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Yun-han Chu* and Chia-lung Lin**

Paper presented at the conference on The Development of Contemporary Taiwan

Co-sponsored by Institute for National Policy Research (Taipei) And

French Research Centre for Contemporary China (Hong Kong)

Taipei, Taiwan

December 16-17, 1998

Transition from authoritarianism in Taiwan has involved more than just a legitimacy crisis of the old regime. It also called into question legitimacy of the state -- its claims over sovereignty status, boundary of jurisdiction, and compass of citizenship. For several decades the old regime had justified its legitimacy and the mainlander elite its dominance of political power on the basis of one-China principle. Political opening has brought about the awakening of the long-suppressed Taiwanese consciousness, the society’s quest for a separate identity in the international community, and the surface of the competition between conflict between Taiwanese nationalism and Chinese nationalism over the stateness issue. As a result, the struggle over the democratic reform and the redistribution of political power between the mainlander group and native Taiwanese has been entangled with the conflict over national identity and its related issue of Taiwan's future political relation with mainland China. The opposition leaders have linked the goal of democratization directly to the issue of Taiwanese identity and the principle of self-determination from very early on.

The issue of national identity became the most unsettling factor for Taiwan’s democratization because this issue, much like ethnic conflicts, revolves around exclusive concept of legitimacy and symbol of worth. The nature of Taiwan’s national identity crisis, however, is distinct from the secessionist-oriented inter-ethnic strives that have disintegrated the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. What is involved in Taiwan's internal debate is a de jure (theoretical) independence without an additional de facto (actual) territorial separation from the state authority. Nonetheless, both the dangers of internal political polarization and external intervention, which are inherent in any dispute over revision of territorial structure of state, are potentially there. Internally, the crisis evolved into a clash between two irreconcilable emotional claims about Taiwan's statehood and the national identity of the people of Taiwan. The Taiwanese nationalists advocate Taiwanese nationalism and seek permanent separation from China while the Chinese nationalists oppose movement toward Taiwan independence and favor eventual re-unification with mainland China. In the end, the state became the arena in which competing forces strive to gain control of the state apparatus and use its power to erect a new cultural hegemony and impose its own vision of nation-building in the direction of either Taiwanization or sinicization. Externally, much mirroring Taiwan's own internal conflict, there is a tug-of-war across the Taiwan Straits between two competing nation-building processes as the PRC also has attempted to impose its vision of nation-building, i.e., the one-country two-system model, on Taiwan and avowed to use military means if necessary to stop the movement toward independence.

This paper aims to analyze the relations between Taiwan’s democracy-building, nation-building and state-building. It tries to answer why the Taiwanese identity arose, what is the nature of this identity, and how its development has interacted with the dynamics of the cross-Strait relations. We argue that national identity is not inborn, but a socially and politically constructed sentiment which is subject to change, especially under the intensive mobilization of political elites at times of regime transition. More specifically, electoral opening has enabled the major opposition (the DPP) to cultivate their social base in terms of ethnic and national identity. At the same time, the logic of electoral competition has compelled the incumbent (the KMT) to accelerate the process of Taiwanization both in terms of its ideological claim and power structure. However, just as the new KMT leadership under Lee Teng-hui has registered some success in narrowing the ideological distance with the DPP, Beijing's suspicion over Taipei’s hidden agenda of creeping independence grew sharply. The increasing hostility from the Chinese Communist regime has given rise to a sense of shared destiny among the people of Taiwan and fostered the growth of a new political identity which is civic and inclusive in nature.

This paper begins by clarifying some key concepts related to nationalism. This is followed by an analysis on how the people’s national identity and their position on the stateness issue have changed during the democratization process. Section 2 investigates how the people of Taiwan perceive the terms “Taiwanese” and “Chinese,” which can be either primordially, territorially or subjectively conceived. It will be pointed out that, for most people, Taiwanese identity is more than an ethnic identity, but a political and civic identity and that a significant portion of the population actually acquire multiple dentities, self-claiming as both Taiwanese and Chinese. Section 3 examines the attitudes of Taiwan’s people towards solving the stateness issues via democratic procedures. Surveys found the majority of the population willing to accept using plebiscite for determining Taiwan’s political future, provided that the process is not rushed. Sections 4 and 5 elaborate on how Taiwan’s democratization and the cross-Strait tension have jointly shaped Taiwan’s identity politics. This paper will conclude by bringing the issue of national security into our discussion through a two-level game perspective and exploring the prospect of whether the new democracy can defend itself in the red shadow.

Nationalism is a widely used term that has no consensual definition. Discussion on nationalism has been difficult and at times confusing because three vaguely defined terms, namely, nationhood, stateness and nation-state, have frequently been used interchangeably.

For our own analytical purpose, nationalism is defined as a political principle that calls for the building of a nation-state or the congruence of nationhood and statehood. In other words, nationalism demands a nation to have its own political state and a state to be comprised of a homogeneous national or ethnic group; or simply put, nationalism demands one nation, one state.<1> Nationalist movement may present itself in many forms. For instance, some uphold expansionism to incorporate their national fellowmen in other states; some pursue separatism, striving to control the destiny of their nations; and still, there is irredentism, where minority national group(s) in a state seeks to unite themselves with their national fellowmen in another state.

Nationhood, or national identity, is a sense of shared identity among people who believe in their belonging to the same nation but do not necessarily demand that the nation constitutes one sovereign state. And stateness, or statehood, refers to a sovereign state whose people can be of different ethnic and/or national origins. Contrary to nationalism which demands “one nation, one state,” the concepts of nationhood and stateness allow for the existence of “one nation, multiple states” and “one state, multiple nations,” respectively.

In an ethnically divided society where people have competing imaginations of nationhood and statehood and different ideas about what the relations between the two should be, the institutionalization of democratic rules is naturally more complicated and difficult.<2> Since only approximately 10% of countries in the world have congruent state and ethnic borders,<3> to prevent nationalist movements from endangering democracy-building in multi-ethnic and multi-national societies, some have urged for the construction of civic, liberal nationalism over ethnic nationalism, with the former defining nationhood in terms of citizenship.<4> Civic nationalism can reduce the risk of democratic breakdown in an ethnically-divided society because it strives to construct a sense of political loyalty to a civic community that transcends ethnicity. As Juan Linz (1993: 2) highlights, democracy can be more easily consolidated in divided societies if people make efforts to build a state-nation rather than a nation-state and are able to tolerate the existence of multiple identities.<5>

In the case of Taiwan, the issue of national identity is highly complicated. First, it is important to make distinction between the nationalist claim and statehood claim. The Taiwan independence (TI) claim and the Taiwanese identity are correlated but not of the same thing. Some people support Taiwan independence primarily on the nationalist ground, but other may do so because they are concerned with the huge socioeconomic and political disparity between the two sides of the Strait. Similarly, some people support Chinese unification (CU) for the perceived potential security assurance and economic benefits, rather nationalist commitment. Second, for both the statehood and national identity issues, there exists a middle-ground position. Between the polarized choice between Taiwan independence and Chinese unification, some people favor the status quo above all, no matter how confusing the concept of “status quo” may be. In a similar vein, many people do not subscribe themselves to the two exclusive claims on national identity. Instead, they have acquired dual identities, claiming themselves as both Taiwanese Taiwan Ren (台灣人) and Zhongguo Ren (中國人).

At the risk of over-simplification, we can construct a six-category typology to differentiate the nationalist and non-nationalist based on their national identity and position on the statehood issue (see Table 1). Taiwanese nationalists are those who identify themselves as Taiwanese and support TI. Chinese nationalists are those who self-identify as Chinese and support CU. Those who support TI but have dual identities fall into the category of Independentist, and those who support CU but have some degree of Taiwanese identity are classified as Unificationists. And those who advocate for the maintaining of the status quo, regardless their national identity, are defined in our typology as Realists. And finally, Passivists are those who have no opinion on the stateness issue or those who find all three outcomes (TI, CU and status quo) equally acceptable.

In Table 2, we apply this six-category typology to empirical data collected in various island-wide surveys. Essentially, we rely on the respondents’ answer to two question: one on national identity and the other on stateness issue.<6> Table 2 exhibits the changes of people’s national identity, stateness preference and attitude on nation-state building between 1989 and 1996. During Taiwan’s democratization, those with a sense of Taiwanese identity rose sharply from 16% in 1989 to 35.6% in 1996 and Chinese identity has visibly lost its popularity from 52% in 1989 to 20.9% in 1996; and there continues to be a significant portion of the population who consider themselves both Taiwanese and Chinese (26% in 1989 and 40.5% in 1996). In terms of the shift in the people’s stateness preference, we also find a general trend of increasing support for TI (from 6% in 1989 to 18.2% in 1996) and a sharp drop in the support for CU (from 55% in 1989 to 23% in 1996). At the same time, those who prefer the status quo have also risen sharply, from 17.8% in 1992 to 41.1% in 1996.

[Tables 1 and 2 about here]

By combining one’s response to the two questions on national identity and stateness preference, we can group our interviewees into one of the six categories. Table 2 shows that, between 1993 and 1996, Taiwanese nationalists rose from 7.2% to 12.4% while Chinese nationalists declined significantly from 22.3% to 9.6%. The most dramatic change occurred in the Realist category, which increased from 10.8% to 41.1% during the three years. Overall speaking, only one-fifth of the population in Taiwan falls into the two polarized categories of nationalists.

Table 3 further breaks down the data in Table 2 by the interviewee’s ethnic (or some may prefer to call it “sub-ethnic”) background. Not surprisingly, we find a high correlation between one’s ethnic background and his/her attitude on nation-state building. Generally speaking, when compared to Mainlanders (外省人), native Taiwanese (本省人) tend to have a clearer sense of Taiwanese identity and are more likely to support TI. And, most Taiwanese nationalists are native Taiwanese (especially minnan-speaking native Taiwanese) and most Chinese nationalists are Mainlanders. It is very interesting to note that the sharp decline in the support for Chinese nationalism was a common phenomenon not only within the native Taiwanese but also among the Mainlanders. Within the latter, self-proclaimed Chinese nationalists dropped from 59.6% in 1993 to 22.5% in 1996. Nonetheless, only very few of these ex-Chinese nationalists turned to the TI cause; most of them finding it more comfortable to remain a Realist and support the status quo. Among mainlanders, the support for status quo has jumped from 5.1% in 1993 to 40.1% in 1996). As of 1996, only approximately 23% of the Mainlander population remained Chinese nationalists.

[Table 3 about here]

Based on our crude typology, the awakening of Taiwanese consciousness can be observed at three different strata: the rise in Taiwanese nationalism, the acquisition of a Taiwanese identity, and the growing support for Taiwan independence. To understand how the national identity conflict might constrain the prospect of democratic consolidation in Taiwan, we need to explore the nature of “Taiwanese identity vs. Chinese identity” in greater details.

Our empirical data below suggest that, while the people of Taiwan still lack of a strong consensus on what the future Taiwan-Mainland relationship should be, the rising Taiwanese identity is less an ethnicity-based primordial identity, but more a civic identity. Furthermore, for people who have acquired dual identity, they may not conceive the concept of “Taiwanese identity” necessarily in nationalist term. They may conceive themselves citizens of Taiwan and ethnic Chinese at the same time. Alternatively, some may conceive themselves as ethnic Taiwanese and Chinese national. This means, for some people, the two labels, Taiwanese and Chinese, do not conform perfectly to the very definition of “national identity”. Furthermore, most nationalists, especially Taiwanese nationalists, do not reject the idea that the future of Taiwan be decided through democratic procedures.

Also our empirical data shows that people who hold Chinese identity are far more likely to hold compatible Taiwan identity than vice versa. However, even among those who self-identify as Taiwanese only, dual identity still exists. A general survey conducted after the 1996 presidential election found that 47.8% of the population said that they were proud of being of both Taiwanese and Chinese, compared to 20.8% proud of being only a Taiwanese and not as a Chinese and only 5.5% proud of being a Chinese and not as a Taiwanese (see Table 4). When cross-examining the data by self-identification, we find that 59.6% of those self-identify as Chinese said that they are proud of both identities, while 18.8% only proud of being a Chinese and not as a Taiwanese. Among those who self-identify as Taiwanese, only 29.4% of them said that proud of both identities and 42.5% of them said that they are only proud of being a Taiwanese and not as a Chinese.

[Table 4 about here]

The words “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” are increasingly being used by the people in Taiwan, especially politicians, as political labels for distinguishing “us” from “them” in the promotion of collective consciousness. Proponents of Taiwanese identity have used such phrases as “we are all Taiwanese,” “it’s the Taiwanese people’s turn,” “it’s a misery being a Taiwanese,” “identify with Taiwan and you are a Taiwanese,” and “let’s build a new Taiwanese consciousness” have all been used. At the same time, proponent of Chinese identity have promoted such ideas as “we are all Chinese,” “Chinese do not attack Chinese,” “all Chinese are the children of the Yellow Emperor,” “Taiwan independence is an endeavor that betrays our Chinese Fathers,” and “the 21^st century belongs to us Chinese” have been used to defend Chinese identity. The two words actually mean different things to different people. Some view them as mutually exclusive categories; others find them compatible or even complementary, and still some have no trouble using the two interchangeably depending on situations. In fact, the popular connotation of the two concepts involve a variety of elements, such as ethnic origin, language, culture, residency, citizenship, and identification.<7>

There is a tendency to assume that one’s ethnic identity is necessarily the same as his/her national identity. However, as Table 3 shows, although there is a high correlation between the two, one should not equate ethnic identity with national identity. In other words, not all Mainlanders lack Taiwanese consciousness and not all native Taiwanese embrace Taiwanese identity. Tables 5 and 6 show how the two terms “Taiwanese” and “Chinese” are conceived by the people of Taiwan. A general finding is that the people tend to define “Taiwanese” using territorial/political and subjective/psychological criteria and define “Chinese” using primordial/cultural criteria.

[Tables 5 and 6 about here]

For most people in Taiwan, the term “Taiwanese” is quite loosely defined; 55% of the respondents thought that “Taiwanese” refers to those were born or reside in Taiwan. Among our respondents, 55% thought that one qualifies to be a Taiwanese as long as he/she has a strong sense of Taiwanese identity and 39% think the most important criterion is to self-identifies as a Taiwanese. On the other hand, there is also a significant portion of the population who apply a narrower, thus more exclusive, set of criteria to the definition of Taiwanese. For instance, 38% thought that Taiwan provincial origin should be the criteria, 22% thought that the ability to speak Taiwanese (whether the Minnan or Hakka language) is a litmus test, and 16% thought that Taiwanese are those who recognize Taiwan as an independent state.

No matter how confusing a picture our empirical data might suggest, the important point is: One’s national identity is, to the most part, a matter of perception. As Walker Connor (1994: 75) points out, “it is not what is, but what people believe is that has behavioral consequences.” No matter what really constitute the differences between “Taiwanese” and “Chinese,” how the differences between the two are conceptualized and whether they are considered compatible or irreconcilable will certainly influence the people’s reactions to nationalism-related issues. One way to reconcile the differences between the two identities and minimize their possible conflicts is for one to treat his/her Chinese identity as a cultural expression (i.e., hua jen) or an ethnic origin (i.e., han jen) and to treat his/her Taiwanese identity as a political identity, one shared by a group of people living in the same political territory with a common citizenship. As long as those with Chinese identity do not deny Taiwan as a sovereign political entity, whether an independent state or a geographical territory, whether under the name “Republic of China” or “Republic of Taiwan,” and as long as those with Taiwanese identity do not deny the fact that the Chinese culture and the Han people have constituted a large portion of the Taiwanese culture and the Taiwanese people, then the surge of Taiwanese identity would not necessarily intensify ethnic confrontation and bring about political upheavals.

To what extent will the growth of Taiwanese identity and Taiwanese nationalism obstruct Taiwan’s democratic development will largely depend on two factors: First, if the people can form a basic consensus on the boundary of their state. Second, if they accept the use of democratic procedures to solve the dispute over stateness issue.<8> After all, a liberal democracy is founded on both the principle of majority-rule and protection of minority rights. The ultimate test for the consolidation of a liberal democracy in a divided society like Taiwan lies in if people of different national identities can learn to trust one another and tolerate collective allegiances drastically different from their own.

Questions 1 and 2 in Table 7 show how the people in each of our six categories define the territory and citizenship of the Republic of China. Generally speaking, there seems to be no strong consensus among the people of Taiwan on whether the territory of the ROC covers only Taiwan (and its neighboring islands) or extends to cover the Mainland as well. There is also no consensus on whether the citizens of the ROC refer only to the 21 million people of Taiwan or they include the 1.2 billion people on the Mainland. Use the mid-1996 survey data as an example, we can see that while 51.4% of the people hold a more realistic view that the territory of the ROC does not cover the mainland, thus acknowledging the de facto independence of the “ROC on Taiwan,” there is also 32.9% of the people, especially Chinese nationalists and unificationists, who think that the territory of the ROC includes the mainland. When it comes to the question of ROC citizenship, a higher percentage of the people (57.5%) argue that it should only include the 21 million people of Taiwan although 27.5% of the people still believe that it also includes the 1.2 billion people on the Mainland.

[Table 7 about here]

Two important points can be drawn from the response patterns to Questions 1 and 2. First, the two 1996 surveys, one conducted before the PRC’s missile test during the 1996 presidential election and one conducted after the missile test, found a significant change in the people’s perception on the ROC’s territory and citizenship after the missile test. Within the six months between the two surveys, those who considered the territory of the ROC only covers Taiwan and its neighboring islands increased from 40.7% to 51.4%; those who thought that the ROC citizenship refers only to the 21 million people of Taiwan also increased from 44.2% to 57.5% during the same period. Although we cannot make a direct inference from these data that the increase is a direct result of the PRC’s missile test of the PRC, since the two face-to-face surveys were conducted by the same research group, we tend to believe that this significant change of popular opinion in such a short period of time is beyond sampling errors and that the change is related to the increase in cross-Strait tension during the period. Second, the fact that a huge portion of Taiwanese nationalists and independentists confine the sovereignty of the ROC as to Taiwan and the 21 million people on the island implies that these people have gradually come to tolerate or accept the term “ROC” and treat it as a sovereign state whose sovereignty only covers Taiwan.

Question 3 asked the interviewees who they thought have the right to determine the future of Taiwan; the people had a stronger consensus on this question. 72.7% of the interviewees thought that only the 21 million people of Taiwan have the right to determine Taiwan’s future, a view even shared by most Chinese nationalists (60.6%) and unificationists (59.5%). In other words, despite their conflicting claims on the sovereignty of the ROC, most Chinese nationalists and unificationists view the island the legitimate unit for making fundamental political decisions such as determining the future of Taiwan.

Question 4 explored whether the people considered it appropriate that Taiwan’s future be determined via plebiscite. It turns out that most interviewees actually supported using plebiscite to solve the stateness disputes. In fact, over the years, support for plebiscite has been on a steady increase, rising from 51.6% in 1993 to 68.3% in 1996. What is encouraging is that the majority of Chinese nationalists and unificationist also do not object to the idea of using plebiscite for solving critical national issues despite their fear that the majority of the people might vote for Taiwan independence in a plebiscite.

Given Taiwan’s domestic and international situations, a gradualist approach to the stateness issue seems most acceptable to most people on Taiwan. And political reality seems to prevent both Taiwanese and Chinese nationalists from pursuing their nationalist goals with a strong sense of urgency and radical acts. To most Taiwanese nationalists and independentists, the stateness issue is not very urgent because Taiwan has long enjoyed a de facto independence and was never for one day ruled by the PRC. To them, what to strive for is not a separation from the PRC like in Tibet, East Turkistan, and the Southern Mongolia, but a de jure recognition from the international society. Therefore, as long as Taiwan retains its sovereignty and keeps marching toward a full democracy, most Taiwanese nationalists will find no urgency to declare independence in the immediate future. On the other hand, to most Chinese nationalists and unificationists, a speedy unification is unrealistic due to the great socio-political disparity across the Strait. What these people identify with is the Chinese nation, not the CCP regime. Since the Chinese mainland is still under the control of the CCP, pursuing unification with the mainland in the near future will certainly mean surrendering a new democracy to a communist regime and sacrificing the economic well-being and freedom that they have worked so hard to achieve. Since neither Taiwanese nationalists nor Chinese nationalists consider it extremely urgent to pursue their nationalist goal at all costs and to push for a final settlement in the immediate future, the status quo is likely to be prolonged for quite some time. As long as the stateness issue remains unsettled, Taiwan’s political future will be always shrouded in doubt. On the other hand, the waiting also buys Taiwan time to deepen its democratic reform and to prepare itself politically, socially and culturally for a peaceful settlement of the stateness issue when the situation becomes ripe.

Why did the Taiwanese identity surge during Taiwan’s democratization and why has it acquired high degree of civic and liberal nature? First, one can argue that the seed of Taiwanese identity was deeply buried during the Japanese colonial rule and the post-War political reconstruction. Second, one should point to the epic changes in the international system since the late 1970s which has precipitated the crisis of state legitimacy at first and aroused the local aspiration for an independent statehood subsequently. However, we argue that neither historical roots nor system-level changes can directly bring about a sudden change in group identity. The effects of these various historical and global forces on the people‘s political consciousness must be actualized through the action of states, the strategies of competing elites, and their mutual influences and accommodation. In the final analysis, national identities are not inborn but are socially and politically constructed sentiments which are subject to political mobilization and manipulation. While it is natural that people develop a sense of group consciousness after a long period of social integration and territorial isolation, any sudden change of group identity certainly requires a political explanation.<9>

Throughout the post-War era, the state-sponsored formation of Chinese nationality had always met with arduous resistance from certain quarters of the native society, especially among the victim families of the February 28th incident, overseas Taiwanese and members of the Presbyterian church, representing the Westernized native elite. The resistance has its historical roots. The development of a distinctive Taiwanese identity and its ensuing quest for an independent statehood were fostered by two related historical antecedents. The first is the extended Japanese colonial rule, during which the native elite was subordinated first to a state-orchestrated desinicization campaign and later a naturalizaion (huangminhua) program which proceeded in full earnest during the Pacific war. At the same time, the colonial rule facilitated Taiwan's early acquisition of a semi-peripheral position relative to China within the Japanese Imperium through state-directed modernization program. The interest of the native Taiwanese elite was incorporated into the Japanese military conquest and economic dominance over other peripheral countries, including China, in the so-called Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Zone (Cumings, 1984). The second is the "birth defect" incurred during the decolonization and reestablishment of Chinese rule over the island after the war. This birth defect, epitomized by the February 28th Incidence (Kerr, 1970), along with the imposed political subordination, precipitated the formation of Taiwan independence movement among Taiwanese in exile (Chen, 1972). The birth defect also attenuated the state's effort to establish the supremacy of Chinese identity over local identity through resinicization and mandarinization programs despite many shared ethnic heritages between the native and the newly arrived emigre group (Winckler, 1992; Gold, 1991). As soon as the political compression was loosened, the long-suppressed Taiwanese identity re-emerged.

There has been a surge in the Taiwanese identity in part also because the old myth of one-China principle crumbled in a tidal wave of de-recognization crisis of the late 1970s and the formation of the so-called new world order in the late 1980s provided a window of opportunity for the admission of new states. Taiwan's precarious sovereign status, for an extended period following the outbreak of the Korean War, was sustained essentially by the U.S. hegemony and its post-war security arrangements. It was the U.S.-harbored international recognition, including a membership in the United Nation and a seat on Security Council before 1971, and American security commitment that elongated Taiwan's diminishing sovereign status until the end of 1979 (Lin 1989: 7-14). The weakening of the entrenched one-party authoritarian regime was actually triggered by a crisis of diplomatic derecognition.<10> The PRC-US rapprochement in early 1970s set off a series of diplomatic setbacks for Taiwan -- the loss of the UN seat to the PRC, the expulsion from all major international organizations, and derecognition by major allies. The external shocks severely undermined the KMT's long-standing claim that the ROC government is the sole legitimate government of all of China. Next came the break-up of the Eastern bloc, which was accompanied by a resurgence of ethnic and national strife. In the transition to post-Cold War era, the political and territorial integrity of many existing states were seriously challenged. In many instances, the international community is seemingly perceptive to the claims of certain collective entities of their rights to self-determination, autonomy or secession. The international system has made room for the creation of a score of new states. Also the emerging structural configuration of the Asia-Pacific security order has made more room for Taiwan's diplomatic maneuvering as the long-term goals of China, as the major power aspirant, would be potentially in conflict with that of a defending hegemony, i.e., the United States, and a regional rivalry, i.e., Japan.<11> These developments have raised new hope for an independent Taiwanese statehood.

However, both the growth potential of the historical seeds and the transformative potential of the so-called "new world order" would not have brought about a fundamental shift in people’s group identity had not there been succession crisis within the KMT, electoral opening at national level, and an intensifying tension across the Taiwan Strait. In Taiwan, democratization has served as a pulling force, drawing people together through the process of political participation, which not only creates in them a sense of loyalty to the political system, but generates multiple issues that are of interest to different groups and provides them an incentive to form various cross-cutting coalitions on different issues, with no groups or interests able to permanently dominate other groups or interests. If the existence of a nation is, in the words of Ernest Renan, an everyday plebiscite,<12> then the practice of democracy in Taiwan definitely serves to nurture their sense of belonging to a civic nation. On the other hand, the PRC’s hostility toward the democratizing Taiwan has served as a pushing force. The long-existing and ever-growing threat from the PRC has fostered a sense of common destiny that is shared by a great majority of people of Taiwan regardless of ethnic background. Again, drawing on Renan, having suffered together actually weighs more in the formation of a nation than the sharing of triumph because suffering imposes obligations and demands a common effort, which later becomes a collective memory that is part of each individual’s life. Together, the pulling and pushing forces have interacted to lead the people of Taiwan, who are in search of a collective identity, to gradually turn to develop an embracing civic identity (state-nation) that looks forward to what the new democracy must be, rather than backward to the unrealized ideal of building either a unified Chinese or independent Taiwanese nation-state.

For a full explanation of the surge of Taiwanese identity since early 1990s, we have to focus on the role of political elite in the construction of new group identity and the cultivating function of the democratic practices. We place more emphasis on the strategic interaction between competing elites, because “politicians are specialists in the mobilization of hopes and grievances,” to quote the words of Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan.

From early on, the DPP leaders have built up their electoral support on highlighting the shared sense of suffering and deprivation among the native Taiwanese. The DPP leadership played up the issue because this salient cleavage cut across socioeconomic strata. It was considered an effective counter strategy to the KMT's broadly-based socio-economic development program and an issue that could unite DPP supporters of different social and economic interests under a common cause. However it was the power struggle within the KMT after the passing of Chiang Ching-kuo that critically turned the tide against the prevailing official ideological claim on Chinese identity. The intra-party struggle came to a point of no return in the early part of 1990, when Lee Teng-hui was challenged by his rivalry in the party nomination for presidential candidate. This was also the turning point for the growth of Taiwanese identity. We will back up this claim with public opinion poll data later on.

On his way to power consolidation, Lee Teng-hui skillfully shifted the burden of defending the orthodox lines -- defending the extra-constitutional arrangements amid a global wave of democratization, insisting on the One-China principle when virtually all major nations have shifted their diplomatic recognition to the PRC as the sole legitimate government of China, and upholding a Chinese identity in the wake of a re-emergence of Taiwanese identity -- to his mainlander rivalry in the KMT. Instead, Lee emphasized a "Taiwan-centered" view in managing the island's external relations and launched a series of bold policy initiative. The redirection of foreign and mainland policy aggravated the division over one-China principle within the KMT and transfigured both intra-party and inter-party coalitional politics.<13> In the fierce intra-party power struggle between the so-called mainstream and non-mainstream factions,<14> Lee characterized his rivalry as a conservative group interested only in preserving its past prerogatives and identifying more closely with mainland China than with the 21 million people on the island. The more the non-mainstream faction questioned Lee's commitment to Chinese nationalism and objected his effort to seek ideological accommodation with the opposition, the more popular Lee became among the native Taiwanese. Increasingly, Lee Teng-hui has been not only adored by a great majority of native Taiwanese but viewed as as the protector of island's autonomy from the PRC and the embodiment of the glory and honor of the Taiwanese people, especially for his dedicated efforts in accelerating the Taiwanization of the KMT's power structure, alleviating the past grievance such as the February 28th incident, restoring the pride and self-respect of Taiwanese, and asserting an separate sovereign status for the R.O.C. in the international community. The logic of strategic alliance compelled the DPP to side with Lee Teng-hui at all crucial junctures of power struggle between the mainstream and non-mainstream factions. The tacit grand coalition between the DPP and the mainstream culminated in their joint effort to oust Hau Pei-tsun around the end of 1992. From this point on, Lee has enjoyed full control of the state apparatus, which was since then gradually re-engineered to endorse the burgeoning Taiwanese consciousness and to cultivate a new sense of common destiny among the 21 million people. In his most revealing interview with Ryotaro Shiba, a well-known Japanese writer, in fall 1993, Lee spoke of “the misery of being a Taiwanese,” implying that Taiwan has, for hundreds of years, been ruled by different foreign regimes and never got a chance to determine its own fate. This widely-cited line came very close to an tacit endorsement of the principle of self-determination.

After the downfall of Hau Pei-tsun some leading figures of the KMT nonmainstream faction decided to break away from the KMT and established the New Party. The New Party (NP) built up its electoral support initially by appealing to the besieged mentality of the mainlander voters, who were increasingly alienated by the swift Taiwanization of the KMT power structure. In the 1994 Taipei mayoral race, the NP candidate Jaw Shao-kang heated up the crisis mentality of the voters with strong Chinese nationalist sentiment to boiling point by attacking Lee Teng-hui for his hidden agenda of Taiwan independence.

However, given the prevailing social and political conditions, both the DPP and NP have soon found out the diminishing utility of ethnic and nationalist mobilization. The first challenge nationalist elites faced in promoting ethnic nationalism was the fact that a significant portion of the population has dual identities and prefers the preservation of status quo over anything else. To win over the median voters, the DPP and NP were both induced to modify their ethnic nationalist appeals and soften their ideological stances. For the NP, an explicit ethnic and nationalist mobilization is certainly not a good approach, not only because mainlanders only account for around 16% of the population, but because roughly half of NP supporters are native Taiwanese.<15> On the other hand, intensive ethnic mobilization also does not serve the purpose for the DPP in the late stage of the democratic transition in part because it could no longer characterize the KMT as an "emigre regime" as the ruing party is now in the firm grip of President Lee. Furthermore, after nearly five decades of social integration, mostly through intermarriages, work and school, most native Taiwanese have relatives, friends and neighbors who are mainlanders, which makes it too costly and nearly impossible for the DPP to pursue the building of a Taiwanese state on the island that politically excludes mainlanders. In addition, there exists a sub-ethnic division between the Minnan-speaking and Hakka-speaking native Taiwanese, which account for about 12 percent of the population. If the DPP overplay the ethnic tone, which has been essentialy Minnan-centric, it is bound to loose favor among the Hakka-speaking native Taiwanese. As pointed out by Juan Linz (1985: 203-53), in a heterogeneous society where people of various primordial backgrounds are mixed-living, building a nation-state solely on primordial ties is nearly impossible and always too costly. Therefore most nationalist elites who promote separatism are eventually forced/induced to put more emphasis on territoriality and to shine less spotlight on primordial characteristics, albeit the importance of primordial mobilization in their initial development stage.<16>

The third challenge for both Taiwanese and Chinese nationalists was the KMT’s impressive adaptability on both the national identity and stateness issues. Lee Teng-hui has been able to harness the independence zeal with a call for the formation of sense of shared-destiny among the twenty-one million people and a gradual defection from the one-China principle. As an alternative to the pursuit of de jure independence, Lee promoted the so-called "Republic of China on Taiwan" formula anchored on a two-China model while being ingeniously evasive, flexible and ambiguous on the issue of national re-unification. At the same time, the KMT's propaganda characterized the DPP's independence cause as dangerous and irresponsible and the New Party's pro-reunification platform disloyal to the Taiwanese people. Lee’s ingenious program of gradually consolidating Taiwan's sovereign claim without endangering the status quo has enabled the KMT not only effectively reconcile the seeming contradiction between the popular aspiration for a separate identity in the international community and the prevailing concern for stability and prosperity, but also virtually chained the two opposition to the two polar ends of the spectrum.

As the KMT mainstream moved to consolidate its centrist position on this most salient issue, the DPP and NP were compelled to soften their nationalist stances. Starting in early 1995, some pragamatic leaders, notably party chairmen Shih Ming-teh (1994-96) and Hsu Hsin-liang (1996-1998) began to soft-paddle the Taiwan independence claim through a re-interpretation of the status quo. They argued that, since Taiwan has already been an independent sovereign state for almost half a century, there is no need to declare formal independence or to hold plebecite to decide the matter.<17>

Parallel to the adjustments of the KMT and DPP was the NP’s reformulation of its nationalist appeal, which now highlights the forming of a “New Taiwanese” consciousness and the consolidation of the new democracy before the pursuit of unification. Since the option of an immediate unification with the Mainland seems unacceptable to most people of Taiwan, the NP found it necessary to moderate its nationalist appeal and cultivate other issues for electoral survival. Immediately after the 1995 Legislative election, in which the KMT barely passed the majority threshold, some NP and DPP leaders held a symbolic talk, the so-called Grand Reconciliation, to signal that the two parties were willing to set aside their ethnic and ideological differences and jointly promote reforms and the building of a coalition government. After this talk, the NP began to articulate a new set of rhetoric that emphasizes the party’s sincere commitment to democracy and its willingness to cooperate with the DPP on democratic reform issues.

The above developments suggestion that the democratic process has been conducive to the narrowing of the formerly severe polarization on the independence-unification issue. In addition, during Taiwan’s regime transition, the newly-installed democratic practices also served as an agent of political re-socialization. Political democratization, especially electoral opening, functioned like a whirlpool drawing common people into the political process through campaigning, voting, taking part in political discussion, participating in political parties and social movements. The practice of democracy has made the people gradually accustomed to participating in the deliberation and decision-making of “national” affairs and made them implicitly or explicitly accept the island as the legitimate unit of governance. Democratization not only provides a public sphere for people to communicate and understand each other, but broadens and deepens the people’s daily interactions by absorbing different groups and interests into the political system. Constant political participation helped the growth of a new collective consciousness among the people, transforming the term “Taiwan” from a geographic unit to a political society and the term “Taiwanese” from an ethnic term for “native Taiwanese” to a civic term for “citizens of Taiwan.” If the existence of a nation, as Renan stressed, can be revealed through the “everyday plebiscite” of the people, then democratization in Taiwan certainly strengthens their sense of belonging to a civic nation through participation in the public sphere every day.

Table 8 shows how the public evaluate the impact of the 1996 presidential election on Taiwan’s political future. As data confirm, most people thought that the election had a positive influence on Taiwan’s democratization, nation-building, and international visibility. Through Questions 1 and 2 we found that 80.5% of the respondents thought that the 1996 direct presidential election helped push Taiwan’s democracy forward, and only 23.5% thought that it had aroused social instability. Questions 3 and 4 reveal that 72.5% of the interviewees thought that the election helped strengthen the sovereignty consciousness of the 21 million people in Taiwan, and only 16.6% of the people thought that it intensified ethnic and national identity conflict. In addition, 66.4% and 77.4% of the respondents thought that this election strengthened the government’s ruling legitimacy and increased international support for Taiwan, respectively, and only 11.2% and 4.8% of the interviewees disagreed with the two statements, respectively. Even the Chinese nationalists and unificationists at large agreed that this election helped improve Taiwan’s democracy, sovereignty consciousness, international support, and the government’s ruling legitimacy.

[Table 8 about here]

The dynamics of the cross-Straits strategic interaction has exerted as much influence on the process of state-making and nation-building in Taiwan as the island’s internal political process. Beijing’s hostile reunification campaign, recurring military threat, and measures of diplomatic strangulation have all served to alienating the people of Taiwan from Chinese identity and strengthening the call for a separate identity. In recent years, intensified economic exchanges and cultural contacts have so far done little to ameliorate the tension and animosity between the two sides. On the contrary, the cross-Straits relations has entered a most turbulent period of time since the summer of 1995 (Chu, 1997).

The strategic interaction between Taipei and Beijing has operated primarily at three levels: First, much mirroring Taiwan's own internal conflict, there is a tug-of-war across the Taiwan Straits between two competing nation-building processes. On the one hand, the PRC has attempted to block any possibility of an independent Taiwan in the short run and to impose its vision of nation-state-building, i.e., the one-country two-system model, on Taiwan in the long run.<18> On the other hand, Taipei's foreign and mainland policies are driven by the perceived needs to nullify Beijing's reunification campaign and discredit the PRC's sovereign claim over the island in the international community.

Second, both sides attempt to gain control over the scope and speed of cross-Straits economic exchange to serve their own political agenda. Beijing encourages the acceleration as well as normalization of cross-Straits economic exchange in a hope that increased economic interdependence will bind Taipei's hands in seeking unilateral solution, in particular, Taiwan independence, to the sovereignty dispute. On the other hand, Taipei resists the possibility of Taiwan becoming another Hong Kong, reasoning that full-scale economic integration with mainland China will eventually compromise Taiwan's political autonomy. Taipei strives to regulate the pace of Taiwanese business expansion into mainland market in accordance with the level of PRC's hostility toward Taiwan.

Third, Beijing has always been either an overt or implicit party in Taiwan’s internal conflict over national identity and stateness issue. On the one hand, Beijing has been quite blunt about its intention to influence Taiwan’s domestic politics.<19> On the other hand, during Taiwan’s democratic transition, the perceived need to resist PRC’s reunification campaign has constantly structured the domestic debate not only on mainland and foreign policy but also on the very issue of democracy-building and nation-building. For instance, the center piece of the Taiwan’s constitutional reform is the adoption of a semi-presidential system, with direct popular election for the president and expansion of the presidential power.<20> The semi-presidentialism was promoted by both the KMT mainstream and the DPP because it was deemed imperative for the safe-guard of Taiwan's national interests. Both believed that a popular election for the highest executive office would not only boost Taiwan's international visibility but strengthen the government's position in either cross-Straits negotiation or domestic political bargaining. The DPP, in particular, also hoped that an island-wide popular election would help foster the growth of Taiwanese nationalism.<21> In a dialectic twist, growing suspicion over the meaning and outcomes of the democratization process has provoked Beijing to double up its hostile reunification campaign, which only reinforced Taiwan’s popular resentment toward the PRC.

In a similar vein, Lee’s decision to seek membership in the U. N. General Assembly was prompted not only by the expected PR benefits in getting international recognition of Taiwan’s aspiration for a sovereign status but its value in domestic political mobilization. The U. N. membership issue was expected to the issue can as a rally point around which emotions of loyalty and assurance can cluster. The DPP has been quite anxious to push for a bid for U. N. membership because the program was deemed not only fully compatible with its independence cause but a necessary foreign policy maneuver to counterbalance the rapid and seemingly unstoppable trend toward economic integration between mainland China. An U. N. membership for Taiwan could provide a permanent multilateral guarantee for Taiwan's political autonomy and territorial security in the long run and sharpen the political quarrel between Taiwan and mainland China in the short run. In this sense, Beijing's strong reaction to Taipei's bid for U. N. membership was not only expected but welcome by the DPP, as Beijing's counter measures would only tighten the popular awareness of Taiwan's endangered sovereign status.

Lee Teng-hui has tried to consolidate Taiwan’s fragile new democracy on a new foundation of state legitimacy. He launched a three-prong strategy. On the international front, Lee tried to salvage Taiwan’s precarious sovereign status by taking a series of new diplomatic initiatives: seeking dual recognition, applying for the GATT/WTO membership, conducting unofficial state visits, and launching a bid for a seat in the U.N. General Assembly. Next, with regard to the cross-Straits relations, his government has tried to engage the PRC in a game of co-existence and to induce Beijing to accept a divided-nation model as exemplified by the divided Germany before 1990. On the domestic front, he tried to harness the DPP’s independence zeal with a call for the formation of ‘a sense of shared-destiny among the twenty-one million people’ and a gradual backing-away from the so-called one-China principle. However, just as the KMT new leadership has registered some success in narrowing the ideological distance with the DPP, Beijing's suspicion over Taipei’s hidden agenda of creeping independence grew sharply. Beijing was especially alarmed by Taipei's recent bid for U. N. membership. This bold move is viewed by Beijing increasingly as a preparatory step for seeking formal independence. In response, Beijing was taking a triad strategy: "to blockade Taiwan diplomatically, to check Taiwan militarily, and to drag along Taiwan economically".<22> After its futile attempt to block Lee’s unofficial visit to the United States in June 1995, Beijing threatened Taipei with a week of missile tests off the northern coast of Taiwan. On the eve of the KMT Congress for presidential nomination in late August of 1995, the PLA launched the second round of missile test near a Taiwan-controlled off-shore island. The two missile tests and the ensuing shock waves sent Taiwan's stock market for a 30% plummet and the New Taiwan dollars for a 9% devaluation, and precipitated a wave of capital flight between July and September. Apparently, CCP’s hard-liners had hoped that, through a series of threatening move, Beijing would be able to disrupt Lee's reelection bid and bring Taipei to its knee. Along this line of reasoning, Beijing's decided to extend the military threats well on to the election day. The strategic objectives of these threats were expanded from upsetting Lee's reelection to include shaping Taiwan's domestic debate on mainland policy and foreign policy in the campaign process. However to the disappointment of Beijing‘s hard-liners, the crisis in the Straits might have actually helped Lee Teng-hui‘s reelection as many traditional DPP supporters shifted their support out of the worry that Taiwan might loose ground to the PRC if the majority could not speak with one voice.<23>

The dynamics of the cross-Strait development in the last decade has made a profound impact on Taiwan’s nation-state and state-nation formation, which can be seen clearly from the growing number of people who self-identify as Taiwanese and support Taiwan independence (see Figure 1).

A longitudinal study of public opinions on the stateness and national identity issues found a positive correlation between the rise in cross-Strait tension and the people’s support for Taiwanese independence and Taiwanese identity. These telephone surveys conducted by The United Daily between October 1989 and July 1997 found an increasing trend of support for Taiwan independence and Taiwanese identity (see Figure 1). The timing of a few critical cross-Strait interactions were added to the figure to facilitate the understanding of the changes in public opinion.

[Figure 1 about here]

Figure 1 shows that, at the early stage of democratization around late 1989 and early 1990), when promoting Taiwan independence (TI) was still a taboo, only 8% of the population openly supported TI and only 16% of them self-identified as Taiwanese. The Between early 1991 and late 1993, the people’s sense of Taiwanese identity and support for TI registered a 100% growth. The visible surge was in part explained by the intensified power struggle between KMT mainstream and non-mainstream factions and the political mobilization along the ethnic line. The rise was also correlated with two developments in the cross-Strait relations: the sharpening of sovereign dispute with the launch of semi-official negotiation between the SEF and ARATS and Beijing’s intensive efforts to further isolate Taiwan in the international community (e.g., through forcing South Korea to de-recognize the ROC government, publishing a whitepaper on Principles on the Taiwan Issue, and boycotting Taiwan’s efforts to seek UN membership).

Between early 1994 and late 1997, there was a second surge. The support for TI has increased to more than 30% and the level of Taiwanese identity to more than 40% and up to 50%. A number of incidents clearly contributed to historical high: the Thousand Island Lake Incident on March 31, 1994,<24> the first missile test and the subsequent publication of "four joint editorials" voraciously attacking Lee Teng-hui in the summer of 1995,<25> and the launch of missile at Taiwan’s doorstep, as close as 30 miles from the two major seaports in March 1996.

A series of survey, which were conducted immediately before and after the missile crisis, demonstrated more clearly on the impact of PRC’s military threat on mind-set of the people of Taiwan. Figure 2 shows that While roughly 33%, 29% and 16% of the population, respectively, supported CU, TI, and the status quo before the PRC’s announcement of the military exercises, the percentages changed quite a bit within the two weeks of actual military exercises. While roughly 33%, 29% and 16% of the population, respectively, supported CU, TI, and the status quo before the PRC’s announcement of the military exercises, the percentages changed quite a bit within the two weeks of actual military exercises. As the military exercises continued in the next two weeks, the surveys found a different pattern of change in the people’s attitudes toward the stateness issue. Support for CU was on a steady decline, and those preferred the status quo rose up sharply. Support for TI also gradually dropped back down to the normal level of around 27%, which means that, after their initial reaction somewhat cooled off, the people probably became more sober on the independence issue, reckoning that the PRC’s military threats mean business. Although the people’s support for TI stagnated for a while after the PRC’s military exercises, the awakening of Taiwanese consciousness did not slow down (see Figure 1). The tension and animosity across the Taiwan Strait have nurtured a sense of common destiny among the people of Taiwan. If the forming of a new group identity requires some sort of collective memory, then the PRC’s military threat during Taiwan’s first presidential election would certainly leave its mark in the collective memory of the people of Taiwan.

[Figure 2 about here]

These recent developments suggest that to what extent Taiwan can consolidate its new democracy and preclude the dire possibility of becoming another Hong Kong, depends on, among other things, the willingness of the international community in safeguarding the right of self-rule and in the furtherance of democracy. In this sense, democratization has created an acute security dilemma. for Taiwan. On the one hand, democracy becomes an essential ingredient of Taiwan‘s national security. It helps foster a strong sense of political solidarity, enhance Taiwan’s international legitimacy, nullify Beijing's peaceful reunification campaign, and discredit the PRC's sovereign claim over the island in the international community. Conversely, the popular commitment to democratic values is reinforced as long as the international society is willing to reward Taiwan with an elevated level of recognition and support for its democratic progress.

For the very reason, however, Taiwan‘s democratization increases the possibility of intervention from the rival regime across the straits. Uncertainty about the meaning and outcomes of the regime transition, in particular the repercussion for the reunification prospect and the potential destabilizing effects on its internal political order, has provoked the communist regime to double up its hostile reunification campaign. Furthermore, the growing aspiration for a separate Taiwanese identity which came with the democratization is likely to fuel an ultra-nationalistic response from the mainland China. At the same time, the threat of external intervention creates additional burden on the new democracy. The perceived need to contain the political infiltration of the PRC and the emergence of the so-called ‘the PRC’s collaborators in Taiwan’ is likely to clash with the respect for political pluralism, minority rights, and due process. These developments suggest that as long as the PRC stands ready to infiltrate Taiwan’s domestic political process and threatens to subvert, with the use of force if necessary, any democratically elected government that allegedly promotes Taiwan independence, Taiwan’s new democracy will have a difficult time on its way to consolidation.

Also, it is a daunting task for Taipei to reconcile the acute conflict between its political agenda and economic interests. The mainland China has already become the island's most important trading partners, second only to the United States.<26> Also, it is reasonable to assume that the island's trade and investment pattern will become even more skewed after PRC's admission into the WTO. Next, it will be a tough challenge for Taiwan to figure out how to, on the one hand, ease off Beijing's deep suspicion over its "hidden agenda" and sustain the PRC's hope for a peaceful reunification and, on the other hand, consolidate its separate identity in the international community. In a dialective twist, the more efforts Taipei puts into upgrading international status and military modernization the greater suspision Beijing will have over Taiwan's incremental and "unofficial" approach to independence and, thence, more counter measures. As the accumulation of distrust and animosity continues, the two sides will be farther and farther away from a negotiated peace.

Note: Percentages in each category may not add to 100% because some interviewees either gave answers that are not listed in this table or declined to answer.

Source: Data in the 1992, 1993 and 1996 columns were provided by the Political System and Change Workshop on led by Professor Hu Fu, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. These three face-to-face interviews were conducted after the 1991 year-end National Assembly election, the 1992 year-end Legislative election and the 1995 year-end Legislative election, respectively. Data in the 1989 column are based on a telephone survey conducted by The United Daily (see The World Journal, July 4, 1997).

Note: Column percentages do not add up to 100% because those who had answers not listed here, had no opinion, or declined to answer were not included.

^a We have combined two questions, namely, “are you proud of being a Taiwanese?” and “are you proud of being a Chinese?” to arrive at these four categories of answer.

Source: This post-election survey was conducted immediately after the 1996 presidential election by the Political System and Change Workshop, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University.

Note: Data not in parentheses are based on a general survey conducted in mid 1996 after the presidential election. Data in ( ) are based on a general survey conducted in early 1996, immediately after the 1995 year-end Legislative election. Data in < > are based on a general survey conducted in the summer of 1993, after the year-end 1992 Legislative election.

^a This question was worded differently in the mid-1996 general survey, which asked “do you consider plebiscite a good way to resolve disputes on critical national issues?”

Source: Same as Table 2.

Note: The “Agree” and “Disagree” percentages for each statement do not add up to 100% because those had no opinion or declined to answer were omitted in this table.

Source: same as Table 4.

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