Taiwan’s Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era

By Martin L. Lasater

Nov. 2000

Author’s Note: Peace in the Taiwan Strait is becoming much more problematic in view of political changes in Taiwan and the United States, and the growing national power of China. The following article addresses many of the key factors influencing Taiwan’s present security situation. The article is taken from the concluding chapter of a recently published book by the same title, written by Martin L. Lasater and  Peter Kien-hong Yu, with contributions from Kuang-ming Hsu and Robyn Lim (London: Frank Cass, November 2000).

              The overall conclusion reached in this study is that Taiwan’s security situation in the post-Deng era is complex and unpredictable. However, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 being ensured peace in the Taiwan Strait and 10 being ensured war, one would have to conclude that the prospects for war are greater than the prospects for peace. Perhaps a 6 or 7 on the 10-point scale would reflect the probability of some form of conflict occurring in the Taiwan Strait before 2010—and that might be optimistically biased in favor of peace.

              It is not that peace is impossible to sustain; it is that peace is so difficult to maintain in a situation, like that of the Taiwan issue, in which all concerned parties have vital or important interests at stake with relatively little room for compromise. Taipei, Beijing, Washington, and their various domestic audiences (some supporting existing policy, some opposed)—all have in common a desire to find a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that is relatively fair and serves the interests of all. That common desire is the hope we all must embrace that a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question can be found. But barring some change in the fundamental positions of the ROC, PRC, or the United States, the hope for peace may give way to the exigencies of conflict. The outcome of such violence is becoming harder to predict, but under most circumstances it would seem that Taiwan would lose and China would win in an internal Chinese conflict, but that Taiwan would win and China would lose if the conflict involved the United States.

              Thus, the circumstances under which the United States would intervene become all-important. This question will be addressed in some detail momentarily, but first it might be useful to summarize the most important factors bearing on Taiwan’s security in the post-Deng Xiaoping era, as these have been discussed in the previous chapters.

Summary of Major Findings

              1. China is willing to go to war over Taiwan. The PRC seems most likely to use force against Taiwan (a) if the island seeks to become an independent nation-state, separate from Chinese territory; or (b) if the island is to become a base of military operations for a foreign power such as the United States. Of the two circumstances, the former is more credible; however, China’s historical experiences do not discount the second possibility. Indeed, a common perception in Beijing is that Washington uses the Taiwan issue to keep China divided and weakened. Within the PLA, there is a growing consensus that Taiwan must be reunited with the mainland if China is ever to achieve its great power status in Asia. Thus, Chinese nationalism and a powerful strategic rationale are combining to strengthen PRC resolve to fight over Taiwan, even it means a military confrontation with the United States. Moreover, as this resolve firms, Beijing’s patience over a resolution of the Taiwan issue seems to be wearing thin.

              2. The United States probably will defend Taiwan against PRC aggression. The security of Taiwan is linked to many important U.S. interests, including the maintenance of a favorable balance of power in the Western Pacific. American willingness to defend Taiwan against an unprovoked PRC attack (a) strengthens perceptions of American credibility in the Asian Pacific and (b) demonstrates U.S. determination to prevent China from becoming a regional hegemon. The United States probably would accept any solution to the Taiwan issue arrived at peacefully between the two sides of the Strait. However, as China increases its national power and seeks to expand its sphere of influence beyond its borders, thereby becoming a peer competitor of the United States in the Western Pacific, American recognition of Taiwan’s geostrategic importance may be growing. The PRC’s increased power does add to its deterrence against American intervention, but U.S. interests in maintaining a favorable balance of power are far more important than the risks associated with China’s increased threat.

              3. The PLA, already quantitatively superior to ROC armed forces, is gaining qualitatively as well. The ROC probably can defeat a PRC attack until around 2005, at which time the PLA’s modernization—with Russian assistance—will pose a quantitative and qualitative threat difficult for Taiwan to match, even with purchases of American weapons and technology. A major arms race is underway in the Taiwan Strait, with both sides trying desperately to leverage their respective military advantages into a decisive checkmate.

              4. U.S. arms sales to Taiwan are critical and likely will continue. Despite the many restrictions on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, enough flows through the pipeline to provide the ROC with defensive capabilities against most forms of PRC aggression. Without these sales, Taiwan would be extremely vulnerable to Chinese intimidation; with the sales, Taipei can be moderately autonomous, if not quite independent. The level of U.S. arms sales fluctuates with both the nature of the PRC threat to Taiwan as well as the political relationships existing between Washington, Taipei, and Beijing. Although these sales might increase as the PLA modernizes and as the PRC exercises its growing national power, U.S. arms sales in themselves are no guarantee of Taiwan’s security.

              5. To date, there is no political solution to the Taiwan issue in sight, but the situation is fluid. In the final analysis, a resolution of the Taiwan question must come from the Chinese themselves on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Thus far, however, neither side has been able to formulate a proposal acceptable to the other. In many respects, the political confrontation across the Strait . . . is a zero-sum game—with hot and cold tactics—in which each side’s proposals are in effect a demand that the other side surrender. Both sides seek to use the United States to their advantage, and both sides have had success and failure in these efforts. As the security climate in the Taiwan Strait becomes more pressurized, various “wild cards” are emerging that might break through the political impasse and result in peaceful or nonpeaceful resolution. These wild cards include track-II diplomatic efforts, the policy influence of the DPP on Taiwan and hardliners in Beijing, growing economic and cultural exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, and unexpected moves by political leaders, such as Lee Teng-hui’s moving away from a “one-China” policy.

              6. The security of Taiwan is of international strategic concern. Taiwan’s geostrategic importance has increased, not decreased, as a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. As China’s geopolitical importance has grown relative to that of the United States and other great powers in the 1990s, Beijing increasingly has looked to the East and South Chinas Seas—and to the Pacific and Indian Oceans beyond—as areas into which it would like to project power and influence. This ambition, as natural as it may seem from China’s point of view, runs counter to the maritime security interests of Japan, much of ASEAN, Australia, India, and, most importantly, the United States—the current “offshore balancer.” In the Asian Pacific, the island chain is a natural barrier to China’s expansion of influence; and in this island chain, Taiwan occupies a central position. From a strategic point of view, therefore, the security of Taiwan is of grave concern, since the island can either contribute to or impede the projection of Chinese power into the western Pacific Basin. The revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines almost guarantee that, should Washington become involved in a future conflict in the Taiwan Strait, Tokyo will play a supportive role.

              7. The military situation in the Taiwan Strait is increasingly volatile. It is difficult to gather accurate information on the PLA or its strategies to attack Taiwan. There also is no consensus on the duration of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or the number of PLA troops and equipment necessary to defeat Taipei. Both sides have their strengths and weaknesses, but the overall trends point to both a quantitative and qualitative advantage accruing to the PRC no later than 2010. Since both Taipei and Beijing constantly prepare for conflict in the Taiwan Strait, and the two militaries are in close proximity, even a small incident may spark a war.

              8. PRC missiles pose the greatest threat to Taiwan, since they may suffice to break the will of the Taiwanese people. War may break out at any time in the Taiwan Strait, and there are many scenarios by which the PLA may try to defeat Taiwan. In most conventional scenarios, the first priority for Taiwan’s defense is to establish control over the air and sea surrounding Taiwan. The ROC is strongest in terms of air defense, but its air force can be exhausted by repeated PLA sorties. In terms of sea control, Taipei is somewhat weaker and may not be able to control the Taiwan Strait, although Beijing may not be able to control the waters to the east of Taiwan. The second priority for Taiwan’s defense is to counter a blockade. The PRC can use submarines, mines, blocking ships, and other devices to close Taiwan’s harbors and restrict shipborne movement into and out of Taiwan ports, but this is a long and difficult process. By itself, a blockade of Taiwan probably would not bring Taipei to its knees, although it would cause severe economic dislocation. A third priority for Taiwan’s defense is to counter PLA ground forces attempting to land on the island. Land operations on Taiwan present major problems for both the attacker and the defender; therefore, other factors—such as the effectiveness of special operations forces and the determination of local defense forces—would probably make the difference between victory or defeat for either side. However, the critical determinant in a war in the Taiwan Strait is probably the effectiveness of PLA missiles in breaking the will of the Taiwan people to resist. In this respect, Taiwan may be vulnerable.

              9. The national and military strategies of the ROC are evolving but they have not yet solved the problem of long-term survival. Due to the nature of the modern PRC threat to Taiwan—unrelenting political confrontation and preparation for attack—the ROC must continually review and adjust its national strategy and its military strategy. Of the two types of threat faced by Taiwan, the political is more severe than the military at present, but the PLA’s preparation for military conflict under modern conditions will require a strategic adjustment on the part of Taipei. Unfortunately, the restrictions under which Taiwan must operate—e.g., no nuclear weapons—makes an effective defensive strategy difficult to conceptualize and implement.

              10. Congress and the American public will likely continue to be supportive of Taiwan. Because Taiwan is a market democracy and friend of the United States, the American people and their representatives in Congress favor a U.S. policy of continued friendship and support for Taiwan. Congress exercises considerable influence on U.S. policy toward both Taiwan and China, and there is little or no inclination on Capitol Hill to compromise Taiwan’s security interests for improved relations with Beijing. Indeed, Congress will act to ensure—through law if necessary—the continued implementation of the TRA’s arms sales requirements and act as a brake on administration efforts to move “strategic partnership” with China beyond the talking phase.

              11. The principles on which Sino-American relations are built are under severe strain because of developments in China and Taiwan. The Taiwan issue has long been at the center of U.S.-PRC relations—at least from the point of view of Beijing. The three joint communiqués and various administrative precedents gradually developed a set of principles governing the Taiwan issue in Sino-American relations. Since the mid-1980s, but especially since the beginning of the 1990s, these principles have been challenged by a series of trends: (a) the growing national power of the PRC, accompanied by a stronger sense of Chinese nationalism, including a desire for early unification with Taiwan; (b) democratization and Taiwanization within the ROC, giving voice to stronger demands for Taiwan’s political separation from China; and (c) a dramatic shift in the international security environment of the United States, with China replacing Russia as the nation most likely to challenge U.S. global and regional interests in coming decades.

              12. The probability of a Sino-American confrontation over Taiwan is growing. Neither Beijing nor Washington wants such a confrontation, but the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis proved to both countries that war is possible if the Taiwan issue is not handled carefully. Among the lessons learned from the crisis were: (a) the PRC will use force to intimidate Taiwan if ROC leaders move the island toward greater political autonomy; (b) the United States will intervene on Taiwan’s behalf to prevent PRC intimidation; and (c) actions by the Taiwan government can bring the United States and China to the brink of war. Beginning in 1997 the Clinton administration tried to adjust its policies toward the Taiwan issue, but the “three no’s,” “interim agreements,” and “track-II” efforts may have had unintended effects. Taipei believes the United States is now nudging Taiwan to become part of the PRC, pressure resulting not in capitulation but rather stronger Taiwanese expressions of a desire to be separate from a communist-dominated China. At the same time, hardliners in Beijing are now more convinced than ever that the United States would not intervene to protect Taiwan, or would not intervene effectively. If not handled carefully, U.S. policies, whatever their motivation, can increase the prospects for war in the Taiwan Strait and a Sino-American conflict.

              13. Taiwan will benefit from TMD, but its overall security will become more dependent on external factors in the early twenty-first century. In all likelihood, the ROC will acquire PAC- 3 and Aegis-based systems for point missile defense over the next several years. This will increase Taiwan’s ability to defeat some, but not all, PRC cruise missiles and ballistic missiles that might be launched should war occur in the Taiwan Strait. The ability of China to produce large numbers of guided missiles and to acquire state-of-the-art conventional offensive weaponry from Russia and other sources means that Taiwan’s narrow technological advantage over the PRC will likely be overwhelmed in five to ten years (2005–2010). At that time, absent intervention by the United States, Taiwan probably can be defeated by a determined PLA attack. Whether the United States intervenes or not will likely have less to do with Taiwan policies than with (a) domestic American politics, (b) international circumstances such as global demands on American military forces,  and (c) perceptions by U.S. policymakers of China’s threat to American interests at the time.

              14. Other than military preparedness, the most important contribution Taiwan can make to its own security is political astuteness. It is Taiwan’s destiny to be caught in the middle as great powers compete for influence in the Western Pacific. Historically, small nations in such positions have either been absorbed or marginalized by some larger country or have prospered by learning how to play the power game to their advantage. There is no reason to be unduly pessimistic about Taiwan’s future, unless the Taiwan people and their elected officials contribute to their society’s demise by alienating both their enemies and their friends, while at the same time weakening the island’s social cohesion. In other words, to survive well into the twenty-first century, Taiwan’s democracy must produce enlightened policies not divisive partisanship.

U.S. Response to PRC Use of Force

              In assessing Taiwan’s security, it is important to examine the probability of American intervention on Taiwan’s behalf. . . . American intervention is one of the most important determinants of whether the PRC would or would not be successful in the employment of force against Taiwan. Absent U.S. intervention, the PRC might well be successful in defeating Taiwan; with U.S. intervention, the likelihood of Taiwan’s defeat could be reduced to near nil proportions. However, whether the United States decides to intervene would be greatly influenced by the circumstances surrounding the crisis. No doubt, the first and preferred U.S. option would be political, that is, diplomatic entreaties to try to stop the use of force before it began, to limit its escalation, and to end it as soon as possible. These efforts at diplomatic containment would continue throughout the crisis and may or may not be successful. But assuming military intervention became a necessary option, three factors would be critical in the U.S. decision: (1) the reason the PRC elected to use force against Taiwan, (2) the type of force being used, and (3) the circumstances in place at the time.

              The following table lists various reasons the PRC might use to justify force against Taiwan and speculates whether the United States would likely intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.

As can be seen, there are few justifications for the PRC to use force against Taiwan that would not risk American military intervention. The exceptions might be (a) Taiwan moving in the direction of independence, in which case the U.S. response would be uncertain because of probable disagreement between the Congress and the administration over conflicting American interests—e.g., support for Taiwan’s right of self-determination versus conflict avoidance with the PRC; (b) internal chaos on Taiwan, in which case the United States might be hamstrung due to the lack of a viable government in Taipei with which to coordinate; and (c) Taiwan developing nuclear weapons, in which case the United States might impose sanctions on Taipei for proliferation. Most of the other justifications Beijing might use to attack Taiwan would be rejected by the United States. In these cases, the United States would see the PRC as an aggressor and probably respond with military intervention.

              The probability of American intervention becomes a little more difficult to determine when considering the many different kinds of force the PRC might threaten or use against Taiwan. For example, an unprovoked, land-air-sea-missile PRC attack would probably result in quick and decisive American intervention. Chinese sabotage of Taiwan’s electrical system, however, probably would not draw the Seventh Fleet into nearby waters. What follows, then, is a table of various types of force the PRC might use with an accompanying assessment of the probability of American military intervention.

As discussed, the type of force being threatened or used against Taiwan can have an important impact on the likelihood of American military intervention. Significant uses of force are more likely to result in U.S. intervention: e.g., missile testing on Taiwan territory, enforced blockade of Taiwan, any use of nuclear weapons, any direct attack on Taiwan or the Pescadores, attacks or threats against ships in international waters around Taiwan, attacks on key ROC offshore islands, and mobilization of the PLA for an apparent war against Taiwan.

              Low levels of force are least likely to result in American intervention: e.g., agitation or sabotage, verbal threats, Chinese fishing boat nuisance, economic or political pressure, accidents in the Taiwan Strait, harassment of ROC fishing vessels, increases in PLA strength in the Taiwan region but not mobilization, and propaganda attacks.

              Still more complexity is introduced in the U.S. decision to intervene when the circumstances under which the threat or use of force occurred are factored in. For example, Washington would be more inclined to assist Taipei if the PRC initiated an attack with no provocation than if Taipei deliberately caused a crisis in the Taiwan Strait to secure U.S. backing for its independence or U.S. forces were busy elsewhere. The following table lists various circumstances surrounding the use of force in the Taiwan Strait and speculates on whether the United States would be inclined to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf.

As can be seen, the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of violence in the Taiwan Strait would play an important and perhaps decisive role in the U.S. decision whether to intervene militarily on Taiwan’s behalf. The likelihood of U.S. intervention would be strongest if the PRC attacked Taiwan under circumstances such as: a PRC leader sought to use the Taiwan issue to firm up his or her political authority, Beijing sought to become a regional hegemon, the PRC adopted an anti-American strategy and policy, the PRC retreated on its economic and political reforms, China was disintegrating, the U.S. changed its policy from engagement to containment of China, the PRC applied political or economic pressure on Taiwan to push it into an incident, or the PLA was seeking to take advantage of ROC armed forces weakness.

              The likelihood of U.S. intervention would be weakest under circumstances such as political instability on Taiwan or in the United States, if Taipei deliberately tried to precipitate a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, if China were embarked on a clear path of democratization, if the United States became isolationist, or if the United States redrew its Pacific line of defense eastward to Guam or Hawaii.

              A great many circumstances would have a significant but uncertain influence on the U.S. decision to intervene: e.g., sharply divided opinion in the United States over intervention, the U.S. military was heavily overextended, the U.S. alliance with Japan was in deep trouble, Congress or the American people were far less supportive of Taiwan, Taipei moved to declare Taiwan an independent nation-state separate from China, the conflict began accidentally, or it was clear the two Chinese sides had determined to fight the war to the finish despite American entreaties. . .  .

              Since Taiwan’s ability to resist PRC force would be vastly improved if the ROC were aided by the United States, it follows that Beijing would prefer to use force against Taiwan under conditions least likely to bring American intervention. . . . However, there are at least four problems PRC strategists face in trying to take advantage of these conditions: (1) the PRC has limited ability to control levels of social stability or instability on Taiwan; (2) Beijing has virtually no influence over political stability or instability in the United States; (3) the levels of force unlikely to precipitate American intervention may be inadequate to defeat the ROC; (4) the CCP does not want China to become democratic; and (5) the PRC has very limited influence over whether the United States becomes isolationist or redefines its line of defense in the Western Pacific.

              In addition to the factor of American intervention, there is also the highly determining factor of whether Taiwan’s society is strong and unified in the face of the PRC threat or whether Taiwan’s society is divided and weak. If Taiwan is strong and unified—even in the absence of U.S. intervention—then the only certain way to defeat the ROC would be a successful PLA amphibious invasion, no doubt accompanied by blockade, missile attack, airborne invasion, and air-sea battles over the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan island. Without U.S. intervention, this kind of attack might defeat Taiwan. However, these circumstances—a strong, unified Taiwan and massive PRC use of force—are the precise conditions most likely to draw American intervention.

              On the other hand, if Taiwan were unstable due to social chaos or political paralysis, then many of the possible uses of force against Taiwan could result in Taipei’s capitulation—perhaps even with American intervention. Under conditions of social or political weakness, coordination of the island’s defenses and summons to resist could be ineffective. Taiwan might be able to survive with U.S. support, but social chaos on Taiwan is one of the very few conditions under which American intervention is improbable. The United States would not want to become involved in a situation risking war with China when Taiwan was unstable. Since China has at least some influence over social stability on Taiwan, it probably should be assumed that one of Beijing’s principal strategies is the undermining of social and political stability on the island—a strategy consistent with traditional Chinese methods of indirect approach.

              Since there is no guarantee that China can be successful either in undermining Taiwan’s social stability or in preventing American military intervention, Chinese leaders must be prepared to fight the United States if they are determined to prevent Taiwan from becoming an independent state. Several conclusions relative to PRC strategy and policy can be drawn from this analysis:

1. Beijing can safely maneuver in a “low risk” threat environment to try to pressure Taipei and Washington and can be expected to do so.
2. The PRC will probably do more to undermine social, economic, and political stability on Taiwan.
3. China will prepare to use higher levels of force and accept more risks to achieve its goal of national unification.
4. Beijing might well conclude that a military confrontation with the United States may be necessary to achieve unification.
5. Chinese leaders will try to bid their time on the Taiwan issue, waiting for circumstances which might weaken Taiwan internally and reduce the probability of American military intervention.
6. At the same time, PRC leaders are under a great deal of pressure—both from hardliners within the party and PLA and indirectly from independent advocates on Taiwan—to prevent Taiwan independence before it is too late.
7. To deter or defeat the United States, China will design and deploy the PLA to inflict unacceptably high losses on U.S. forces.
8. As China develops these capabilities, its political leaders will attempt to neutralize American opposition to China and its unification objectives. . . .

Policy Suggestions

            Taiwan’s security in the future will be heavily influenced by three interlocking factors: developments on Taiwan itself, cross-Strait relations, and the level of American support for Taiwan. As a democracy, Taiwan’s policy choices rightfully reside with its people and their elected representatives; however, insofar as Taiwan’s security is dependent on continued American support, those choices should take into consideration the interests and views of the United States. This is a fact of life for Taiwan, unless it wants to face the PRC threat alone.

            From an American perspective, Taiwan is closely tied to China culturally, historically, and geographically. And since China is an international actor of strategic proportions, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has to take into account the nature of Sino-American relations. Most Americans do not approve of the communist government of Beijing; and a long-term U.S. goal is to see China become a market democracy, as Taiwan now is. However, the United States cannot function as a global leader without dealing extensively with the PRC across the entire spectrum of security, political, economic, environmental, and other international issues.

            Since the United States must deal with China, it is important to Washington that cooperative relations with Beijing be maintained. And because the Taiwan issue is so important to Chinese leaders, the United States must seek to manage the Taiwan issue in ways least likely to disrupt Sino-American relations. This was accomplished with some success through the mid-1990s, at which time two developments began to disrupt the U.S. “dual-track” policy and the basic principles governing the Taiwan issue. These two developments were the growing power and rising nationalism of mainland China, and trends toward independence on Taiwan. Together, these two forces have increased tension in the Taiwan area, loosened the one-China “glue” that held U.S.-PRC-Taiwan relations together in relative stability, and deepened divisions within U.S. policymaking circles over how best to respond.

            Taiwan bears considerable responsibility, in the view of many Americans, for growing tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Lee Teng-hui in particular is singled out for criticism because of his “pushing the envelope” in lobbying for a trip to the United States in 1995 and his redefinition of Taiwan’s one-China policy in 1999. But in reality, former President Lee is but the tip of the iceberg of Taiwanese nationalism; and that sense of unique identity will not be suppressed by Beijing or Washington or even Taipei—at least not without considerable force. Some way has to be found to allow expression of Taiwanese nationalism, even if it should not be allowed to precipitate a war in the Taiwan Strait.

            Beijing has sought by way of threat and intimidation to stifle Taiwanese nationalism, while the Clinton administration sought to restrict Taiwan’s freedom of international movement toward the same end. Such policies will not result in Taiwan’s acceptance of local status under the PRC, but rather will result in a vicious circle of increased tensions in the Taiwan Strait and added pressure on Taiwan—all of which will contribute to probable conflict involving the United States.

            The challenge for Beijing and Taipei is to find an escape from the zero-sum game in which only one side can win. But with mutual distrust running so high, it stretches optimism to believe such equilibrium can easily be found. . . . Washington cannot control the policies of Beijing and Taipei, but it can pursue policies which encourage both sides to find a peaceful and fair settlement—even while the United States protects its own interests. These bottom-line interests are important to identify:

1.      The United States has interests in a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, but not at the cost of pressuring Taiwan to become part of a communist-dominated China.

2.      The United States has interests in a cooperative, friendly relationship with the PRC, but not at the cost of abandoning the people of Taiwan or violating American values. . . .

3.      The United States has interests in supporting Taiwan and maintaining friendly, unofficial relations with its authorities, but not at the cost of defending Taiwan’s formal separation from China with American lives and treasure.

4.      The United States has interests in integrating China into the world’s council of great powers, but not at the cost of allowing Chinese hegemony.

5.      The United States has interests in more humane, democratic, and free market institutions in China, but not at the cost of ignoring pragmatism and courtesy in dealing with Beijing.

            It may well be that war will occur in the Taiwan Strait during this decade; and if this happens, the probability of a Sino-American conflict in the Taiwan region is quite high. War is a price all sides are willing to pay to protect their principles and interests. On the other hand, peace is possible, even if a quick resolution of the Taiwan issue may not be forthcoming. Decision makers in Beijing, Taipei, and Washington may have an excellent opportunity in the 2001–2005 period to devise a new framework for their triangular relationship. At minimum, it would seem that

1. The interests of China must be protected by firm commitments from Taipei that Taiwan is part of China and that it will not seek to become an independent country separate from China, and from Washington that the United States will not encourage or support Taiwan independence.
2. The interests of Taiwan must be protected by guarantees of its autonomy from communist rule, a respectful place in the international community, security from threat or intimidation, and freedom from pressure to enter into early negotiations with Beijing.
3. The interests of the United States must be protected by peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait region, relations with both the mainland and Taiwan in a manner consistent with the joint communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, and assurances that both sides of the Taiwan Strait are committed to a gradual, peaceful, and mutually beneficial resolution of their differences.
4. The interests of the Asian-Pacific community must be protected by assurances from Beijing that it will not seek regional hegemony and from Taipei that it will not precipitate a war with the mainland by rejecting the idea of a united China in the future.

            Is such a framework possible? At this point in time it is premature to say. But it can be reliably forecast that without such a framework, or one similarly designed to protect the interests of all concerned parties, Taiwan’s security in the post-Deng Xiaoping era will progressively become more tenuous and war in the Taiwan Strait will progressively become more likely.