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Cross-Strait Relations from the Perspective of the Republic of China
Tzong-Ho Bau
Department of Political Science
National Taiwan University
July 1998
The interaction across the Taiwan Strait is a serious issue which is relevant to the stability and peace of East Asia. The unstable relation between Beijing and Taipei continues after the middle period of 1995. The military and literal campaigns against Taiwan initiated by Beijing government during 1995-1996 greatly slowed down the progress of relationship across the Taiwan Strait. The damage can not be removed even three years later. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relations structure between Beijing and Taipei which could be regarded as the main problem leading to the delay of cross-strait negotiation. Game theory and bargaining theory will be employed to analyze why the relations between the both sides normally end up with a deadlock. The reunification model such as "one country, two systems" will be reviewed because the concept of this model is developed from the structure problem across the Taiwan Strait and brings about the fundamental dispute between Beijing and Taipei. National unification as a process of integration will be discussed since the previous reunification model demanded by Beijing government is inconsistent with this concept. The difficult interaction across the Taiwan Strait is furthered by Chinese face-saving policy which will be analyzed in this paper. The public opinion survey of Taiwan will be examined since the Republic of China has been a democratized country. The use of coercion as a strategy of Beijing to compel Taipei government to concede will be discussed. The impact of the US as an external factor on the cross-strait relations could be either a positive or a negative element to resume the talks between Chinese mainland and Taiwan. The role of the US to end the dilemma across the Taiwan Strait will be explored as well.
The Relations Structure Across the Taiwan Straits
The relationship among sovereign states should be equal no matter whether they are great powers or minor powers. This conclusion is derived from theargument that sovereignty is supreme, perpetual, universal, unlimited, indivisible and inalienable.<1> Sovereign states are therefore independent of and exclusive with one after another in dealing with their internal affairs.<2> Sovereignty is strongly associated with the concepts such as exclusive jurisdiction and absolute independence. In other words, a sovereign state enjoys absolute power over its own territory.
In fact, sovereignty can not be separated from jurisdiction. Sovereignty is always referred to a power by which the laws of a sovereign state can be enforced. For instance, the government of a sovereign state is able to allow foreigners to immigrate or to expel them due to their illegal behaviors. The government can exercise its jurisdiction over internal crimes.<3> It is therefore unimaginable for a country to claim its sovereignty over a territory which is totally beyond its control.
The relations across the Taiwan Strait have suffered the issue of sovereignty for a long time. Originally, both Beijing and Taipei governments argue that they have sovereignty over Chinese mainland and Taiwan. According to this argument, either Beijing or Taipei should concede its sovereignty to the other side. This is therefore a zero-sum game. On May 1, 1991, the government of the Republic of China claimed the end of the period of mobilization to suppress communist rebellion. Taipei has somewhat relaxed its demand of sovereignty over Chinese mainland while emphasizing the political reality of a divided China from then on. However, Beijing never withdrew from its original position with respect to its sovereignty over Taiwan. For example, on July 25, 1995, People's Daily News argued that "according to international law, the sovereignty of a state is indivisible and inalienable. There is only one government to exercise sovereignty in a country. Taiwan as a part of China has nothing to do with sovereignty. The people on Taiwan are Chinese and can not enjoy sovereignty independently."<4> On behalf of the position of Taipei, it is clear that Beijing is not able to exercise its jurisdiction on Taiwan. It is highly debatable for Chinese mainland to claim its sovereignty over Taiwan while enjoying no jurisdiction on this island. Taipei is willing to accept Beijing government as an equal political entity, but Beijing refuses to accept this concept. The relations across the Taiwan Strait, according to Beijing, is defined as a hierarchical interaction with Chinese mainland as motherland of Taiwan. The relations structure between Chinese mainland and Taiwan is therefore biased against the latter. The issue of sovereignty is clearly the main cause of Beijing-Taipei confrontation.
The Issue of Integration As A Condition Or A Process
Integration can be referred to a condition or a process. Amitai Etzioni asserts that "a political community which possesses effective control over the use of the means of violence is integrated. Such a community has a center of decision-making that allocates resources and rewards throughout the community and forms the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens."<5> Karl W. Deutsch refers to political integration as a condition in which a group of people have "attained within a territory a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time, dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population."<6> He suggests that "integration is a matter of fact, not of time."<7>
Integration, according to Ernst Haas, is defined as "a process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states." He also conceives integration as "referring exclusively to a process that links a given concrete international system with a dimly discernible future concrete system."<8>
As a matter of fact, integration can be regarded as a both dynamic and static concept. Integration is dynamic when it is defined as a process. It is static while being defined as a condition. Normally, a condition can not be achieved without a process. A fundamental problem of cross-strait relations is the issue of national unification as a process or a condition. According to the leaders of Beijing, "one country, two systems" is a feasible model of national reunification. They never think about other alternatives to this model. Consequently, "one country, two systems" is developed as a political faith and unification is taken for granted. Beyond that, this model is dictated as an essential element to precondition the interactions across the Taiwan Strait. That is to say, the relations structure between Beijing and Taipei is established as hierarchical with the former as central government. The leaders of Beijing perceive integration as a condition in terms of the achievement of the model of "one country, two systems".
On behalf of the position of Taipei, the model and timing of reunification are open-ended issues and the process of integration is required. Functionalism can be employed as a feasible theory to describe the policy of Taipei towards national reunification. David Mitrany, a functionalist, suggested that "the growing complexity of governmental systems had increased greatly the essentially technical problems at the international level. If such problems could be assigned to specialists and somehow separated from the political sector, it would be possible to achieve international integration. The growth in technical problems which could not be solved exclusively at the national level, would contribute to the proliferation of international collaboration in technical fields...Eventually such collaboration would encroach upon, even absorb, the political sector."<9> Neofunctionalism emphasizes that political system and policy design are essential for a successful transition from economic integration into political integration. Political push is necessary to bring about an integration.<10> The government of Taipei has attached much importance to the nonpolitical interactions across the Taiwan Strait over the past few years. According to the leaders of Taipei, national unification should be an incremental process in which technical collaboration is an indispensable experience. Besides, Guidelines for National Unification adopted by the National Unification Council in 1991 states that "the unification of China is meant to bring about a strong and prosperous nation with a long-lasting, bright future for its people; it is the common wish of Chinese people at home and abroad. After an appropriate period of forthright exchange, cooperation, and consultation conducted under the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity, the two sides of the Taiwan Straits should foster a consensus of democracy, freedom and equal prosperity, and together build anew a unified China."<11> It is clear that the policy of Taiwan towards Chinese mainland is designed as a unification-oriented effort. Nevertheless, "process" is emphasized by Taipei as a necessary test for the possibility of eventual reunification. This is much different from Beijing's perception of integration as a condition in terms of the enforcement of "one country, two systems" model which is totally unacceptable to Taiwan.
Taipei's Disagreement with the Model of "One Country, Two Systems"
"One country, two systems" is the unification model which was put forward by Vice-premier Deng Xiaoping in early January 1979 when he met with a group ofvisiting US senators. The contents of this model were in the concrete after Marshall Ye Jianying, the chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, presented a "Nine-Point Peace Proposal" in 1981 and Deng Xiaoping told Winston Yang, a professor of Seton Hall University, the Six-Point Peace Proposal in 1983. The name of the model, i.e., "one country, two systems", was mentioned officially by Deng Xiaoping in 1984 when he met with Zbigniew Brzezinski, the former White House national security advisor of the US.<12>
The key points of the model of "one country, two systems" can be summarized as follows:<13>
In response to Beijing's offer of "one country, two systems" as the unification model, the late President Chiang Ching-kuo announced that this proposal was "primarily intended to stop US arms sale to our country." He refused to accept this model in 1981.<14> Most recently, the President Lee Teng-hui claimed on July 22, 1998 at the 13th meeting of National Unification Council that China should not be unified under the model of "one country, two systems". He asserted that this model will be definitely rejected by Taiwan.<15> Based on the public opinion survey conducted during the period of 1991-1998, we find that the percentages of people being opposed to the model of "one country, two systems" are always much higher than those in support of this model.(see Figure 1)
The model of "one country, two systems" can not be accepted by Taiwan because of the following reasons:
First, after July 1, 1997, Beijing frequently took advantage of Hong Kong as an example to convince the other countries that "one country, two systems" is a feasible model to integreate Chinese mainland and Taiwan. However, unlike Hong Kong, the integration of Chinese mainland and Taiwan is not only an issue of "two systems", but also an issue of "one country". Beijing always argues that "there is only one China. The PRC is the sole legal government of China. Taiwan is a part of China."<16> The Hong Kong Wen Hui News commented as well on November 15, 1995 that "after October 1, 1949, the PRC was established and succeeded the ROC in terms of the transfer of territory, sovereignty and people."<17> Based on the logic of Beijing lesders, it is clear that "one country" is the PRC and Taiwan is a part of this country. The ROC ceased to exist after October 1, 1949. The problem is that the ROC never lost its conditions as a sovereign state even if the territory of it shrinked after 1949. The ROC continues to maintain its territory, people, government and ability to deal with foreign countries. In other words, the existence of the ROC is a political reality. Moreover, a survey of public opinion conducted in 1997 showed that the most of the people on Taiwan still preferred "the ROC" as the national title. Only a very few people are willing to choose "the PRC" instead. The results of the survey in this respect can be illustrated by Table 1.
According to the same survey, 53.5% of the respondents asserted that the national title and the national flag of "the ROC" should not be changed.<18> Apparently, the government and the people of Taiwan are not able to accept the model of "one country, two systems" because of their strong identification with the Republic of China and the lack of their identification with the People's Republic of China.
Second, there are some problems in the concept of "two systems". The leaders of Beijing argued that socialism on Chinese mainland and capitalism on Taiwan could coexist after national reunification. In fact, 'the coexietence of two systems" is not supported by empirical study due to the absence of appropriate cases in the world. Normally, it is taken for granted that there is only one system in a country. If socialism is superior to capitalism, Beijing should exercise the former in not only Chinese mainland, but also in Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. On the contrary, if capitalism is superior to socialism, Chinese mainland should choose the former instead. In fact, the design of "two systems" implies that capitalism is a better system. It is not persuasive at all to allow those tiny islands to remain capitalistic system unchanged otherwise, particularly when Chinese mainland is much bigger than these islands.
The coexistence of two systems, in fact, legalizes and rationalizes the existing system on Chinese mainland. That is to say, Beijing could continue its uncivilized system, i.e., a totalitarian regime with poor record of human rights, in the future. It is highly debatable to impose different systems upon the people who belong to the same country. The people should not be unequal in the sense of political and economic life styles just because of their different accommodation locations. The model of "one country, two systems" should give way to the concept of "one country, one better system".
Third, even if Taipei is willing to accept the model of "one country, two systems", it is a great challenge to the people on Taiwan to ensure their capitalistic system unchanged. The linkage between Chinese mainland and Hong kong is the Hong kong Basic Law which endows the people of the latter with the rights to enjoy a capatalistic life. However, the law is not allowed to be against the Constitution of the PRC. Likewise, the future Taiwan Basic Law, if any, can not conflict with the Constitution either. Beijing government can offer Taiwan a status of "special administrative region" on the basis of the Constitution of the PRC. Likewise, Beijing is able to deprive Taiwan of this status through Constitutional amendment. Because the PRC has not been a democratized and institutionalized country yet, only a few people such as the top leaders of Beijing can make a decision whether or not the Constitution should be amended. In other words, the stability of the PRC Constitution is highly doubtful due to the lack of a democratic process to revise the version of Constitution. Above all, the commitment of Beijing leaders to the model of "one country, two systems" will decline after integration across the Taiwan Strait because there is not any other target for Chinese government to show the feasibility of this unification model. The function and value of this model to exercise on Hong Kong for the sake of persuading the people on Taiwan will cease to exist after Chinese unification. The chance of the "one country, two systems" model to survive the post-unification period will be highly uncertain as a result.
The Dilemma of Beijing-Taipei Two-Person Game
Based on the discussions of the previous sections, we can find that Beijing and Taipei is playing a game which can be illustrated as follows:
In Figure 2, "C" is referred to "cooperation" while "D" is referred to "defection"(i.e. confrontation). The numbers in the boxes are referred to the "priority" of the players. "A cold war" is referred to a condition in which negotiations and dialogues are interrupted and the threat of force or the preparation for war is frequently mentioned by both sides. "A cold peace" is referred to a condition in which negotiations and dialogues are maintained although the potential hostility towards each other still exists.
Figure 2 shows that the first choice of Beijing is Taipei's acception of "one country, two systems" as the future unification model. It is clear that this is the worst choice of Taipei. On the contrary, the best choice of Taipei is Beijing's acception of a unified China with freedom, democracy and equal prosperity. This is the worst choice of Beijing. On behalf of the positions of Beijing and Taipei, both "a cold war" and "a cold peace" are referred to the maintenance of the status quo which are better than their last choices which mean the breakdown of the status quo in favor of the opposing party. Compared with the cold war, it is clear that a cold peace is an approach to maintain the status quo with less costs. The choice of "a cold peace" is therefore better than the choice of "a cold war" for both sides. Apparently, this is a Prisoner's Dilemma Game and "cold war" is the outcome of the game. The dilemma of this game is that the two players can be better off simultaneously by the choice of the strategy of "cooperation". The problem is that how this outcome can be achieved.
As a matter of fact, it is always a main goal for game theorists to find solutions to the prisoner's dilemma game. One of the most convincing solutions is proposed by Robert Jervis. According to his analyses, the possibility of mutual cooperation will be enhanced under the following conditions: (1) the payoffs of both parties under mutual cooperation increase; (2) the costs of mutual confrontation increase; (3) the gains of the party that deviates from a cooperative strategy to double-cross its opponent decrease; (4) the costs of the party that is double-crossed by its opponent decrease; (5) the expectations to achieve mutual cooperation by both parties increase.<19> Another key point for achieving mutual cooperation is that the actors must perceive the game as indefinite, because once the actors find that the game will end, they might choose defection as strategy at the last moment so their payoff could be heightened. The justification of cooperation as a rational choice by the actors is therefore closely associated with the unlimitedness of the game.<20>
Mutual cooperation under the prisoner's dilemma game could be enforced due to a psychological fear that the opponent might retaliate in the next round, only if the end of the game is not expected. A metagame with tit for tat as an added strategy can best explain these conditions. This game can be illustrated by Figure 3.
Based on Robert Axelrod's definition, tit for tat refers to a strategy in which the actors choose cooperation first and then choose whatever strategy the opponent chooses.<21> Figure 3 shows that neither party enjoys a dominant strategy. However, the boxes with an asterisk are Nash equilibria and only (2,2) is a Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium. That is to say, the outcome will be very stable if both parties choose tit for tat as a strategy. The same conclusion could be drawn if we remove dominated strategies such as A's strategy "C" and then B's strategies "C" and "D" and then A's strategy "D". The mutual choice of the strategy of "tit for tat", i.e., (2,2), is the equilibrium of the game. The use of the approach to remove the dominated strategies reconfirms the finding in Figure 3. The choice of "tit for tat" as a strategy by both parties could be a significant solution to the prisoner's dilemma game.<22>
The possibility of mutual cooperation will decrease if the conditions which Jervis points out are reversed and the end of the game is expected by one or both of these two parties.
Some Negative Factors to Disengage from Beijing-Taipei Dilemma
(1) the lack of mutual trust
The possibility of mutual cooperation, as Robert Jervis puts it, will increase if both sides expect that the opposing party will choose the strategy of cooperation. "Mutual trust" is therefore important for both sides to develop this expectation. The expectation will break down if anyone of them suspects that the other side might take advantage of the cooperation of the former to maximize its benefits by choosing the strategy of "defection" instead.
The leaders of Beijing, as I discussed previously, are very concerned with the issue of sovereignty. "One country, two systems" is demanded by Beijing as the model of Chinese reunification. All of these are highly political issues which might push Taiwan into the corner since the status of the ROC will be destroyed under these concepts. Consequently, it is reasonable that Taipei is so concerned with the issue of its security in dealing with Beijing. The mechanism of psychological defense will be brought into full play and both Beijing and Taipei will fall into a vicious circle. For the sake of the maintenance of national security, Taiwan has to make an effort to develop its relationship with other countries and try to purchase arms from military powers. Because the concept of sovereignty is highly exclusive, Beijing is therefore very sensitive to the possible political and military linkages between Taiwan and other countries. The leaders of Beijing are worried by the development of Taiwan independence movement which might benefit from the foreign intervention. This anxiety is furthered by the following observations of public opinion on Taiwan which are concluded on the basis of a three-year survey: first, a pretty high percentage of people who support the maintenance of the status quo and keep the issue of reunification or independence open; second, a slight growth of the percentage of people who support the status quo indefinitely; third, a percentage growth of people in support of Taiwan independence; fourth, a decrease of percentage of people who support reunification.(see Figures 4-5)
Based on the concept that sovereignty is indivisible, Beijing make every effort to blockade the foreign relations of Taipei and the possible channels of arms sale to Taiwan. The leaders of Taipei perceive the policy of Chinese mainland towards Taiwan as a great threat to the survival of the ROC as a result. A struggle for the development of foreign relations is therefore a necessary approach for the ROC on Taiwan to survive the political and military threat of Chinese mainland. Consequently, the more Taiwan is concerned with its security by making efforts to reenter international community and to maintain the channels of arms sale from great powers, the more Chinese mainland is concerned with the issue of sovereignty by the use of diplomatic blockade towards Taiwan. The more Beijing is concerned with the issue of sovereignty, the more Taipei is concerned with national security of the ROC. A vicious circle between Chinese mainland and Taiwan results, which will inevitably bring about the lack of mutual trust.
In fact, the achievement of "mutual cooperation" between Beijing and Taipei is dependent upon whether or not there exist mutual benefits across the Taiwan Strait. Thomas C. Schelling argues that common interests are essential for bargaining.<23> It is beyond question that Beijing and Taipei share common interests in some respects. This is the reason why both parties have achieved few agreements through negotiation over the past few years. However, it is clear that the negotiations were frequently frustrated due to the lack of mutual trust. The issues of sovereignty and security were always the psychological shadow which slowed down the process to develop more "common interests" and reach more agreements. After the three-year interruption of negotiation, Beijing is demanding a political talk at the present time. This policy might lead to a showdown with respect to the issue of sovereignty. Unless Beijing shows sufficient flexibility towards this issue, the achievement of a "mutual cooperation" in terms of the resumption of negotiation, particularly a political talk, is difficult.
(2) the use of coercive strategy
The initiation of missile tests against Taiwan by Chinese mainland during 1995-1996 displayed that the threat of force is an approach of Beijing to compel Taipei to concede politically. The problem is that Taipei might respond by resistance rather than concession. Thomas C. Schelling is sound to argue that "coercion by threat of damage requires that our interests and our opponent's not be absolutely opposed. If his pain were our greatest delight and our satisfaction his greatest woe, we should just proceed to hurt and to frustrate each other. It is when his pain gives us little or no satisfaction compared with what he can do for us, and the action or inaction that satisfies us costs him less than the pain we can cause, that there is room for coercion."<24> Snyder and Diesing assert that "some acts of coercion logically fall outside the bargaining umbrella. For example, if the carrying out of a certain compellent threat were costless or positively beneficial to the threatening party, but costly to the victim, the parties would have no common interest in avoiding the fulfillment of the threat and thus no mutual incentive to reach a bargain."<25>
The relationship across the Taiwan Strait, as I put it previously, is entangled in the issues such as sovereignty, national identification and integration. The use of the strategy of coercion by Beijing is an effort to achieve compellent threat which is beneficial to Chinese mainland at the expense of Taiwan. It is clear that there is very little room for Taipei to concede in a political negotiation. A quasi zero-sum game, in fact, will further the lack of mutual trust and lower the possibility of "mutual cooperation".
The resistance of Taiwan to the threat of force of Chinese mainland can be confirmed by the examination of the public opinion of the latter. According to the survey conducted during June 1995 throughout May 1998, we can find that people on Taiwan think that developing foreign relations is more important than developing cross-strait relations. (see Figure 6) Nevertheless, the percentages gaps between those who prefer foreign relations to cross-strait relations and those who prefer the reverse are not so big. However, when being asked "if developing foreign ties led to rising tension on cross-strait relations, would you agree with such an effort?", the percentages of the people who support this effort are much higher than those of the people who are opposed to this effort. (see Figure 7) Besides, it is clear that the percentage of people who support Taiwan independence increases while that of people who support reunification decreases after 1995, the year Beijing initiated its military coercion against Taiwan. (see Figure 4)
In response to the threat of force of Chinese mainland, Taiwan has to prepare for war by the development of military technology. The purchase of advanced weapons is the inevitable means to deter the possible invasion of Chinese mainland. The use of the strategy of deterrence might indirectly encourage Beijing to cling to its coercive strategy. In fact, the vicious circle which I discussed previously will continue under this condition.
(3) the issue of face-saving
Chinese are a face-loving nation. Chinese people are very concerned with their self-image.<26> Once they lose their faces, they will try their best to win them back. The leaders of Beijing are therefore very sensitive to their international frustration and always tend to choose a face-saving policy towards other countries. The relationship across the Taiwan Strait is relevant to the issues such as sovereignty and national identification which are highly political. Beijing leaders are therefore more concerned with the status of Taiwan as a part of China and regards any deviation of Taipei from the track of national reunification as a serious challenge to Beijing's face-saving policy.
The efforts of Beijing and Taipei to disengage from dilemma, according to the concept of game theory, are closely associated with the assumption that the decision-makers of both parties are rational. In other words, Beijing and Taipei, under the prisoner's dilemma game, should try to disengage from mutual confrontation and achieve a mutual cooperation in which all of them will be better off. However, a face-saving policy is normally filled with anxiety and angry which are irrational. The decision-makers are even willing to struggle for face-saving at the expense of national interests. The possibility of concession to opposing party will be very low in the sense. Because the government of Taipei is very sensitive to political issues which are relevant to the survival of the ROC, the room for Taiwan to concede in this respect is very limited. It is therefore important for Beijing to perform more peacefully and cooperatively in order to convince Taipei that a mutual cooperation is feasible and valuable. However, due to the factor of face-saving, the leaders of Beijing are not as active as we assume to offer sufficient conditions to disengage from dilemma.
A Positive Factor to Disengage from Beijing-Taipei Dilemma
The United States as a foreign factor to influence the relationship across the Taiwan Strait is reevaluated by both Chinese mainland and Taiwan. Particularly the leaders of Beijing do not perceive the role of the US in dealing with this relationship as negative anymore. In other words, the possibility for the US to play a more active role in Beijing-Taipei relations is enhanced due to the changing policy of Chinese mainland. The government of the US, in fact, seems more concerned with and more responsive to the interactions between Beijing and Taipei. The elites of Washington D.C. have been more active than before to participate into the process of the resumption of Beijing-Taipei dialogues after US-Chinese mainland summits in 1998. The establishment of track two dialogue under a Washington-Beijing-Taipei triangle is an effort to achieve the previous goal. It is hence significant to evaluate the role of the US to help Beijing and Taipei to disengage from their dilemma.
First, it is clear that both Chinese mainland and Taiwan pay attention to their relations with the US. The policy of the US towards East Asia is to maintain the peace and stability of this region. The US is willing to approach Chinese mainland through the policy of "engagement". A peaceful dialogue across the Taiwan Strait is urged by the US. The US tries to maintain its ability to deter the possible use of force by Beijing against Taiwan. The government of the US, however, does not want to involve into any military conflicts between Chinese mainland and Taiwan.<27> On June 27, 1998, the President Clinton strongly encouraged Beijing and Taipei to resume their dialogues with each other when he paid a visit to Chinese mainland and attended a press conference with Chinese President, Chiang Tse-ming.<28> The positive attitude of the US towards the resumption of bilateral talks across the Taiwan Strait will increase the payoffs of both Beijing and Taipei under mutual cooperation since they might benefit from their active responses to the the US. On the other hand, the costs of mutual confrontation across the Taiwan Strait will increase because any negative response of Beijing and Taipei to the expectation of the US might hurt their relations with Washington D.C.. In other words, it is unwise for Chinese mainland or Taiwan to deviate from a cooperative strategy to double-cross its opponent. The gains of defection decrease as a result. The expectations to achieve mutual cooperation by both Beijing and Taipei increase under these conditions.
The justification of cooperation as a rational choice by the actors, as I discussed it previously, is closely associated with the unlimitedness of the game. On behalf of the position of Beijing, the two-person game between Chinese mainland and Taiwan is over once Taipei declares Taiwan independence legally. The game tends to end as well for Taipei if Beijing initiates a war against Taiwan. On June 30, 1998, the President Clinton announced his "three-no policy" in Shanghai, i.e., the US does not support Taiwan independence; the US does not support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" policy; the US does not believe that Taiwan is able to participate into the UN or any other international organizations whose members must be sovereign states.<29> The "three-no policy" clearly discourages separatism on Taiwan. The possibility of Taiwan independence decreases thereby. On July 1, 1998, James B. Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the president for national Security Affairs, promised in Shanghai that the US will continue its arms sale to Taiwan. He announced that the President Clinton urged Beijing government to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Although Chiang Tse-ming was not willing to offer this promise, the US and Chinese mainland had reached an agreement for peaceful resolution to Taiwan issue.<30> It is clear that the US remains its concern with the security of Taiwan unchanged and will maintain its long-term position that the settlement of disputes between Chinese mainland and Taiwan must be peaceful. The possibility of Beijing to initiate a war against Taiwan decreases consequently. The end of the two-person game across the Taiwan Strait is not expected thereby. Insofar as the impacts of the US on the relations across the Taiwan Strait are concerned, it seems hopeful that this country is able to play a positive role to help both Beijing and Taipei to disengage from their dilemma although the negative factors I discussed previously might slow down this development.
Conclusion
The relationship between Chinese mainland and Taiwan has suffered structural issues such as sovereignty and national identification for a long time. These issues greatly narrow down the room for Beijing and, particularly Taipei, to concede. Both parties have spent too much energy on the "pull and haul" with respect to these issues and are normally entangled in a vicious circle of sovereignty and security. It is easy for both sides to develop an emotional response to each other when their disputes are relevant to the meaning of "one China". The design of the model of "one country, two systems" is taken for granted by Beijing as a generous offer to the future status of Taiwan after national unification. However, this model is totally unacceptable to Taiwan because the ROC as a sovereign state will be completely destroyed as a result. The struggle for a better system rather than the coexistence of two systems in a unified China is the policy of Taipei, which inevitably downplays the feasibility of "one country, two systems" model. Besides, Beijing's perception of national integration as a condition in terms of the achievement of this model is greatly inconsistent with the Taipei's perception of integration as a process.
In fact, the interactions between Chinese mainland and Taiwan can be regarded as a prisoner's dilemma game in which the efforts of both parties to establish the consensus of mutual cooperation is critical to the possibility of them to disengage from dilemma. However, the lack of mutual trust, the use of coercive strategy by Beijing and the issue of face-saving are all negative factors to achieve a mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, the policy of the US towards China enhances the possibility of Chinese mainland and Taipei to cooperate with each other. This possibility is closely associated with the grave concerns of Beijing and Taipei with their relations with the US and their expectation of the unlimitedness of the two-person game. The problem is that the disengagement from Beijing-Taipei dilemma under the influence of the US may be hopeful, but not for sure. The future relations across the Taiwan Strait are still highly uncertain if the problem of structure remains unsettled. The key point to find solution to Beijing-Taipei dilemma is dependent upon whether or not Chinese mainland is willing to relax its concept of sovereignty. The relaxation of the concept of sovereignty, according to Hoffman, could be achieved by the development of the following ideas: 1. the establishment of interdependence; 2. the recognition of the limitation of power; 3. the coexistence of idealism and realism; 4. the expansion of common interests; 5. the acception of mutual difference; 6. the blame on violence; 7. a successful establishment of the concept of popular sovereignty; 8. mutual respects and reciprocity; 9. sovereignty as a relative rather than an absolute concept; 10. an emphasis on intergovernmental interaction instead of statism.<31> Basically, paternalism implied in the concept of sovereignty should be replaced by feminism in order to relax the rigidity of this concept.
The logic deduction of the linkage between the relaxation of the concept of sovereignty and the disengagement from the dilemma can be summarized as follows: The concept of sovereignty can not be separated from political reality in which jurisdiction should be taken into account. Based on mutual respects for the jurisdiction of the opposing party, sovereignty should be relaxed as a relative rather than an absolute concept. National unification is better defined as a process through which the integration may be achieved eventually. The system of "one country, two systems" should not be imposed upon the people on Taiwan. The model of unuification should be a open-ended issue which can not be concluded without negotiation and compromise. Once Beijing is able to relax the concept of sovereignty, the sensitivity of Chinese mainland to the policy of Taiwan will decrease and the possibility of overreaction due to overestimation of the hostility of the opposing party will decline. As a matter of fact, Taipei will feel more comfortable to deal with Beijing when Chinese mainland is able to relax its concept of sovereignty. Both parties might deviate from the vicious circle between sovereignty and security. The threat of force or the use of force are not necessary when Beijing and Taipei could maintain a more flexible policy towards each other. The issue of face-saving is not so negative anymore because of this flexibility. In other words, there will be more room for Beijing and Taipei to compromise. "Mutual cooperation" will be not only possible, but also stable once achieved.
1. Hwai-yin Tu, "Sovereignty," Yun-wu Wang (ed.), Yun-wu Dictionary for Social Science, vol.3 (Taipei: Taiwan Shan Wu Books Inc., 1976), p.67.
2. Sung-sheng Lei, The Theory of international Law. the first half volume (Taipei: Cheng Chung Books, 1971), p.38. Also see Hungdah Chiu, "The Main Actors of International Law," Hungdah Chiu (ed.), The Modern International Law (Taipei: San Ming Books, 1973), p.181.
3. Chiu. ibid..
4. "A Political Drug for the Promotion of 'Taiwan Independence - the Third Critique of Lee Teng-hui's Speech at Cornell University," People's Daily News (overseas edition), July 26, 1995, p.1.
5. James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, jr., Contending Theories of International Relations (N.Y.: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971), pp.281-282.
6. ibid., p.282.
7. ibid..
8. ibid., p.281.
9. ibid., pp.280-281.
10. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. & Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation (N.Y.: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp.454-455.
11. Guidelines for National unification, A document adopted by the National Unification Council at its third meeting on February 23, 1991, and distributed by the ROC government.
12. Tzong-Ho Bau, "Beijing-Taipei Interaction as a Two-Person Conflict (1949-88)," Denis F. Simon and Michael Y.M. Kau (eds.), Taiwan Beyond the Economic Miracle (N.Y.: An East Gate Book, 1992), pp.319-321.
13. ibid..
14. ibid., p.320.
15. A Closing Remarks delivered by the President Lee Teng-hui at the 13th meeting of National unification Council on July 22, 1998.
16. "A Confession to Advocate Separatism - A Critique of Lee Teng-hui's Speech at Cornell University," People's Daily News (overseas edition), July 24, 1995, p.1.
17. "The Integration of National Sovereignty is not Allowed to be Challenged," Wen Hui News, November 15, 1995, p.A3.
18. Mainland China Affairs and Cross-Strait Relations, a project chaired by Professor Yi-Yen Chen and cochaired by Professor Tzong-Ho Bau, and conducted by Center for Election Study, National Chengchi University, 1997 (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, 1997), p.112.
19. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics 30 (1978), p.171.
20. Michael D. McGinnis, "Issue Linkage and the Evolution of International Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution 30, no.1 (March 1986), p.144. Also see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1984).
21. Robert Axelrod, "More Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma," Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, no.3 (September 1980), p.380.
22. For the detailed discussion about the choice of "tit for tat" strategy, see Bau, op.cit., pp.303-305.
23. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), p.1.
24. ibid., p.4.
25. Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations ( New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p.196.
26. Samuel S. Kim, "China and the World in Theory and Practice," Samuel S. Kim (ed.), China and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1994), p.14.
27. A statement by Dr. Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the House International Relations Committee on 20 May 1998.
28. United Daily News, June 27, 1998, p.1.
29. United Evening News, June 30, 1998, p.1.
30. China Times, July 2, 1998, p.1.
31. John Hoffman, "Feminism, Democracy and the Problem of Sovereignty," A paper prepared for presentation at the XVIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, August 21-25, 1994.