

The engaging-China/accommodationist approach is currently supported by most US “China experts” who regard Taiwan as a “troublemaker” in the Sino-U.S. relationship. The objective of this approach it to create a favorable atmosphere for moving ahead on problems that have troubled the U.S.-China relationship and to persuade China to be a friendly and cooperative rising power in the international arena. This approach is epitomized by Joseph Nye’s proposal, published in a March 1998 article in the Washington Post, which argued that the United States should abandon the “calculatingly ambiguous” policy of the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué and the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act. <29>

Nye’s paper proposed a three-part policy bargain. First, the United States should make a clear policy statement that “if Taiwan were to declare independence, we would not recognize or defend it. Moreover, we would work hard to discourage other countries from recognizing Taiwan independence.” Meanwhile, the United States should also stress that “we would not accept the use of force [by the PRC], since nothing would change as a result of any abortive declaration of independence by Taiwan.” Second, Taiwan has to reject the idea of declaring de jure independence, and the Beijing government also has to make a clear statement that it agrees “not to oppose the idea of more international living space for Taiwan.” Nye also advised Beijing that it might broaden the “one country, two systems” approach to Hong Kong's reunification to “one country, three systems,” so that Taiwan can enjoy its own political, economic, and social systems under a reunified China framework. Third, the last part of Nye’s proposal would require Taiwan “to explicitly express its decision on forswear any steps toward independence” and to intensify talks with Beijing for the ultimate purpose of reunification.

Nye’s proposal was not received warmly in either the United States or Taiwan. It attempts to minimize the danger of possible miscalculation of the strategic ambiguity policy by encouraging the United States and Taiwan to publicly eliminate the possibility of Taiwan independence. But the proposal does not demand that Beijing reciprocate by renouncing the use of military force against Taiwan. It also predetermines that Taiwan’s future status will be an eventual unification with the PRC. As Carpenter points out: “Nye and other accommodationists seem to regard a democratic Taiwan as an inconvenient obstacle to a grand bargain involving the present leaders in Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.” <30>

Another example a proposal was raised by a University of Michigan professor, Kenneth Lieberthal, currently the Special Assistant to the President for Asian Affairs and the Senior Director for Asian Affairs of the National Security Council. In his paper presented in Taipei in February 1998, Lieberthal proposed seven basic elements of a solution for the differences between China and Taiwan: <31>

Lieberthal’s proposal has more plausible for several reasons. A five-decade interim period of truce could minimize any instability in cross-strait relations, freeing the United States from having to play a major role in preventing Taiwan from military attack. However, feasibility is a major problem with the proposal. It is highly uncertain, for instance, whether the PRC would agree with a fifty-year non-unification period of truce and whether Taipei would agree to a statement or constitutional revision promising not to claim de jure independence.

It is true that US relations with the PRC and Taiwan are not zero-sum game, however, the announcement of the three noes policy does mean a new stage of U.S. policy toward Taiwan. The major reason behind the new policy is, in fact, a change in perceived U.S. interests regarding Taiwan. All the security, economic, and political interests have changed over the past few decades. And the triangular Washington-Beijing-Taipei relationship has also changed drastically.

In the 1950s and 1960s, U.S. interest in Taiwan was mainly a security one: a forward base for the containment of PRC-Soviet communism. In the 1970s, when the PRC and Soviet Union split, dynamic relations between Washington, Beijing, and Taipei deeply affected the U.S. security interests in Taiwan. In fact, during the period, Washington viewed the PRC “more as a strategic asset against the USSR than an adversary to be confronted in the Taiwan Strait.” <33> The idea of “strategic asset” led to the recognition of the PRC in 1979 and termination of defense and other official relations with Taiwan. Since then, the U.S. interests in Taiwan were mainly trade, economic, and unofficial relations. Through the Taiwan Relations Act, Washington also admitted its security interests in Taiwan, but its true focus is the peace and stability in the Western Pacific area.

Beginning in the early 1990s, the world gradually began to see China, with the world’s largest standing army and incessant military modernization program, as a potential future power in the Asia-Pacific region. For almost all U.S. foreign policy domains, the PRC continues to be a challenge. China will, for good or bad, play a very large role in shaping the 21st century. A clear policy direction and strategic plan, therefore, have emerged from the Clinton administration’s China policy since 1994, namely the “engagement and enlargement” policy, or simply “engagement policy.” The primary argument is this: Since China is an unstable non-status quo power, and the regime in Beijing is growing stronger by the day, if the United States can expand its engagement and provide enough incentives to China, the most likely possibility is that China will eventually take its place in the regional and international community as a satisfied status quo power. Thus engagement is nothing more than a method or process, the final goal of which is to promote China’s adherence to existing international norms and participation in the system of international organizations, and to allow China to play the role it should in the international system. <34>

“Engagement” has already become the magic word of U.S.-China bilateral relations, and is currently dictating the direction and content of development of relations between the two countries. During Jiang Zemin's visit to the U.S., the two governments came to an understanding that they should develop further security cooperation or even a "strategic cooperation" to address regional security issues jointly. <35> Accordingly, U.S. policymakers and realist scholars worry that the deteriorating cross-strait relations between Beijing and Taipei over the past several years and the growing drive for independence in Taiwan may have negative impact on the implementation of the engagement policy and have the potential to lead to military confrontation between Beijing and Washington.

It is in this context that the United States would like to formulate a new policy toward the Taiwan Strait issue -- to minimize the possibility of a military conflict between Beijing and Taipei caused by the miscalculation of the U.S. position on the Taiwan issue. Also, under the diplomatic pressure from Beijing and the lesson learned from the March 1996 missile crisis, the Clinton administration regards the Taiwan issue is an sensitive issue which might hamper the perceived progress in Sino-US engagement and cooperation. Meanwhile, the democratic development in Taiwan is witnessing a possible change of government by a pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. The United States, in order to maintain its core interests in the peace and stability of East Asia and its policy of engaging a rising China, changed its policy toward Taiwan from the ambiguous position on Taiwan’s future and security to the “three noes” on Taiwan’s future and international profile.

As a key player in the development of cross-strait relations, the U.S. wants to see some substantive and constructive dialogue and cooperation between the two government across the Taiwan Strait. However, what Clinton said in Shanghai about the "three noes" policy is in no way similar to the careful language Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger crafted in the Shanghai communique in 1972.

The three noes policy was made to secure and enhance U.S. interests in Taiwan and East Asia region. Though emphasizing that its Taiwan policy remains unchanged, President Clinton’s pronouncement of the “three noes” made several changes in some important directions.

The first was a shift from “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity.” The “three noes” policy represents a subtle but significant change in Washington’s policy toward Taiwan. The United States abandons the policy of strategic ambiguity, established in the Shanghai Communiqué in which the United States “acknowledged” the China’s assertion with regard to Taiwan, and then publicly expresses American objection to the possibility of Taiwan independence or even Taiwan’s participation in intergovernmental international organizations. In other words, the Clinton administration “accepts” <36> Beijing’s claim that “there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China.” Therefore, the U.S. has changed its policy from acknowledging Beijing’s position of one China policy to accepting its claim. The “three noes” is the public statement of acceptance, by an American President on Chinese soil, of Beijing’s position regarding the status of Taiwan. The Clinton administration now sides with Beijing’s claim even without demanding that China renounce the use of force in seeking reunification with Taiwan.

The second transition is from "non-mediator" to "invisible hand." The U.S. long-standing position on the cross-strait issue is a peaceful resolution agreed by both sides of the Taiwan Strait and non-intervention in the process of negotiations of the cross-strait disputes. Washington makes it clear that it "will not seek to support to mediate the cross-strait dispute nor pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiation." <37> By announcing the three nose policy in China, however, President Clinton was intervening in the cross-strait issue in a way that no previous president and administration had done before. After the missile crisis in 1996, the U.S. has quietly persuaded Taiwan to enter into negotiations with Beijing to ease tensions between the two political rivalries. Washington sent the message to Taipei through some former high officials' visit to Taiwan to push to talks. This kind of "second channels" is no secret. For instance, former U.S. defense secretary William Perry, former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and former joint chiefs of staff chairman John Shalikashvili visited Taipei and likely advised Taipei government to have more contact with China. <38>

The third shift is from "liberal democracy" to "hard-core realist." According to wording and meaning of the “three noes” policy, the United States now considers Taiwan independence an illegitimate option for Taiwan’s future. This is a far cry from previous U.S. position on Taiwan’s future that it only “acknowledges” that both China and Taiwan uphold the idea of “one China.” Though the official position of the Taipei government is against Taiwan independence and looks for eventual reunification of “one China” in the future under a democratic political system, the United States has no right to make any assertion regarding the domestic affairs of a prosperous democracy. If the Clinton administration’s true intention is to avoid any military conflict resulting from a declaration of Taiwan independence that would drag the US into a war with the PRC, it would be sufficient for U.S. officials to warn Taiwan not to expect U.S. support for a unilateral declaration of independence. The “three noes” policy rules out the possibility of peacefully getting independence or any other option for Taiwan. Furthermore, through the announcement of the three noes policy, the Clinton Administration "risks polarizing Taiwan domestic politics and provoking the kind of public debate and international activity in Taiwan." <39> These changes in US policy towards Taiwan and cross-strait question will a reflection of realist consideration of the US interests. Democracy and human rights are of minor concerns.

The fourth transition is from "de facto ally" to "troublemaker." The three noes policy has weakened Taiwan’s bargaining power with the PRC over cross-strait affairs. China’s main card for pressuring Taiwan to engage political talks has been its threat of using military force. Taiwan has tried to obtain an equal footing in any cross-strait negotiations by increasing its participation in international activities and membership in international organizations. The Clinton Administration’s new policy has closed the door to Taiwan’s participation and involvement in the international community, thereby weakening Taiwan’s bargaining power with China. The TRA creates a framework that allows Taiwan to be a de facto security ally of the U.S. to deter any military threat or action taken by the Beijing government. The three noes pronouncement invalidates this framework, if not completely rejects it, and punishes Taiwan for being a "troublemaker" that is putting regional security at risk.

The fifth shift is from “peaceful resolution” to “peaceful reunification.” The TRA states that the future of Taiwan should be determined by peaceful resolution and the three communiqués between the United States and the PRC emphasize the peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. None of them say that Taiwan and the PRC will be reunited by peaceful means. According to these documents, the ultimate fate of Taiwan should be something for Taiwan and China to work out, through peaceful means. These documents wisely reflect the current complex situation between Taiwan and the PRC, and deliberately leave room for ambiguity and flexibility. Therefore, by addressing the three noes, Clinton has altered the essence and meaning of the TRA and three communiqués.

In response to President Clinton's remark that the US does not support Taiwan joining international organizations in which statehood is a requirement, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution stating that it should be United States policy to “(1) support changes to the International Monetary Fund Charter that would allow the Republic of China on Taiwan and other qualified economies to become members of the International Monetary Fund; and (2) support the admission of Taiwan to membership in other international economic organizations for which it is qualified, including the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.” <40>

At the same time, the Congress also adopted another resolution, titled “Affirming United States commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act,” regarding the TRA that offered support of Taiwan, in which the Congress: <41>

1. affairs its longstanding commitment to Taiwan and the people of Taiwan in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act (Public Law 96-8);
2. affirms its expectation, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means, and considers any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States;
3. affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, to make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability;
4. affirms its commitment, consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, that only the President and Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of defense articles and services for Taiwan based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan; and
5. urges the President of the United States to seek a public renunciation by the People's Republic of China of any use of force, or threat of use force, against democratic Taiwan.

In the effort to ensure that the U.S. policy toward Taiwan remains unchanged, President Clinton, in his August 18 letter addressed to Senator Robert Torricelli, stated: “My administration was pleased to support the Senate resolution passed earlier this month reaffirming our commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act and calling on the PRC to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. I will continue to develop our strong unofficial relations with Taiwan and to assure Taiwan is provided the defensive weapons necessary for it to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” <42>

Besides condemnation from the Congress, President Clinton’s “three noes” pronouncement also drew criticism from sources as politically diverse as the Wall Street Journal and Washington Post. The Post pointed out that President Clinton’s new policy had significantly reduced Taiwan’s bargaining power in the cross-strait negotiations and questioned the propriety of the United States’ ruling out “independence or any other option the Taiwanese people might choose.” <43> The Wall Street Journal stated that Jiang “got his number one priority: Mr. Clinton carving the next slice of salami toward the Chinese goal of getting the U.S. to coerce Taiwan to join China, or alternatively, to stand aside while China invades.” <44>

As to the issue of Taiwanese membership in international organizations, the Journal noted that it is “especially ridiculous” because Taiwan is “already excluded from presumably serious organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, though it is among the world’s top 20 economics and holds enormous monetary reserves.” The Journal then commented that “the world’s remaining superpower should be acting to curb the ongoing farce, not entrench it.” <45> Therefore, by make the “three noes” pronouncement during his landmark visit in China , the Clinton administration is “committing itself to help isolate Taiwan politically and diplomatically.” <46>

The security and arms sales provisions of the TRA remain unchanged as the guiding principles for the U.S. commitment on the peace and security of the Taiwan Strait. Richard Bush, Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, said at a conference on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The First 20 Years” after Clinton’s visit to China, that the TRA still enumerates the US position on security issues:

• that the United States expects the future of Taiwan to be determined by peaceful means;
• that hostile action by the PRC against Taiwan would be regarded as a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific and a matter of grave concern to the United States;
• that the United States should maintain the capacity to resist such hostile action;
• that the President and the Congress would consult and take appropriate action in response to any threat to Taiwan's security and danger to U.S. interests; and
• that the United States should provide defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to maintain a sufficient ability to defend itself. <47>

It is true that peaceful solution of the cross-strait question can only be reached through dialogue between Beijing and Taipei. Only when the two sides start negotiating a solution that respects the concerns of all parties, then Washington can stay out of the middle of the cross-strait question. Otherwise, as Ralph Cossa points out, "the U.S. cannot help but be involved in this otherwise internal Chinese affairs, given its moral and legal obligations regarding a peaceful solution." <48> Therefore, the United States has expressed its position on encouraging the resumption of cross-strait dialogue and talks in many occasions. As a result, despite huge political differences, top negotiators from China and Taiwan reached a breakthrough agreement in Shanghai to resume a regular series of talks frozen since mid-1995.

However, the key to resolving the complicated issue between Taiwan and China is China’s own political evolution. <49> The Clinton administration’s three noes policy toward Taiwan ignored the realities on Taiwan and China. President Clinton should remember what he told student s at Peking University: