Michael Townsend

Taiwan Research Institute, February 10, 1999

Three years ago, the People's Republic of China staged a series of missile tests in and around the Taiwan Strait in an attempt to intimidate the democratic people of Taiwan, prompting one of the largest non-wartime deployments of U.S. armed forces in history. President Clinton sent two aircraft carrier groups, comprising more than three dozen ships and submarines, to patrol the region until tensions ebbed. But the Chinese show of force demonstrated a new PRC aggressiveness in the region and provided the U.S. with the first in a series of increasingly worrisome signals that the carefully-maintained military balance in the Taiwan Strait may be tipping toward the PRC.

Today, China specialists and military observers agree that China has embarked on a major upgrade of its power projection capabilities in the region and is actively seeking to intimidate Taiwan -- if not preparing for an outright attack on the island.

On February 3, 1999, George Tenet, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified before Congress that the PRC is developing and acquiring air and naval systems "intended to deter the United States from involvement in Taiwan and to extend China's fighting capabilities beyond its coastline... Although China does not want a conflict over Taiwan, it refuses to renounce the use of force as an option and continues to place its best new military equipment opposite the island."

Tenet's observations dovetail with information that China has been expanding its military budget and upgrading the People's Liberation Army's equipment and technology -- steps taken with an eye toward pressuring Taiwan into reunification with the mainland.

For two decades, since the normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China resulted in the severing of official ties between Taiwan and the U.S., American policy has been designed to discourage conflict in the region by maintaining a military balance and urging the two sides to settle their differences peacefully. The Taiwan Relations Act, enacted in 1979, provided that the United States would sell such weapons as Taiwan might need for its defense. For most of the last 20 years, these sales have allowed Taiwan to maintain a qualitative advantage over its cross-strait rival. But a serious question now exists whether recent sales are adequate to maintain that technical edge in the face of the PLA's rapid modernization program. The changing balance of power in the region may require a rethinking of just how effective current policies are at deterring a conflict in the Taiwan Strait that would have serious implications for regional security and U.S. interests in the Asia-Pacific.

The Pentagon's East Asian Strategy Report 1998 notes that "many of China's neighbors are closely monitoring China's growing defense expenditures and modernization of the People's Liberation Army, including development and acquisition of advanced fighter aircraft; programs to develop mobile ballistic systems, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles and advanced surface-to-air missiles; and a range of power projection platforms." A more detailed Pentagon report, compelled by Congress in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act and completed in the fall of 1998, outlines 18 specific ways in which the Chinese military is modernizing. The report's bland language disguises a chilling message of growing military power, describing China's efforts:

"to enhance its capabilities in the area of nuclear weapon development,"

"to upgrade its electronic warfare technology, equipment and training,"

"to develop highly accurate and stealthy ballistic and cruise missiles," and

"to develop a capability to establish control of space or to dent access and use of military and commercial space systems in times of crisis or war," among other steps.

Similarly troubling is China's recent purchase of a variety of technologically-advanced weapons from other countries. Russia has sold China more than four dozen SU-27 fighter aircraft, as well as advanced anti-ship missiles and Kilo-class submarines. The PLA has also purchased technology from Israel -- much of it, ironically, of U.S. origin -- to develop fighter aircraft, radar systems, cruise missiles and other items. American University professor Duncan Clarke wrote in a July 1998 article in The Christian Science Monitor that "over vigorous Pentagon objections, Israel has apparently transferred to China the most lethal air-to-air missile in the world: the Python-4."

There are also indications that China's military could be anticipating a confrontation with the United States. The Washington Times reported on January 26, 1999, that, for the first time, China's army had conducted mock attacks on U.S. troops stationed in the Asia-Pacific region. According to the report, "People's Liberation Army units, including those equipped with intermediate-range CSS-5s and silo-housed CSS-2 missile units, practiced firing missiles at Taiwan. Intelligence information also indicated that the U.S. Army troops based in South Korea, and Marine Corps troops on the Japanese island of Okinawa and mainland Japan, were targeted with strikes." The story quotes Pentagon sources as observing that "the simulated attacks are a sign China is prepared to go to war with the United States over the issue of Taiwan."

Despite these ominous signs, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have not kept pace in recent years and there is growing concern that the types of weapons sold to the island are no longer adequate to preserve deterrence. Further complicating the United States' role in the Taiwan Strait is the fact that the executive branch has severely limited the type of arms the United States can sell to Taiwan for fear of antagonizing Beijing. This despite a clear injunction in the Taiwan Relations Act that such decisions would be made solely on the basis of what Taiwan needs "to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."

In 1992, President George Bush approved the sale of 150 F-16 fighter planes -- though without many of the "enhancements" that make the plane among the best in the world -- to Taiwan, perhaps the single most significant delivery of arms to Taiwan in the last two decades. As a result, 1993 saw Taiwan make more than $6 billion in arms purchases from the United States. But the next three years saw combined sales of less than $1 billion, including torpedoes, tanks, Knox-class frigates, anti-ship missiles and other systems. And as President Bill Clinton moved toward a "strategic partnership" with China, arms sales to Taiwan seemed almost an afterthought.

The last year, however, has seen a renewed interest in arms sales to Taiwan on the part of the Clinton Administration, a development some observers suggest is designed to reassure Taiwan that burgeoning U.S.-China ties are not a threat to the island. The U.S. agreed to sell significant military hardware to the island in 1998, including Stinger missile launchers, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, military transport helicopters, torpedoes, three Knox-class frigates, and flight guidance equipment for Taiwan's fleet of F-16 fighters. But while these sales are important steps toward maintaining the military balance in the region, the reality is that they are overwhelmed by the PLA's aggressive modernization campaign. Too many American officials appear more concerned with appeasing China than helping Taiwan meet its legitimate defense needs.

The Heritage Foundation's Richard D. Fisher, Jr., points out in a March 1998 paper that military to military contacts between the United States and the People's Liberation Army have increased steadily since 1994. High-level visits by officials of both militaries now occur regularly. According to Fisher, "Pentagon strategists hope that such exchanges will help open the secretive PLA so they can learn more about its doctrine, nuclear forces, and modernization plans. To prompt PLA reciprocation, the Pentagon briefs PLA visitors on broad U.S. doctrine and modernization plans." But Fisher notes that while PLA officers have been allowed to inspect the most modern U.S. weapon systems, including nuclear-powered attack submarines and advanced cruisers, the PLA "has yet to grant the U.S. military equal access to its advanced hardware, doctrine or modernization plans."

At the same time that U.S.-China military contacts are increasing, however, contacts with the Taiwan military are strictly limited, a situation that Fisher observes "could undermine deterrence on the Taiwan Strait." Visits by American officers to Taiwan are usually limited to the rank of colonel and below and are allowed only in connection with arms sales. Similarly, Taiwanese officers may visit Washington only to discuss arms sales.

Fisher believes that "limiting the military dialogue between the United States and Taiwan hurts both sides. Both Taiwan's armed forces and the U.S. Pacific Command lose by knowing less and less about one another's doctrine, operational methods and readiness. This shortcoming will handicap the United States and Taiwan in a future confrontation over the Strait, especially if the United States decides to intervene in support of Taiwan." Furthermore, Fisher notes, "the United States loses opportunities to bolster deterrence...through its inability to assess effectively the state of Taiwan's military preparedness."

Few military experts believe that China's military modernization has yet reached the point where it can dominate the region or take Taiwan by force. National Defense University expert Ronald N. Montaperto concluded in an April 1998 paper that "the PLA cannot mount a successful invasion of Taiwan and will not be able to do so until approximately 2005 at the very earliest." But, Montaperto notes, "Beijing could apply military force against Taiwan and prevail on Taipei to accept a political settlement essentially on Chinese terms." Such a situation would force the United States into a fundamentally unappealing choice: either moving to protect Taiwan militarily (as it did in 1996), thereby risking American lives and jeopardizing future relations with China, or doing nothing, thereby turning its back on one of the democratic miracles of the last decade, Taiwan.

Clearly, preserving the military balance in the Taiwan Strait is in the U.S. interest. The current pattern of arms sales to Taiwan is, to most observers, inadequate to maintain that balance. Therefore, the United States should move forward with sales of advanced military technology and systems to Taiwan that will allow the island to maintain deterrence; upgrade military to military contacts between the United States and Taiwan; and urge China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Together, these steps would help preserve stability in the Asia-Pacific region, encourage a peaceful settlement of the China-Taiwan dispute, allow Taiwan's vibrant democracy to continue to flourish, and protect U.S. interests and lives.

Clarke, Duncan, "Selling U.S. Weapons to China," The Christian Science Monitor, July 22, 1998, p. 15.

Department of Defense report, "Future Military Capabilities and Strategy of the People's Republic of China," September 1998.

Department of Defense report, "The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998."

Fisher, Jr., Richard D., China's Arms Require Better U.S. Military Ties with Taiwan, The Heritage Foundation, March 11, 1998.

Gertz, Bill, "Chinese exercise targets Taiwan," The Washington Times, January 26, 1999, p. A1.

Gilley, Bruce, "Sharper Image," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 10, 1998, p. 28.

Hickey, Dennis Van Vranken, "U.S. Security Ties: Toward the Next Millenium," Southwest Missouri State University, paper delivered at conference at Nationalz Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, January 4-5, 1999.

Montaperto, Ronald N., Reality Check: Assessing the Chinese Military Threat, Progressive Policy Institute, April 1998.