By Peggy Hu

Washington -- The global economic crisis has affected the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific in a way that -- more than ever -- requires America's presence as a stabilizing force in the region, according to a recent study by Sheldon Simon of the National Bureau of Asian Research.

"The Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 has had profound implications for Southeast Asian security. ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) political cohesion, armed forces modernization, and the quest for greater security autonomy have all been challenged by the region's most serious economic crisis since World War II," the study says.

According to the December 1998 study, which was partially funded by a grant from the U.S. Information Agency, most of the countries in Southeast Asia have cut defense budgets and postponed arms modernization programs because of their economic difficulties.

However, instead of generating interest in formal arms control or cooperative security efforts among the ASEAN members, "mutual antagonisms in Southeast Asia appear to be heightened by the economic crisis and accompanying domestic political tensions," according to Sheldon Simon, the study's author.

The economic crisis and its effect on defense budgets and arms modernization programs have also threatened ASEAN members' ability to participate in joint military exercises with the United States, Simon continues.

"Not only have defense budgets been decimated in all ASEAN states -- with the exception of Singapore -- but massive currency devaluations have effectively doubled the price of arms procurements on the international market. Should this defense stagnation persist over several years, it will ultimately weaken the region's ability to participate effectively in joint exercises with U.S. forces," he warns.

 "Outdated equipment lacks interoperability with American systems," Simon adds. "This could become particularly important if the United States and ASEAN members were considering joint sea and air cooperation with respect to the SLOCs (sea lines of communication) in the South China Sea and around the Spratly Islands. Regional naval and air buildups had been providing the littoral states with the capacity to patrol EEZs (exclusive economic zones) and potentially share intelligence with each other as well as with the U.S. Seventh Fleet. The economic crisis undoubtedly retards these developments."

In contrast, China has continued to modernize its military capability.

"With ASEAN armed forces modernization programs essentially stagnant, there could be serious implications for the protracted dispute among the Spratly Island claimants, particularly with China," the study warns. "The Spratly archipelago consists of more than 230 barren islets, reefs, shoals, and atolls located about 900 miles south of China's Hainan Island, 150 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan, and 230 miles off the coast of Vietnam. Claimants include China, Taiwan, and Vietnam -- for the whole archipelago -- and the Philippines, Brunei, and Malaysia for portions of it."

The study also notes that "there is a more limited dispute with respect to the Natuna Islands south of the Spratlys, situated 200 miles northwest of the Malaysian state of Sarawak and approximately 300 miles south of Vietnam. While Indonesia is the uncontested sovereign of the Natunas themselves, Jakarta contests overlapping EEZs with Hanoi to the north and with China over a gas field to the northeast that the latter claims as part of its EEZ. Monitoring and enforcing these claims requires effective air and sea operations."

"These endemic intra-ASEAN political tensions are undoubtedly exacerbated by the economic crisis," the study concludes. "In strategic terms, they reveal an Association unable to create a common external security front even as China continues to upgrade its installations in the Spratlys. Beijing may be taking advantage of what it perceives to be a period of ASEAN weakness to expand and strengthen its presence in the South China Sea.

"The ASEAN states' inability to counter new Chinese facilities makes U.S. naval and air deployments in the region even more essential for the maintenance of a Southeast Asian balance of power. Far from declining, as the twenty-first century dawns, the U.S. military presence will continue to be a permanent fixture in the Western Pacific."