By Daniel C. Lynch

Immediately after Taiwan’s legislative, mayoral, and city council elections the first week of December, the island’s politically-charged citizenry began intensively discussing the presidential elections of March 2000, only 15 months away. Will Taipei’s outgoing mayor, the Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP’s) Chen Shui-pien, run for president? If so, will Chen call for a referendum on declaring independence from China? What would be the implications for American foreign policy of an elected Taiwan president declaring, on the basis of a referendum, the abolition of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT) and its replacement by a new, independent Republic of Taiwan? Certainly the U.S could not easily dismiss such an outcome, given its long-standing commitment to promoting democracy and self-determination worldwide. Yet equally certainly, the cost to the U.S. of Chinese antagonism would be exceptionally high.

What a vexing, irritating, and destabilizing factor Taiwan democracy is in world politics! Countless American China specialists inside and outside of government cling to this view. They sometimes go so far as to lament the passing of the days when dictators ruled in Taipei, dictators who emigrated from the mainland only after 1945 and who, therefore, might be willing to strike a deal with Beijing that would eliminate the Taiwan irritant once and for all.

Naturally, Beijing, too, fears Taiwan democracy, and sees it as posing insuperable obstacles to reining in this wayward “province.” Repeatedly, the Chinese media criticize direct presidential elections as “implying that Taiwan is not a province but a country.” They also complain that a democracy in which even pro-independence personages like Chen Shui-pien can run for office “brings uncertain factors to cross-strait relations.”

But these fears are actually quite misplaced. Taiwan’s democratization is in fact a force for stability in cross-strait relations that helps ensure the island’s leaders will not take rash actions that threaten regional security. Originally, of course—when democratization first began—many people expressed a long-suppressed hostility to China and it was reasonable to ask where the calls for independence might lead. But especially in the past three years, Taiwan’s democracy has matured to the point that a genuine consensus has developed around the notion that it would be dangerous—and even foolish—to declare independence. Why? Simply because China would almost certainly attack, and even if the U.S. and Japan were to come to Taiwan’s aid, the costs of war would be enormous.

In Taiwan today there is a much greater appreciation of the fact that a democratic government’s most fundamental responsibility is to ensure its people’s comprehensive security. In the case of Taiwan, this means suspending the “feel-good” issue of asserting ethnic pride in the face of cold, uncompromising threats form Beijing. It means suspending the quest for independence until conditions are more conducive. And it is precisely democratization—including increasing media freedoms, facilitating debate and discussion--that allows this consensus to develop and take root. Before democratization, many Taiwanese saw themselves as repressed by alien carpetbaggers from the mainland who were corrupt and incompetent. Certainly the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) had presided over an economic miracle and had begun to loosen its tight grip on politics. But still the KMT might sell Taiwan out to Beijing at any time, and for that reason the DPP and its supporters continued to assert a vigorous and tendentious anti-Chinese identity well into the mid-1990s. They appeared willing to take great risks in angering Beijing and endangering the Taiwan people’s comprehensive security in exchange for public attention. Especially when democracy is new, lightening rods can easily attract votes.

Even today, the DPP’s official platform calls for an eventual declaration of independence. But the radical liberalization of the media now forces independence supporters to debate objectively among themselves and with KMT supporters just how wise such a course would be. During this debate—a complicated, convoluted affair that turned white-hot in the mid-1990s—a new consensus eventually emerged, evident in the December elections. For the good of Taiwan’s comprehensive security, it is best to play down ethnic divisions; not stir up tensions between mainlanders and native Taiwanese; and not pursue Taiwan’s independence--even while continuing efforts to raise the ROCOT’s profile on the world stage. Without media liberalization and political democratization, reaching this level-headed consensus would have been impossible. Instead, the native Taiwanese would probably have continued to feel that the only way they could resist KMT domination would be precisely by playing up ethnic divisions and demanding a radical separation from China—any China.

So even if Chen Shui-pien does announce a run for the presidency in the coming months, he is quite unlikely to “play the independence card.” Already, the DPP suffers from perceptions that it takes too many risks and is unpredictable, and also that among its leaders there are far too few capable people who can manage Taiwan’s affairs. Should Chen run in 2000 on a platform that angers Beijing and alarms the United States, he is very likely to lose the election—assuming the KMT is able to heal its own inner-party rifts. There simply is no market for high-profile risk-taking in a democratic Taiwan whose people, through public discourse, have agreed on the primary importance of comprehensive security, a security that requires continuing dialogue with Beijing and shelving the reunification/independence issue until such time as China becomes more flexible.

The days of high-stakes brinkmanship in Taiwan politics are over. The people speak almost daily through public opinion polls, letters-to-the-editor, and radio and television call-in shows, and they clearly express a consistent desire for maintaining the status quo. No Taiwan politician can afford to ignore this sentiment, not even the pro-independence Chen Shui-pien. Taiwan’s democratic politics may have destabilized cross-strait relations in the early and mid-1990s, but today they are a force for stability. No one in Washington or Beijing need fear Taiwan democracy; indeed, they should celebrate it, given that Taiwan is now one of the freest, most prosperous societies in Asia, a society whose people can look forward optimistically to a bright future.

Daniel C. Lynch is an assistant professor of international relations at USC. He was in Taiwan during the elections