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 Air Activity Over the Taiwan Strait

Kenneth W. Allen

Senior Associate, The Henry L. Stimson Center

According to press reports, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has flown numerous sorties over the Taiwan Strait and has crossed over the center line of the Strait several times in reaction to President Lee Teng-hui's statement about "state-to-state" relations between Taiwan and mainland China on July 9. This issue has generated a lot of interest and speculation about the possibility of an aircraft incident occurring, either by accident or on purpose by either side, that might trigger hostilities across the Strait. Is this really new activity? Is the PLAAF building up its force to attack Taiwan? Is there a real possibility of an accidental shootdown by either side occurring over the Strait? Can Taiwan's Air Force (TAF) defend itself against an air attack?

On August 3, The Washington Post reported that "A US official said that China, which rarely sends planes over the Taiwan Strait, has flown more than 100 sorties with three different types of aircraft, including advanced Sukhoi-27s recently acquired from Russia. Another senior Administration official said that Taiwanese aircraft have flown a similar number of times and ventured over the center line of the strait, which is about 100 miles wide." This equates to less than ten sorties per day over a three week period. Further reporting from Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense (MND) confirmed that:

• Two PLAAF J-8 fighters crossed the center line of the Strait on July 25 and two J-7 fighters crossed the center line on July 30. Shortly after the planes crossed the line, they corrected their routes and returned to the west side of the center line;

• The J-7s and J-8s from Fuzhou and Longxi airbases have been flying over the Strait on a daily basis;

• Sukhoi-27 fighters stationed at Suixi airbase in Guangdong Province have begun training activities in areas close to the center line. (The Sukhoi-27s from Wuhu airbase in Anhui Province are probably also involved);

• There is no truth to reports that PLAAF Sukhoi-27s locked on with their fire control radars to two Taiwan Mirage 2000 fighters over the Taiwan Strait on August 2; and

• About 340 international flights and 730 domestic flights fly over the Taiwan Strait daily.

Is this really new activity? In November 1998, the commander of a Taiwan Air Force Mirage-2000 fighter group confirmed that "while the Air Force was conducting training of Mirage fighters, Chinese Communist fighters were detected through radar to appear above the Taiwan Strait several times. However, according to the battle control instructions and to avoid sensitive events from happening, fighters from both sides flew on their own routes, moving away from each other. The attempt of Chinese Communist fighters to fly across the central line of the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly obvious."

The commander further stated that "since the end of air battles over the Taiwan Strait in 1958, when carrying out patrol duties during Ordinary times, our fighters have always kept a distance of 30 nautical Miles (nm) from the mainland's coast, while the Chinese Communist fighters usually carry out their duties close to their own coast line. If two Communist jet fighters took off, the Taiwan Air Force would dispatch four planes to watch them. Maintaining a tacit agreement on an invisible central line of the strait, neither side has conducted any provocative flights against each other so as to prevent an air battle from breaking out due to misjudgments made by their pilots. In the past, there was a tacit agreement between the two air forces that ‘we leave when you come, and we come when you leave.' However, recently the Chinese Communist fighters have conducted frequent intentional flights across the central line of the Taiwan Strait. While the Air Force was conducting training of F-16 and Mirage 2000 fighters, the fighters could detect the traces of Chinese Communist fighters on the screens of their radar. In so doing, they probably attempted to get information about the training of our new-generation fighters."

In addition, US State Department Spokesman James Rubin stated on August 3 that "We have seen sortie rates much higher than this in the past, but we are monitoring the situation closely." According to a Taiwan MND spokesman on August 4, "following Beijing's 1996 military exercise to threaten Taiwan, Communist Chinese airplanes have been flying more often in the Taiwan Strait. Currently about 12 planes can be detected flying at the same time and more than 30 planes can be detected in the air daily." Is the PLAAF building up its force to attack Taiwan? According to the Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report, at the thirteen military-civilian airports within 250 nm of Taiwan proper, the PLA Air Force can station 1,200 combat aircraft and maneuver fifty-nine air transports to carry two airborne regiments for operational missions. The stationing and deployment of PLA Air Force aircraft are divided into three areas based on their distance from Taiwan; first line (250 nm), second line (500 nm) and third line(beyond 500 nm). At present, stationed on the air bases within 500 nm from Taiwan are 1,300 aircraft, of which some 600 have a radius of operation over Taiwan proper. The total of 48 Su-27s, with a radius of operation of 810 nm, now based at Wuhu, Anhui Province, and Suixi, Guangdong Province, also cover Taiwan.

On August 10, an MND spokesperson stated that "about 150 Communist Chinese aircraft are stationed in Fujian's coastal areas, in addition to the deployment of eight J-8s to Fuzhou airbase." Furthermore, "Su-27 fighters stationed in Guangdong Province have begun training activities in areas close to the center line." Although not stated, these aircraft are probably flying direct missions to and from the Strait from their home base at Suixi. Based on interviews in Japan and Taiwan, aircraft from Fujian Province have been deploying to and from airbases outside Fujian during the same day, providing them with the ability to move out of the area rapidly if the need arose. In addition, all PLAAF pilots within the Nanjing Military Region have been conducting live air-to-air missile firing over water since 1996. A July 27, 1999 Beijing Evening News report emphasized that the PLAAF had broken a 15-year record for flight time logged in the first half of the year, including difficult drills at night, at low altitude and in heavy weather.

The most recent example of the PLAAF's operational readiness was the PLA exercises opposite Taiwan during March 1996. According to available open source material, "there were 12,000 Air Force and 3,000 Naval Aviation servicemen involved. More than 280 aircraft were deployed, making 680 sorties, including 82 sorties by transports. Over 800 combat aircraft were in combat readiness (500 nm) or on the alert." According to another report, there were fewer than 100 additional aircraft deployed to the thirteen Fujian airfields from other bases, raising the total to only 226 aircraft. Based on a briefing from the US Office of Naval Intelligence, the PLA conducted a total of 1,755 sorties during the exercise. Further press reporting stated that military intelligencehas learned that when the PLA carried out its large-scale military exercises near Taiwan in 1996, its second- and third-line fighters were launched from first-line bases. It took about 3.5 hours for them to accomplish the preparation for takeoff, compared to the ten hours they had needed in the past. Interviews in Taiwan indicate that the PLAAF routinely has four-eight aircraft airborne at a time out of various airfields in Fujian. In addition, the PLAAF has demonstrated rapid aircraft sortie regeneration of forty minutes, which is considerably quicker than the past.

In the event of the outbreak of hostilities, once the PLAAF has deployed several hundred aircraft near Taiwan, it must then coordinate an air attack. Although the PLAAF has been practicing this, they do not yet have this capability. According to a US Office of Naval Intelligence briefing, during the 1996 exercises, PLAAF and PLA Naval Air Force fighters and bombers engaged in simulated and live bombing, fighter escort for bombers, air-to-air combat training, and other routine training. The PLAAF's airborne forces were also involved in airdrop activity by PLAAF transport aircraft. The key to any conflict for the PLAAF is sustained combat, however, the PLAAF has not yet demonstrated the capability to conduct sustained, high intensity operations. They have no real-world experience in planning and executing the kind of high intensity air campaign that has proven so successful in recent US and NATO operations. For example, during the early stages of the conflict in Kosovo, allied air forces deployed approximately 400 aircraft to the area. On the third day of operations, allied aircraft flew 249 sorties in one day. By the end of the conflict, the number of US and NATO combat aircraft participating in strike delivery rose from 214 to 590. According to Pentagon information, 23,000 bombs and missiles were used. The maximum intensity of operations of Allied Air Forces was reached on 21 May, when 1,000 sorties were flown, 800 of which were combat missions. This example still does not reflect the capability of the US and NATO, because the allied forces air operations were severely constrained by the restrictions imposed by NATO civil authorities. Nevertheless, our effort in ALLIED FORCE demonstrates the US/NATO capability to ramp up and maintain high intensity operations, orchestrate operations through a unified daily air tasking order (ATO), and it further demonstrates the need to sustain intense air operations when faced with a determined adversary. Interviews with Taiwan officials earlier this year indicate that the PLAAF has been rotating J-7 and J-8 aircraft from designated rapid reaction units in and out of Fujian Province on six month rotations since the 1996 crisis to conduct area familiarization training. One would expect these aircraft to be deployed to the area en masse if the PLAAF were going to attack Taiwan. For example, during the 1979 border conflict with Vietnam, the PLAAF deployed almost 20,000 aviation, SAM and AAA troops and 700 aircraft to the border area opposite Vietnam over a 45 day period leading up to the start of the conflict – yet none of these aircraft engaged in any activity across the border so as not to escalate the conflict based on the tacit rules-of-engagement (ROE) for both sides at the time.

Is there a real possibility of an accidental shootdown occurring over the Strait? Yes, there is always the possibility, but there is a low probability unless it is pre-planned. The reason for this is that each side has established unilateral ROEs. For example, Taiwan's Air Force is under the guidance to "neither avoid the Communist planes nor provoke them." Furthermore, the order to attack an intruder must come from Taiwan's Chief of the General Staff. On the mainland side, the PLAAF probably has specific ROEs as well. For example, during the1958 Taiwan Strait crisis, the PRC's Central Military Commission established the following three ROEs: 1) the Air Force could not enter the high seas to conduct operations; 2) if the Nationalist Air Force did not bomb the mainland, the PLAAF could not bomb Quemoy and Matsu; and 3) the Air Force was not allowed to attack the US military, but could defend against any US aircraft entering Chinese territory. Similar PLAAF ROEs probably exist for the situation with Taiwan at this time.

Can Taiwan defend itself against an air attack? The TAF has about 70,000 personnel and over 400 combat aircraft. The current inventory includes approximately 180 older F-5E/F fighters and over 100 more modern Indigenous Defense Fighters (IDF). According to a recent Department of Defense study, the IDF, with its technical sophistication, is believed to be superior to any aircraft produced and deployed by China to date. Taiwan also has purchased 150 F-16 fighters from the United States – 120 single-seat "A" models and 30 two- seat "B" models. Taiwan has also received all of its 60 French-built Mirage 2000-5s.

Taiwan has also established a credible air defense early warning network and ground-based air defense system (I-Hawk and Tien Kung SAMs), which appear to pose a credible deterrent against an air attack from the mainland, when used in conjunction with its fourth-generation tactical aircraft. Combined, these three elements provide a most formidable air defense system.

The TAF's current strategy is to employ the IDF for low altitude interception and ground attack; the F-16 for mid-altitude offshore interception and ground attack; and the Mirage 2000-5 for high altitude offshore interception. Taiwan also is planning an upgrade program for about 100 F-5 fighters. The problems of systemic integration of several old and new types of aircraft that affect Taiwan's overall forces with respect to modernization apparently are having the greatest impact on the TAF, where the technology curve is highest. Meanwhile, the I-Hawk is a medium-range, low- to medium-altitude system, designed to defend fixed and mobile assets from high speed aircraft, and the Tien Kung is a medium-to-long range system, reportedly based on early versions of the US Patriot system.

Maintaining air superiority over the Taiwan Strait would be an essential part of any Chinese effort to mount a military operation against Taiwan. China currently has an overwhelming quantitative advantage over Taiwan in military aircraft. On the other hand, Taiwan's more modern aircraft provide a qualitative advantage. PLA electronic warfare operations against air defense radars, disruption of command and control networks, and/or large scale conventional short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) and land attack cruise missile (LACM) strikes against airfields and SAM sites would reduce the effectiveness of Taiwan's air defenses.

Currently, the TAF and the PLAAF have some deficiencies in their pilot training, in their logistics and maintenance support, and in their ability to integrate satisfactorily several disparate airframes into a cohesive, operational fighting force.

In spite of comments by Jiang Zemin in March 1999 that, "We should build an Air Force capable of both offensive and defensive operations with Chinese characteristics," and by PLAAF Commander Liu Shunyao in 1997 that, "The PLA Air Force is now able to fight both defensive and offensive battles under high-tech conditions," the PLAAF is still basically a defensive force. The addition of 48 Sukhoi-27s from Russia has provided the PLAAF with more capable aircraft than their J-7s and J-8s, but they are not yet fully integrated into the rest of the PLAAF.

The current aerial cat and mouse game over the Strait actually helps each side prepare for potential conflict, while at the same time taking care to avoid conflict. Each side has the opportunity to determine how long it takes for the other side to scramble its aircraft upon detection of an intruder, to reach a specific spot over the Strait, and to determine what altitude and speed these aircraft conduct their missions. Each side may also test the limits by intruding into the other's airspace to see what type of a reaction is prompted. They also have the opportunity to employ their air intercept radars to detect, track, monitor and shadow opposing aircraft, significantly enhancing their confidence in their defensive capability. Concurrently, these defensive reactions against the probes by intruder aircraft demonstrate and reinforce a vigilant air defense posture to the opposing force.

Current activities also afford each side the opportunity to coordinate their flight activity with the ground-based air defense systems, including their radars, antiaircraft artillery, and surface-to-air missile units. For example, one of the biggest problems the PLAAF, and the PLA as a whole, will face if China engages in a conflict with Taiwan is coordination between aircraft and ground-based air defense forces. Ever since the Korean War, the PLA Air Force and Army have had to agree on some basic ROEs, so that the antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air missile units do not shoot down the PLAAF's aircraft. This is even further complicated if they must also coordinate with the Navy. Today, the primary means of coordination between PLAAF aircraft and ground-based air defense units is airspace differentiation. The PLA's air defense system relies heavily on airspace control measures and procedural control (essentially flying air corridors, adhering to strict altitudes and in-area time limits, or speed controls), as opposed to the use of a secure and reliable electronic identification (EID) through identification friend or foe (IFF) or other means. Moreover, it is not clear whether the older J-6 and J-7, or FB-7 aircraft have adequate navigation equipment (inertial navigation system/INS is desirable because it is an on-board system) to maintain a reasonable adherence to air corridors during over water flight. The PLAAF recognizes these weaknesses and recent PLA news reports have highlighted the PLAAF's efforts to conduct over water training for their pilots.

Just because an aircraft "locks on" to another aircraft with its radar, does not necessarily mean that it is going to fire a missile. Most pilots or ground controllers do not have the authority to fire a missile unless told to do so by much higher authority. In this case, the intruder will most likely have already peeled off and returned to its own airspace. This interval provides the opportunity for each side to take a deep breath and cool down. In the current situation, I would say that the probability of an accidental firing is minimal. However, if the PLAAF begins to deploy several hundred additional aircraft opposite Taiwan, along with other ground and naval forces, then the probability of a pre-planned incident increases dramatically.

If something occurs, there will be more than just aircraft involved. The mainland will most likely begin the attack on Taiwan with ballistic missiles in order to degrade Taiwan's command and control capability, as well as to try to destroy aircraft on the ground before they can take off. Although PLA writers have advocated a quick strike on Taiwan to achieve victory within two weeks so that the United States cannot come to Taiwan's aid, this is easier said than done. The mainland is likely to employ political, as well as military signals, directed toward the United States and others to try to achieve some type of political settlement before war breaks out.

Conclusions: There is equal concern that either the PLAAF or the TAF could be ordered to intentionally provoke an incident over the Taiwan Strait in order to meet certain domestic political needs. From Beijing's perspective, the PLAAF's stepped up flight activity near the center line of the Strait is the most visible means of showing China's displeasure with Lee Teng-hui's "state-to-state" comments. From Taipei's perspective, these flights are provocative and break the long held tacit agreement to observe the center line.

One China watcher recently compared the current situation to the "brother syndrome," whereby the parents don't see the younger brother taunt the older brother, but they see and punish the older brother for retaliating. In the Taiwan-China case, who is it that started this troubling situation, and will the United States be pulled into it by either side?

There are several possible scenarios that could occur over the next few weeks or months. These range from relaxation of tension whereby almost all PLAAF flights near the center line of the Taiwan Strait cease, to continued low level psychological pressure with the same number of deployed aircraft and flights as now, to increased pressure with a significantly larger number of aircraft deployed to the area and a higher number of flights. At the same time, any increase in aircraft would also be accompanied by a corresponding increase in ground and naval force deployments.

As this situation continues, Beijing must take into consideration how each of these scenarios will impact its own credibility, especially if Lee Teng-hui does not retract his statements about "state-to-state" relations and the subsequent renunciation of the "One China" policy. Beijing must also take into account how each scenario will impact Taiwan, one gauge of which is Taiwan's stock market. If the number of deployed aircraft and flights remain about the same as now, the media will lose interest in the air activity, and the psychological impact on Taiwan will lose some of its impact. If the number of deployed aircraft and flights increases, the psychological pressure will also increase proportionately, but there are also limits to this. Specifically, the PLAAF and TAF must consider the ability to maintain their aircraft and pilots on a continuous high alert status – something neither side is accustomed to doing.

Beijing is unlikely to increase the number of aircraft deployed to the area or the number of flights near the center line. However, the PLAAF may rotate different units in and out of the area for further area familiarization training. They may also increase the number of aircraft airborne at any one time, moving from four to eight to twelve to sixteen. This provides the PLAAF with valuable training and incrementally increases the pressure without having to deploy more aircraft. However, this also takes a toll on aircraft maintenance and operational readiness on both sides. If this situation resolves itself without conflict, the sustained air activity will further point out some of the operational deficiencies for both air forces. The difference is that the United States will most likely be asked to help Taiwan overcome some of the TAF's "software" deficiencies (logistics, maintenance and training) over a long period of time, while the PLAAF may not be able to overcome the same deficiencies as rapidly.

Beijing may be willing to wait until after the March 2000 elections to make a final decision on what to do. Until then, Beijing will prepare to move forces into the area, but the number of PLAAF flights across the Taiwan Strait is likely to continue at about the current pace, with the possibility to ratchet it up or down as necessary. At the same time, Beijing is seriously considering military options that would demonstrate its displeasure with Lee Teng-hui, but would be unlikely to lead to an all out conflict with Taiwan and the United States or impact negatively on China's relations with Japan and Southeast Asia. One of the most likely options under consideration is to take over one of the islands in the South China Sea that Taiwan's military forces currently occupy, such as Itu Aba in the Spratly Islands. This also fits the pattern that Beijing has followed since the mid-1970s of taking islands claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines.

On the Taiwan side, Lee Teng-hui is unlikely to backtrack on his "state-to-state" comments. Furthermore, as the election nears there is also the possibility that he may up the ante again by making further statements Beijing considers provocative. Neither can a military incident provoked by Taiwan cannot be ruled out.

* One nautical mile equals 1.15 miles or 1.85 kilometers.

Sources

Sergey Sokut and Ilya Kedrov, "War in Europe: Yugoslavia: 78 Days Under Missile and Bombing Attacks: NATO's Limited War Was Uncompromising," Moscow Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye in Russian, FBIS, 2-8 Jul 99, No 25, 2.

"Chinese Air Force Beefs Up Training, Tests SAMs," Reuters, Beijing, July 27, 1999.

Republic of China: 1998 National Defense Report

Lo Ping, "It Costs China 3 Billion Yuan to Make a Show of Its Military Strength," Cheng Ming, Hong Kong, 15 April 1996.

Steven Mufson, "China Masses Troops On Coast Near Taiwan," The Washington Post, February 14, 1996.

"PLAAF aircraft target Taiwan Aircraft," United Daily News, August 5, 1999.

"Mainland Fighters Said To Appear Above Taiwan Straits," Taipei Tzu-Li Wan-Pao in Chinese, FBIS, 26 Nov 98.

"Taiwan Air Force Monitoring China Air Force Movements," Taipei Chung-Yang Jih-Pao in Chinese, FBIS, 4 Aug 99, 10.

John Pomfret and Steven Mufson, "China, Taiwan Step Up Sorties Over Strait: As Tension, Flights Rise, US Fears Risk of Clash," Washington Post, August 3, 1999, 1.

Lin Chien-hua, "Cross-Straits Air Defense Only Effective Till 2010" Tzu-li Wan-pao in Chinese, FBIS, 11 May 97, 2.

Victor Lai, "PRC Jet Fighters Twice Cross Taiwan Strait Center Line," Central News Agency, Taipei, August 10, 1999.

State Department Briefing with James Rubin, Federal Information Systems Corporation, Federal News Service, August 3, 1999.

"PRC Air Force Plans Weapons Advances," Beijing Xinhua in English, FBIS, 14 Apr 97.

"PRC Air Force Plans Weapons Advances," Beijing Xinhua in English, FBIS, 14 Apr 97.

"The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait," Report submitted by Secretary of Defense William Cohen to the US Senate as directed by the FY99 Appropriations Bill, February 17, 1999.

Interviews in Taiwan, Japan, and China.

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