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The Election of Chen
Shui-bian and Its Impact on US Policy toward Taiwan By Dennis V. Hickey Paper Delivered at the 42nd Annual Meeting of the American
Association for Chinese Studies, University of San Fancisco, October 27-29,
2000 The Republic
of China (ROC or Taiwan) enters the new millennium as an economic powerhouse
and one of the world’s fledgling democracies. In fact, Taiwan is now
described officially by the US Department of State as a “multi-party
democracy.” In March, 2000, the island elected a new president—the
first opposition candidate to win the office of the presidency in the history
of the ROC. It is clear that momentous changes have come to Taiwan.
However, dramatic transformations in Washington’s relations with Taipei have
not accompanied these changes. I. US
POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN On December
15, 1978, the US announced the establishment of full diplomatic relations
with the PRC, to become effective January 1, 1979. In order to achieve
normalization, Washington acquiesced to Beijing's three long-standing
demands: (1) termination of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan; (2)
removal of all US troops from Taiwan and (3) abrogation of the 1954 US-ROC
Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the US continues to play a critical
role in the island's defense. American military equipment,
technological assistance, and an informal or tacit alliance augment Taiwan's
security. Since 1979,
American policy toward Taiwan has been guided by the Taiwan Relations Act
(TRA) and three US-PRC Joint Communiqués: (1) the 1972 Shanghai
Communiqué; (2) the 1979 Normalization Communiqué and (3) the August 17, 1982
US-China Joint Communiqué. The TRA provides a legal framework for
America's commercial and cultural relations with Taiwan. It also
outlines the terms of Washington's "unofficial" governmental
relations with Taiwan and includes provisions for its defense. In the
communiqués, the US recognizes the PRC as the legitimate government of China
and acknowledges Beijing's position that there is only one China and Taiwan
is a part of it.<1> Washington also promises not to pursue a
policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan" and
stresses that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter for the Chinese
themselves to decide peacefully. This final point, namely no US support
for Taiwan's de jure independence from China, was publicly reiterated by
President Clinton during his June 1998 visit to the PRC.<2> Beijing has
long threatened to invade the island if it moves too close to independence
from China. The US
security commitment to Taiwan is outlined principally in Sections 2 and 3 of
the TRA. Section 2 (b) states: It is the policy of the United States . . . to consider any effort
to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by
boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western
Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan
with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the
United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that
would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the
people on Taiwan. In terms of
American arms sales to Taiwan, the most pertinent passages of the TRA are to
be found in Section 3: (a) In
furtherance of the policy set forth in section 2 of this Act, the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a
sufficient self-defense capability. (b) The President and Congress shall determine the nature and
quantity of such defense articles and services based solely upon their
judgement of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures established
by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review by
the United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to
the President and Congress. In addition to the TRA, critical elements of US policy toward
Taiwan may be found in the three US-PRC Joint Communiqués. In the 1972
Shanghai Communiqué—a document that helped pave the way for eventual normalization
of US-PRC relations—Washington reaffirmed "its interest in a peaceful
settlement of the Taiwan question." In the 1979 Normalization
Communiqué, Washington also stressed that "the United States continues
to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and
expects that the Taiwan issue will be settled peacefully by the Chinese
themselves.” In the August 17, 1982 US-China Joint Communiqué, American
authorities once again emphasized that Beijing must "strive for a
peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question." In the same
agreement, however, the US promised to eschew long-term arms sales to Taiwan
and to keep sales from exceeding either the quality or quantity of arms sold
to Taiwan after the US established relations with the PRC. This document
also apparently committed the US to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan
gradually.<3> US policy toward Taiwan is both ambiguous and
contradictory. For example, the TRA warns that the US would consider
any hostile actions directed against Taiwan as "a threat to the peace
and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the
US." But Washington is not committed to Taiwan's defense. As
Douglas Paal, a former senior National Security aide observed, "there's
no such thing as an ironclad commitment. . . the belief that the US will send
[aircraft] carriers any time the People's Republic puts pressure on Taiwan
depends on Taiwan's behavior."<4> Furthermore, in the August 17,
1982 US-China Joint Communiqué, Washington promised to reduce its arms
transfers to Taiwan. But since 1982, Washington has sold F-16
warplanes, Hawkeye E-2T early warning aircraft, MK-46 torpedoes, M60A3 tanks,
Knox-class frigates, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, Stinger Missiles and a
derivative of the Patriot missile air defense system to Taiwan.
Washington steadfastly refuses to accede to Beijing's demands that these arms
sales be curbed.<5> Despite the ambiguities associated with US policy, the Clinton
administration has long insisted that it "has no plans to revise the TRA
or to alter our long-standing policy on arms sales [to Taiwan]."<6>
Officials contend that US-Taiwan relations have thrived under the present
arrangement and oppose recent congressional initiatives to bolster security
ties with the island. As Susan L Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
East Asian and Pacific Affairs, observed, America's "unofficial
relations with the people on Taiwan are more robust and stronger than
ever."<7> II. THE
ELECTION OF CHEN SHUI-BIAN On March 18,
2000, Taiwanese voters went to the polls to elect the tenth president of the
Republic of China. The election was significant in several
respects. First, it marked only the second time that the ROC had
conducted a direct presidential election. By most accounts, the
election was free and fair. Moreover, it was the first time that a
candidate outside the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) had been elected president of
the country. Finally, like the 1996 presidential contest, it showed
that the Taiwanese electorate will not yield meekly to threats or
intimidation from Beijing. Once again, the voters chose a presidential
candidate who appeared to be despised by authorities in mainland China—Chen
Shui-bian. The son of a
poor farmer and leader of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a party
that supports Taiwan’s de jure independence from China, Chen received only 39
percent of the vote (see Table I). In other words, he did
not receive a strong mandate from the island’s voters. But many
analysts believe that it is unlikely that the independence issue played a
critical role in the election. The chief issue during the campaign was
corruption or what the Taiwanese press describes as “black gold.”
During the late 1990s, Chen had served as an efficient, popular and
incorruptible mayor of Taipei. Taipei’s remarkable metamorphosis from a
dirty and congested city into a world-class metropolis may be traced largely
to his administration. As James Lilley, former US Ambassador to
China, observed, “he won because he was anti-corruption.”<8> Table
1: Outcome of Taiwan’s 2000 Presidential Election
During much
of the presidential campaign, Chen appeared to make an effort to avoid
provoking the PRC. In fact, he made several goodwill gestures to the
mainland. For example, Chen indicated that he would be willing to
go to China for talks with PRC leaders and/or invite mainland leaders to
visit Taiwan. Perhaps most notable, however, he seemed to soften
his position toward Taiwan’s independence and said that he would support an
island-wide referendum on the issue only if China attacked.
Nevertheless, only three days before the election, Chen responded to
saber-rattling in Beijing by declaring that “Taiwan is an independent,
sovereign country.”<9> Following his
election, Chen continued to tone-down his pro-independence rhetoric.
Perhaps most significant was his inaugural address on May 20, 2000. In
the speech, the new president referred to himself as the president of the
Republic of China (not Republic of Taiwan as some feared he might) and
outlined what has become known as the “Five No’s.” Chen proclaimed
that, as long as the PRC did not use military force against Taiwan: · he will not
declare Taiwan independent of China; · he will not
support changing the national title of the Republic of China; · he will not
push for the inclusion of Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” description in the
ROC Constitution; · he will not
promote an island-wide referendum on the island’s status and · he will not
abolish the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification
Guidelines. Chen’s
inaugural address was received enthusiastically in Taiwan. Public
opinion polls revealed that almost 80 percent of Taiwan’s populace was
satisfied with the content of the speech, while roughly 63 percent believed
it expressed “goodwill” toward the PRC.<10> In the US, analysts
described Chen’s address as “a significant effort to accommodate the United
States and reach out to Beijing.”<11> Ambassador Lilley described it
simply as “brilliant.”<12> Indeed, the speech was so conciliatory
toward Beijing (and Washington) that some suspected that it had been drafted
by the AIT (US officials strongly denied news reports that Washington had
sought to influence the content of Chen’s inaugural address).<13> In
the PRC, Chen’s address was met with guarded optimism. Chinese
authorities reiterated the position that they would judge the new Taiwan
leader by “deeds, not just words.” Since his
inaugural address, Chen Shui-bian has continued to seek to alleviate fears that
he will inch the island closer and closer to war with China. He
has endorsed the PRC’s bid to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
abided by strict American guidelines while visiting Los Angeles en route to
Central America. However, the new president also has insisted that
reunification with mainland China is only one of several options available to
Taiwan. In other words, he will not forswear Taiwan independence. III. US
POLICY AND THE NEW TAIWAN Taiwan’s 2000
presidential election constitutes a major shift in East Asian politics.
The results could hold serious repercussions for Taipei, Washington and
Beijing and for peace and stability in the Western Pacific. However, as
Douglas Paal, a former official in the US Department of Defense, observed,
“Washington was not ready for Mr. Chen’s victory.”<14> Some even
suspect that the Clinton Administration had privately hoped that either Lien
or Soong—or for that matter almost anyone except Chen—be elected president of
the ROC. It is clear
that things have changed in Taiwan. In 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo, the late
president of the ROC, lifted martial law. Since that time, opposition
parties have formed, restrictions on the press have been lifted, the
provincial government has been “downsized” and the nation’s legislative
bodies have been revitalized. Perhaps most significant, a member of an
opposition party, a party that favors independence from China, now occupies
the office of the presidency. Despite these remarkable changes,
however, Washington has made very few adjustments in its relationship with
Taipei. To be sure,
the US has made some changes in its policy toward Taiwan since the
mid-1980s. For example, despite pledges to curb arms sales, Washington
has transferred a wide variety of sophisticated military equipment to the
island. Some of these sales appear to violate, if not abrogate, the
August 17, 1982 US-China Joint Communiqué. <15>Moreover, Washington has
agreed to lift some restrictions on its relationship with Taiwan. As a
result of a comprehensive 1994 inter-agency review, Taiwan authorities now
may make transit stopovers in the US, high ranking US officials may visit
Taiwan and Taiwan’s unofficial embassy may use a designation that gives some
hint of the country it represents. Thus far, however, the US has made
no significant modifications in policy as a result of the election of Chen
Shui-bian. Upon learning
of Chen Shui-bian’s victory, President Bill Clinton proclaimed that “the
election provides a fresh opportunity for both sides (of the Taiwan Strait)
to reach out and resolve their differences peacefully through dialogue.”<16>
The President then dispatched Lee Hamilton, a special “unofficial” envoy, to
Taiwan in the hope that he could dissuade Chen from doing anything that might
be construed as provocative by mainland China. These moves appear to
have set the tone for Washington’s approach toward Taiwan in the
post-election period. It is the
Clinton Administration’s position that US policy toward Taiwan has not
changed and will not change as a result of the 2000 election. For
example, when commenting on the election, Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, emphasized that “three principles” remain
the foundation of the US position toward Taiwan and China: · Our “one
China” policy is unchanged; · We have an
abiding interest that there be a peaceful approach by both sides to resolving
differences and · We support
dialogue between the two sides of the strait as the best way for differences to
be resolved.<17> Madeleine
Albright, US Secretary of State, also has stressed that, during discussions
with Chinese leaders, “we made very clear our usual policy that we have
enunciated now, so many times, about a `one China’ and the `three no’s,’ and various
other principles upon which the relationship is based, and the importance
that we attach to having a peaceful cross-strait dialogue.”<18> Indeed,
lest there be any misunderstanding on this issue, when asked directly by
members of the press whether the US still subscribed to the “one China”
policy, a State Department official replied simply, “mm-hmm.”<19> Just as US
policy toward Taiwan’s international status and/or future remains constant,
there is no change in policy toward the island’s security. Washington
continues to stress that it supports a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan
issue. Moreover, arms sales appear not to have been affected by the
election—a development that has been warmly welcomed by Chen Shui-bian.<20>
In the aftermath of the election, the US has approved two major arms sales to
the island. In June, 2000, Washington announced a sale valued at US
$320 million and in September, 2000, the Pentagon revealed that it plans a
series of arms sales valued at roughly US $1.3 billion.<21> In some minor
respects, American policy does appear to have been influenced by recent
developments in Taiwan. There now seems to be a new sense of urgency
attached to Washington’s calls for cross-strait dialogue. William
Cohen, US Secretary of Defense, has warned PRC authorities “the chances are
that over time this (cross-strait negotiations) will become more difficult,
not less difficult, given the politics in the countries concerned.”<22>
Officials call on Beijing “to change its frame of reference” and argue that
“old approaches and old rhetoric must be put aside. Success will
require positive efforts, flexibility and creativity.”<23> Ironically,
the election also served to energize the administration’s long-standing drive
for permanent normal trading relations (PNTR) for the PRC. Sandy
Berger, National Security Adviser, explained that, when coupled with the
surprising election of Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, a Congressional defeat of
PNTR would unleash “darker forces in China.”<24> Secretary Cohen described
PNTR simply as a “strategic necessity” in the new environment.<25> IV.
CALLS FOR CHANGE IN U.S. POLICY TOWARD TAIWAN As Taiwan
evolves into a multiparty democracy—perhaps the liveliest democracy in East
Asia—an increasing number of individuals contend that it is time for
Washington to chart a new direction in its relationship with Taipei. As
Kurt Campbell, then Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, observed, it now appears as if there is “a whole cottage
industry on the outside of government that is looking at other ways to
consider the situation across the Taiwan Straits.”<26> This “industry”
received a significant boost following the election of Chen Shui-bian.
Several proposed changes in policy are discussed briefly below. Jettison the
`One China’ Policy The Republic
of China exercises predominant authority within its borders, possesses a
relatively stable population that owes its allegiance to the ROC government,
maintains formal diplomatic ties with roughly thirty of its "little
friends" and strong "unofficial" links with many others.
Therefore, it is obvious that the ROC does exist and meets all the
requirements of statehood. Bau Tzong-Ho, then chair of the Political
Science Department at Taipei's prestigious National Taiwan University,
explains: The problem is that the ROC never lost its conditions as a
sovereign state even if the territory of it shrunk after 1949. The ROC
continues to maintain its territory, people, government and ability to deal
with foreign countries. In other words, the existence of the ROC is a
political reality.<27> All other
arguments to the contrary, including the PRC’s suggestion that the ROC cannot
exist because it is no longer a member of the UN, are flawed. According
to this logic, the PRC has existed only since 1971 (when it gained admission
to the UN) and Switzerland has never existed. Some
prominent US officials are calling on Washington to abandon the fiction that
there is only one China. It is their view that Taiwan has evolved peacefully
into a democratic and free Chinese state that is quite independent and
distinct from mainland China. Representative Tom DeLay
(Republican-Texas) argues that the time has arrived for the US to “jettison”
its one China policy and accept that “there are, in fact, two Chinese
states.”<28> Other officials and members of the academic community in
both the US and Taiwan share this view. For example, Dr. Paris Chang, DPP
legislator and a former educator at Pennsylvania State University, also has
expressed the hope that the US will “discard the `one China’ notion.”<29>
Abandon
Strategic Ambiguity As described,
America has long maintained a close security relationship with Taiwan.
However, it is not committed to the island’s defense. The Taiwan
Relations Act provides decision-makers only with an option to defend the
island. It is not a treaty. Calls for the
US to provide Taiwan with an iron-clad security guarantee became commonplace
after China initiated its provocative “missile tests” off the island’s
coastline in 1995 and 1996. Some lawmakers seemed surprised to learn
that a US response to hostilities across the Taiwan Strait was not a
certainty. Recent
efforts to pass the so-called Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) may be
traced, in part, to an attempt to remove some of the ambiguity from the
US-Taiwan security dyad. This drive to achieve greater clarity in
American policy has received another boost with Taiwan’s 2000 presidential
election. Again, Representative DeLay has been at the forefront of this
campaign. DeLay contends that “China would not attack Taiwan if this
administration, in no uncertain terms, had let China know that we would not
tolerate it and we would stand by the democratic free market country.”<30> Upgrade Relations
with Taiwan Like many
other countries, America maintains a curious relationship with Taiwan.
The president of this democratic state is strongly discouraged from visiting
the US. Until 1994, the name of the “unofficial” Taiwanese embassy and
its numerous consulates provided no hint as to the identity of the government
they represented (for over one decade, the Taiwanese were forced to use the
designation “Coordination Council for North American Affairs). US
officials are prohibited from referring to Taiwan by its official name (the
CIA’s World Factbook contends that it has no official name) and its flag
cannot be flown at official functions. Some believe that it is time for
such nonsense to stop. Not
surprisingly, many Taiwanese are surprised and disappointed that the US
appears not to recognize or reward the island for its democratic
transformation. As one government official lamented, “ten years ago,
when our government was still authoritarian, I could understand why the
international community didn’t help us, but now we are a shining example of
democracy, a beacon for China. Why do people turn against us?”<31> Stephen
Yates, a foreign policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation, is only one of a
growing number of voices in Washington who are calling on the Clinton
Administration to treat Taiwan with more dignity and respect. For
example, Yates claims that the US should acknowledge the island’s “democratic
success” and “remove onerous restrictions on activities of Taiwan officials
in the US.”<32> He also contends that the administration should more
actively support Taiwan’s participation in the UN and other international
governmental organizations. A majority of American lawmakers share this
view. Help Taipei
and Beijing Improve Relations According to
long-standing US policy, the resolution of the future status of Taiwan is a
matter that “the Chinese must settle peacefully by themselves.” In
recent years, a new element has been interjected into this position.
American officials now emphasize that any settlement must be acceptable to
the Taiwanese people. However, the US still refuses to broker a settlement or
otherwise take part in cross-strait negotiations. Some contend
that the US could do more to promote a rapprochement between Taipei and Beijing.
Since the election of Chen Shui-bian, these calls have accelerated.
Perhaps most significant, Annette Lu, Taiwan’s Vice President, has requested
that the US become more involved in promoting peace and stability across the
strait. During an interview conducted in April, 2000, Lu asked, “the US
has been talking about peace talks between China and Taiwan for a long
time; why not invite both leaders to meet in front of the White House
for talks?”<33> Other Taiwanese officials have made similar statements.
Summary The
discussion above outlines only several of the most recent proposals calling
for modifications in US policy toward Taiwan. A more complete analysis
would include other proposals as well. Thus far, however, the Clinton
Administration has resisted all calls for a change in policy. In fact,
it is unlikely that either candidate for US president will change American
policy in any meaningful way. Both the Democratic and Republican
parties remain committed to the “one China” principle, and their respective
platforms do not endorse a major shift in policy. For example, when
discussing Washington’s relations with Beijing and Taipei, Condoleezza Rice,
George W. Bush’s chief foreign policy adviser, observed that “the US has a
very big interest in continuing the [China] policy that has served everyone
well. No one changes the status quo.”<34> This might help explain
why Chen Shui-bian has suggested that “no matter which party wins the
November US presidential election, there will be no drastic changes in the US
policy toward Taiwan.”<35> IV.
CONCLUSION The outcome
of Taiwan’s 2000 presidential election stunned observers in Taipei, Beijing
and Washington. Following the election, the US has accelerated calls for
the PRC to adopt a new, flexible approach toward Taiwan. In fact, it
has called on both Taipei and Beijing to become more flexible and drop the
old, anachronistic policies of the past. Ironically, however, there
appears to be no flexibility or change in America’s policy toward the Taiwan
question. The US should
not jettison its long-standing “one China” policy or abandon the policy of
strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan’s defense. It is likely that any move
of this caliber would provoke a highly negative reaction from the PRC and
jeopardize peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. However, it is
clear that the time has arrived for Washington to revisit the issue of
whether there is more it could do to promote cross-strait dialogue and
negotiations. The US
Department of State insists that it will not do more to promote discussions
between Taipei and Beijing because “neither side had ever asked the US to
mediate or engage in any other active role.”<36> This is
incorrect. Taiwan officials are now calling on Washington to do
more—perhaps even host a cross-strait peace summit. Moreover, PRC
officials have long suggested that the US could do more to promote a
resolution of the Taiwan issue. Throughout the 1980s, the late
Deng Xiaoping called on Washington “to do something useful [to bring] about
Taiwan’s reunification.”<37> Deng claimed it was ridiculous for
American officials to claim not be involved in cross-strait relations as “the
fact is that the US has been involved all along.” It certainly
is not in America’s best interest to coerce Taipei or Beijing into a
settlement of the Taiwan question. And the US should avoid becoming
entangled in complex and drawn out negotiations aimed at a settlement of the
issue. At the same time, however, the time may have finally arrived for
Washington to follow its own advice and show some flexibility and “new
thinking” in matters relating to Taiwan. Studying Vice President Lu’s
proposal—the call for Washington to host a ROC-PRC summit—might be a step in
the right direction. Note: 1.The word
"acknowledge" was deliberately chosen as it indicates cognizance
of, but not necessarily agreement with, the Chinese position. 2.Clinton
reiterated the US position that "we don't support independence for
Taiwan, or `two Chinas,' or `one Taiwan, one China,' and we don't believe
Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a
requirement." See Jasper Becker, "Vagueness on Taiwan Policy
Abandoned," South China Morning Post, July 1, 1998 in Lexis/Nexis. 3.For a
complete discussion of the document's meaning, see Dennis Van Vranken Hickey,
United States-Taiwan Security Ties: From Cold War to Beyond Containment
(Westport, CN: Praeger, 1994). 4.See Barbara
Opall, "US, Taiwanese Opposition Chart Collision Course," Defense
News, Volume 13, Number 12, March 23-29, 1998, p.34. 5.President
Clinton defends the US position on arms transfers by stating that "our
policy is that weapons sales to Taiwan are for defensive purposes only."
See, Fong Tak-ho, "Visitor with `Friendly Smile' has the Answers,"
Hong Kong Standard June 30, 1998 in Lexis/Nexis. 6.The United
States and Taiwan, Testimony of Susan L. Shirk. 7.The United
States and Taiwan, testimony of Susan L. Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, US Department of State, before the House
International Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1998 on the
world wide web at http:/www.state.gov/www/policy_
remarks/1998/980520_shirk_taiwan. html. 8.Bay Fang, “Taiwan Shows What Democracy
Can Do,” US News and World Report, April 3, 2000, p.13 in Lexis/Nexis. 9.Michael
Hirsh, Russel Watson, Melinda Liu, Brook Lamer and Mahlon Meyer, “Pointing to
Trouble,” Newsweek, March 27, 2000, p.38 in Lexis/Nexis 10.See “78%
Satisfied with Chen’s Inaugural Address, Liberty Times (Taipei), May 22, 2000
in Taiwan Headlines on the world wide web at http://th.gio.gov.tw
/show.cfm?news_id=350. 11.See
Stephen J. Yates, “Better US Treatment of Taiwan,” Heritage Foundation
Executive Memorandum, Number 694, September 11, 2000, p.1. 12.See
Sangwon Suh and Allen T. Cheng, “A Flash of Hope,” Asiaweek, June 2, 2000,
p.24 in Lexis/Nexis. 13.According
to some accounts, Raymond Burghardt, Chief of the AIT’s Taipei office, had
met with Chen many times and helped influence his inaugural speech. See, “AIT
Head Denies Role in Drafting of Chen’s Inaugural Speech,” Central News
Agency, May 13, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 14.Douglas H.
Paal, “Turbulence Ahead in the Beijing-Taipei-Washington Triangle,”
International Herald Tribune, April 12, 2000, p.8 in Lexis/Nexis. 16.John
Tkacik, “Fraying Nationalists Offer Taiwan’s New President Greatest
Challenge,” China Online, March 20, 2000, in Lexis/Nexis. 17.Stanley O.
Roth, “The United States’ Asia Policy: A National Agenda,” Presentation
to the Council of American Ambassadors, Los Angeles, California, April 4,
2000 on the world wide web at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/
2000/000404_roth _easia.htm. 18.Secretary
of State Madeleine K. Albright, Press Conference, China World Hotel, Beijing
China, June 22, 2000 on the world wide web at http://secretary.state.gov/www
/statements /2000 /000622.html. 19.Phillip
Reeker, Daily Press Briefing, US Department of State, May 23, 2000 on the
world wide web at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings0005/000523db.html 20.See
Deborah Kuo, “Chen Shui-bian Calls on US to Continue Arms Sales to Taiwan,”
Central News Agency, July 11, 2000 in World News Connection on the world wide
web athttp://wnc.fedworld.gov/region.html, 7/13/00 21.See
“Pentagon Approves Arms Sales to Taiwan,” Associated Press, September 29,
2000 in Taiwan Security Research on the world wide web at http://www.
taiwansecurity.org/ 22.Jim
Mannion, “Cohen Presses China’s Leadership to Open Dialogue with
Taiwan,” Agence France Presse, July 14, 2000 in Lexis/Nexis. 23.Susan
Shirk, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Luncheon Discussion on the Impact of WTO Entry for Taiwan and China, US-ROC
Business Council Seminar on Issues Facing Taiwan’s New Cabinet, Washington,
D.C., May 12, 2000 on the world wide web at http://www.state.gov/www/policy_
remarks/2000/000512_shirk_china.html. 24.Jim Hoagland,
“Taiwan: Shaking Up the Strait,” Washington Post, April 27, 2000, p.A27 in
Lexis/Nexis. 25.See Jim
Mannion, “Cohen Presses China’s Leadership to Open Dialogue with Taiwan.” 26.See Testimony
of Kurt Campbell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, in Hearing on the Direction of US-Taiwan Relations,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House International Relations
Committee, May 20, 1998 in Federal Document Clearing House Political
Transcripts in Lexis/Nexis 29.Nelson
Chung, “Taiwan Legislator Hopes US Reviews Taiwan Policy,” Central News
Agency, August 5, 2000 in World News Connection on world wide web at http://wnc.fedworld.gov/region.html. 30.“US
Congressman Urges `Tough’ China Policy to Support Taiwan,” AFX News Limited,
March 19, 2000 in Lexis/Nexis. 31.“Walking a
Tightrope,” Newsweek (Pacific Edition), April 24, 2000, p.58 in Lexis/Nexis. 32.See Stephen
J. Yates, “Better Treatment of Taiwan,” p.1. 33.See,
“Walking a Tightrope.” 34.See Steven
Mufson, “In GOP, A Simmering Struggle on China Policy,” Washington Post,
August 22, 2000 in Lexis/Nexis] 35.Huang Kuei-mei and Sofia Wu, “ROC Still
Hopes to Acquire Aegis-Class Warships.” Central News Agency, September 4,
2000 on the world wide web at http://www.taipei.org/
teco/cicc/news/english/e-09-04-00/e-09-04-00-9.htm. 36.See, “US Declines Mediating Role,” United
Daily News (Taipei), May 16, 2000 in Taiwan 37.See,
Dennis Van Vranken Hickey, “America’s Two Point Policy and the Future of
Taiwan,” Asian Survey, Volume XXVIII, Number 8, August, 1988, p.888. Dennis V.
Hickey is Professor of Political Science, University Fellow in Research and
Director of the Graduate Program in International Affairs and Administration
at Southwest Missouri State University. His new book, East Asian
Armies: Japan, China, Taiwan and the Koreas, will be published by Lynn
Rienner Publishers in early 2001. |