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The paper draws its findings mainly from the Chinese official media. While this may not be an ideal source, it nevertheless provides a systematic data basis for a historical analysis of continuity and change. There is no question that the official Chinese media, particularly before the 1980s, was full of rhetoric and propaganda. There has always been a gap between rhetoric and behavior in Chinese foreign policy, as in other countries. Nevertheless it is equally true that behind rhetoric always lie perceptions, self-serving or not, that provide “diagnostic propensities” and “choice propensities” of the Chinese leaders and elites, and thus have policy implications.

The findings of the paper suggest that China's perceptions of the targets, internal structures, and functions of the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korean alliances have changed remarkably over time, from extreme hostility to high tolerance. These changes resulted from the interactions of such factors as China's assessment of the world balance of power, the wellbeing of its relationship with both indigenous and outside powers, and the priority of its national policy. The evolution of Chinese perceptions also illustrates that China need not view the two security alliances as inherently hostile to its interests. Under some circumstances they can be considered useful or at least harmless. Beijing's attitudes are often determined not by the two alliances per se but rather by its perception of the sources of threat to its security and whether these security alliances can alleviate or aggravate the threat. On the other hand, given the nature of China's foreign policy, Beijing does not have intrinsic love for these alliances. Since the 1980s, China has not particularly endorsed any bilateral or multilateral military alliance in the region. Normatively China is also uneasy with the reality of the American military presence in the region and tends to see it as a short-term arrangement rather than a long-term phenomenon. During the Cold War, the Chinese perceived the two security alliances as either against China or with China. In the post-Cold War period, they have yet to be convinced that the function of the two alliances could be neither.

From the Chinese perspective, 1947 witnessed an obvious flip-flop in U.S. postwar policy toward Japan. The postwar arrangement in the Far East, as envisioned by Franklin Roosevelt, featured a relatively strong, democratic, and pro-America China which was supposed to play a more prominent role in East Asia, while Japan was to be kept nonmilitarized, relatively weak, and in a low profile in regional affairs. Along these lines, MacArthur's occupation headquarters carried out a series of reforms in the wake of Japan's surrender aimed at turning Japan into a nonmilitarized and democratic state. As the Cold War unfolded and, more importantly, the Chinese Communists seemed to be gaining the upper hand in China's civil war, however, policymakers in Washington had to rethink this strategy and redirect America's Japan policy. Beginning in 1947, the U.S. Japan policy was no longer intended to constrain Japan but to foster a strong, pro-America ally and to make Japan a powerful fortress against the expansion of communism in the Far East. The founding of the People's Republic of China and the outbreak of the Korean War further prompted this policy shift. According to Chinese analysts, measures adopted by the United States to assist Japan's resurgence included reducing Japan's war reparations and promoting its economic recovery, suppressing Japanese leftists and communists while treating militarists with leniency, rearming Japan by building its police forces, and finally, after the Korean War broke out, turning Japan into America's strategic base in the Far East.'

China voiced strong concern over this policy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) asserted in a statement on June 12, 1950, that America's Japan policy aimed to turn Japan into America's colony and a base for launching a new war.² A People's Daily editorial of September 3, 1950, launched an even more ferocious attack on America's Japan policy:

On August 15, 1951, Premier Zhou Enlai issued a statement on the draft peace treaty with Japan put forward by America and Britain and the proposed San Francisco peace conference. In this statement, Zhou condemned General MacArthur's failure to enforce democratization in Japan and his policy of rebuilding Japanese militarism, and accused the United States of mobilizing Japan's manpower and military industry for the Korean War. Zhou asserted that the intent of U.S. policy toward Japan was to turn Japan into America's aggressive outpost in the Far East.⁴

U.S. assistance to the Kuomintang government in China's civil war from 1946 and 1949, while failing to change the outcome of the war, caused the Chinese Communists to view the United States as China's archenemy. In fact, as early as the spring of 1949, the CCP was prepared for possible direct U.S. military intervention once the Communist troops crossed the Yangtze River and captured Shanghai.⁵ After coming to power, the leaders of the PRC strongly suspected that the thrust of U.S. strategic deployments in East Asia was to strangle the nascent Communist China. The outbreak of the Korean War further aggravated this concern. A People's Daily editorial on September 3, 1950, painted a gray picture of the U.S. Far Eastern strategy:

In mid-1949, concerned with the U.S. military adventures, Mao proposed that the new China should tilt toward the Soviet Union in its foreign policy, and this led to the forging of the Sino-Soviet Alliance of Friendship and Mutual Assistance on February 14, 1950. The alliance treaty stipulated that China and the Soviet Union would jointly take all the necessary steps to prevent the resurgence of Japanese imperialism, and put an end to any aggression by Japan or any other country that might align with Japan.⁷ Obviously, Japan was merely a pretext here; the real purpose of the alliance was to guard against the United States. To some extent, the Sino-Soviet alliance was a preemptive measure against the forthcoming Japan-U.S. alliance.

Against this backdrop, China's response to the U.S.-Japan security treaty concluded on September 18, 1951, was critical. Beijing's comments on this alliance included the following:⁸

China reacted to the establishment of the U.S.-Japan alliance by taking a series of countermeasures. First, Beijing announced-after consulting Moscow-that it would extend the deadline for the Soviet navy's withdrawal from China's Lushun navy base as stipulated by the Sino-Soviet alliance treaty until the conclusion of a peace treaty between China and Japan and between the USSR and Japan.¹⁰ Obviously, Beijing expected that continued Soviet military presence in northeast China would help to undermine U.S. efforts to strengthen its Far Eastern strategic position as embodied by the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Second, Beijing endeavored to mobilize international consensus to condemn the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan security treaty. The World Peace Council and the Asia-Pacific Region Peace Conference passed resolutions deploring the U.S. attempts to revive Japanese militarism and the adverse impact the two treaties would have on peace in East Asia.¹¹

Third, as the Japan-U.S. alliance also was strongly opposed by many Japanese people, especially leftist students and labor union activists, Beijing extended its strong support, through the media and its links to some Japanese leftist organizations, especially the Japanese Communist Party, to their protest movements. Beijing's support was entirely moral and political; no material assistance was given.

Even though Japan had been brought into the U.S. Far Eastern strategic orbit, given Japan's geostrategic and economic importance the PRC still endeavored to improve relations with it. Beijing indicated that should Japan cut its ties with Taiwan, shed its status as America's vassal and follower, and become a peaceful and independent state, China would like to establish and develop normal relations with it. Even further, the PRC wished to sign a non-aggression treaty with Japan.¹² As diplomatic relations with Japan were unlikely to materialize in a short period of time, PRC leaders adopted a more realistic approach-to encourage nongovernmental economic and cultural ties between the two states and to use people-to-people exchanges to promote official relations.

After the truce of the Korean War, Washington stepped up its strategic deployments in East Asia. In August 1953, the United States and South Korea concluded a mutual defense treaty. Beijing viewed the treaty as a military alliance forged between Washington and Seoul, and interpreted it as intending to enable the United States to maintain its military presence indefinitely on the Korean peninsula in direct violation of the truce treaty signed by China, North Korea, and the United States requiring the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the peninsula. Beijing also asserted that since Syngman Rhee rejected the truce treaty, the U.S. South Korea security treaty would only serve to encourage him to carry out his plan of unifying Korea by force. Beijing expressed its concern that in the event of the South launching a war against the North, the United States would extend its assistance to the ROK as required by the security treaty. From the Chinese perspective, the U.S.-ROK alliance constituted a major obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue.¹⁴

The Eisenhower administration relentlessly endeavored to create a crescent-shaped encirclement around the PRC. In September 1954, Washington sponsored the founding of the five-nation Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the signing of the Southeast Asian Collective Defense Treaty. Beijing viewed this organization as one more military alliance targeted at China, and was very concerned that it would facilitate aggressive U.S. behavior in Asia. Three months later, Washington signed a mutual defense treaty with Taipei. Beijing accused Washington of using this alliance along with the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korean alliances to forge a Northeast Asian defense coalition, which, in conjunction with SEATO, would come to form a Far Eastern system of aggression which would allow the United States to prepare to start a new world war.¹⁶

The PRC's efforts to develop closer ties with Japan also suffered a setback when Kishi Nobusuke came to power in 1957. Nobusuke adopted a tough stance toward China; on various occasions he reiterated his position of non-recognition of the PRC and endorsement of attack by the KMT of the mainland. In addition, the Nobusuke government took an indifferent and non-cooperative attitude toward the economic exchanges between China and Japan. Meanwhile, impelled by Washington, Tokyo opened its talks with Seoul on issues in bilateral relations. The Japanese chief negotiator Sawada made a provocative comment that it was the task of the Japanese diplomacy to push the 38th parallel north of the Yalu River. Nobusuke's conservative foreign policy drew strong criticism from China. Beijing lashed the Nobusuke government for creating “two Chinas” and being hostile to the PRC, and accused it of attempting to revive Japanese militarism. A People's Daily editorial asserted that the Japan-ROK talks were part of an effort to form a Northeast Asian anti-communist military coalition comprising Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and South Vietnam, and warned of the danger of “potential Japanese imperialism.”¹⁷

Beijing viewed the revision of the U.S.-Japan security treaty as foremost an attempt by Washington to alleviate the political, military, and economic difficulties it was facing. It suggested that due to its pursuit of an aggressive and expansionist policy Uncle Sam was politically isolated, militarily overextended, and financially strained. To escape this dilemma, the United States tried to get Japan to share its military and financial burdens, as it did with West Germany in Europe. At the same time, Beijing noted that the Kishi Nobusuke government in Japan, which to it represented the potential for Japanese imperialism, sought to further collaborate with the United States in order to revive Japanese militarism, relieve the growing economic crisis, and realize the ambition of Japanese monopoly capitalism to expand into Southeast Asia.¹⁸

Beijing further suggested that Washington sought to achieve the following goals by revising the security treaty with Japan: to obligate Japan to defend the U.S. military bases in Japan on the pretext of mutual defense; to broaden the scope of mutual defense to cover the entire Western Pacific; and, when necessary, to involve Japan in a nuclear war for U.S. interests.¹⁹

Based on the above judgment, China perceived a series of negative consequences emanating from the revision of the treaty.²⁰

First, under the auspices of the United States, Japanese militarism would rebuild unchecked its armament and develop its offensive capability; Japan would not only help the United States defend its military bases in Japan, but also dispatch troops overseas to fight along with U.S. soldiers. This treaty indicated that Japan had been enlisted as a regular member of the military bloc headed by the United States, and Japanese militarism had been revived as a result of America's long fostering of it.

Second, the treaty enabled the United States to put Japanese forces into joint operations with troops from Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines on the pretext of "maintaining peace and stability in the Far East." In addition, the effective range of the treaty overlapped those of the U.S.-Taiwan, U.S.-South Korea, and U.S.-Philippines treaties. This implied that a Northeast Asian military coalition, long planned by the United States, had come into being with the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan security treaty.

Finally, the new U.S.-Japan security treaty was not just a military bloc; it also harbored a malicious intention of economic aggression. Japan intended to exchange its entering into military alliance with the United States for the U.S.'s endorsement of its overseas economic expansion, especially to Southeast Asia, in order that Japan could envelop Southeast Asia in its economic sphere of influence and revive its dream of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere."

Unlike its views of the prior decade, China's perception of the revision of the Japan-U.S. alliance treaty was characterized by a strong concern over the revival of Japanese militarism and the impact of the treaty on Southeast Asia. During the 1950s, China repeatedly warned of the possibility of a revival of Japanese militarism, but Beijing did not suggest it had become a reality; with the signing of the new security treaty between Washington and Tokyo, however, China affirmed that Japanese militarism had been revived. Obviously, the tough China policy pursued by the Kishi Nobusuke government contributed to Beijing's alarmist conclusion. Japan would massively build up its military capability and under some circumstances dispatch the Self-Defense Force overseas. Since the United States had been escalating its intervention in Indochina since the late 1950s, China was 'worried that the new U.S.-Japan security treaty might directly serve U.S. strategic needs in Southeast Asia.

Although China reacted to the new U.S.-Japan security treaty with an immediate bombardment of rhetoric, it did not take any action until July 11, 1961, when Beijing signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Pyongyang. Several days earlier, a similar treaty was concluded between the DPRK and the USSR. Both Moscow and Beijing stated that their entering into alliance with Pyongyang was a countermeasure against the attempt by the United States to actively revive Japanese militarism and forge a Northeast Asian military coalition.²¹ Obviously, China, the USSR, and the DPRK premeditated this significant action. As noted earlier, China had signed the Treaty of Economic and Cultural Cooperation with North Korea in the wake of the Korean War, but that was not a formal alliance treaty. Even when China completely withdrew its troops from North Korea in 1958, Beijing did not immediately enter into a security alliance with Pyongyang. It was the new U.S.-Japan security treaty that greatly aggravated China's concern over the regional security environment and prompted the Chinese to formally ally with North Korea, although it is yet unclear why it took a year and a half for Beijing and Pyongyang to conclude a formal alliance.

The resumption of Japan-ROK negotiations came as another alarming development to Beijing. The Japan-ROK bilateral talks were opened in 1951 in an effort to normalize relations between the two countries. However, mainly because of South Korea's deep-rooted hatred of Japan due to its colonization of the Korean peninsula, the talks were held intermittently for ten years without bearing fruit. After the signing of the new U.S.-Japan alliance treaty, Washington urged Tokyo and Seoul to resume their bilateral negotiation. Beijing viewed this as an important step taken by the United States to form a "Northeast Asian coalition of aggression." It suggested that although the United States had long attempted to forge such a coalition, due to the opposition of the Asian people as well as various tensions among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan this scheme failed to materialize. As the aggressive policy of the United States suffered more and more setbacks in Asia and the political and economic difficulties it faced mounted, Washington found it all the more urgent to piece together a Northeast Asian military coalition. For the United States, the purpose of this coalition was twofold: to borrow Japan's economic power to buttress the Park ChungHee military dictatorship, which was experiencing a serious political and economic crisis, and, when necessary, to get Japan to dispatch its SDF overseas to fight shoulder to shoulder with the U.S. army. With regard to Japan's motives, Beijing believed it sought to open Korea's doors for the massive invasion of Japanese militarism and monopoly capitalism.²³

In February 1965, the Japan-ROK negotiations that had lasted for fourteen years wound up with the initialing of a "Japan-ROK basic treaty" and the establishment of diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Seoul. In Beijing's opinion, by accelerating the conclusion of the Japan-ROK talks and collaboration between Japanese militarists and the Park ChungHee regime, Washington was endeavoring to form a Northeast Asia military bloc and use it to buttress the tottering Southeast Asia military bloc so as to strengthen America's strategic position in Asia. Specifically, the conclusion of the Japan-ROC basic treaty met the needs of the United States in fighting the Vietnam War: by getting Japan and South Korea to reconcile with one another, the United States would drive them to provide manpower and logistical support to U.S. operations in Vietnam. Beijing warned that the Japan-ROK treaty would seriously obstruct the peaceful unification of the Korean peninsula and greatly increase the possibility of a second Korean war. Some comments carried by China's newspapers went even further: they viewed the treaty as a sign that the United States and Japan were plotting to escalate the Indochina war and to attack China and the DPRK.²⁶

In fact, as the United States stepped up its military intervention in Vietnam, the possibility of its spillover into China increasingly preoccupied Beijing.²⁷ The PRC leadership held that escalation of the Vietnam War indicated that Washington had shifted its global strategic emphasis from Europe to Asia, and from dealing with the USSR to coping with China. To carry out this new strategy that viewed China as its archenemy, the United States, Beijing noted, not only had remarkably increased its military deployments in Asia but also was endeavoring to set up an "anti-China coalition" centered around Japan, the USSR, and India.²⁸

Under such circumstances, Beijing argued, Japan had become more important to the United States. Japan's increasing role in U.S. strategy was reflected in its growing involvement in the Vietnam War. As Japanese prime minister Sato suggested, Japan "should fully, completely and thoroughly fulfill its obligations as stipulated by the Japan-U.S. security treaty." Japan's involvement in the Vietnam War included allowing the United States direct access to its military bases in Japan; supplying the U.S. army with a huge amount of military materials, ranging from ammunition to medicines; and providing technical, engineering, and management assistance to the U.S. troops fighting in Vietnam. As a result, Beijing asserted, Japan had turned itself into an indispensable part of the U.S. war machine.²⁹

Beijing's sense of security was further strained by the Soviet-Japanese rapprochement. Beginning in 1965, Moscow moved to improve relations with Tokyo, which led to the establishment of the "Soviet-Japan Economic Cooperation Commission" and the opening of Soviet-Japan talks. Although the discord between Beijing and Moscow had been eroding their bilateral ties since the late 1950s, their relations did not break up until 1966, when the Cultural Revolution cast China's domestic and foreign policies to extremes. Driven by the internal political need to "stand against the revision of Marxism-Leninism," China adopted an overt anti-Soviet posture. Beijing asserted that efforts made by the Soviet leaders to cooperate with Japanese "counterrevolutionaries" were in close concert with the U.S. policy of vigorously fostering the militarists in Japan. Soviet-Japan collaboration, it suggested, was a product of the U.S. policy of "containing China," and the Soviet-Japan Economic Cooperation Commission, along with the U.S.-Japan alliance, had come to form a U.S.-USSR-Japan anti-China "sacred alliance" which would seek to dominate Asia.³⁰

Although China had long declared that it was ready for a combined attack from "all imperialists, revisionists, and reactionaries," when China's survival was at stake rational calculation prevailed over rhetoric. China's contemplation of a strategic readjustment of its foreign policy was met by President Nixon's strong desire to pull the U.S. troops from the mire in Vietnam and to stop the Soviet global expansion. The U.S.-China tango that began in 1969 eventually led to the dramatic Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan rapprochement. In the short run, however, the imminent security threat from the north did not immediately modify China's perception of the two security alliances. Instead China's criticism of the two alliances intensified and continued until mid-1971. There were several reasons for this lag.

First of all, after Richard Nixon took office in 1969, although Beijing noticed that he "has chanted a lot of 'prayers for peace' and played a lot of 'talks' tricks,"³¹ it had yet to be convinced that the Nixon administration was ready to pursue a China and Asia policy substantially different from those of his predecessors. In October 1969, the PLA air force shot down a pilotless U.S. high-altitude military reconnaissance plane over south-central China. Beijing related this incident by stating that "recently U.S. imperialism has repeatedly dispatched military aircraft and warships to carry out frenzied armed provocations against Chinese fishing fleets on the high seas in the Gulf of Bac Bo and flagrantly sent military aircraft into China's airspace to conduct reconnaissance and harassment." These episodes seemed to suggest that Washington was not prepared to give up its hostile policy toward China. In Beijing's words, they "once again give the lie to the peace hoax of the Nixon government and testify to the great truth of the concept of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought that imperialism means war."³² Also, in early 1970, the United States seemed to be intensifying its war effort in Indochina by invading Cambodia. On May 20, Mao Zedong issued a statement to call the peoples of the world to unite against U.S. imperialism and all its "running dogs." The Sino-U.S. ambassadorial talks in Warsaw were canceled. In sum, by early 1970, the United States was still considered "the main force of aggression and war and the most ferocious common enemy of the peoples of the world."³³

Second, as mentioned earlier, for a while the United States and Japan were perceived to be in the same anti-Chinese boat as the Soviet Union. Even an aviation agreement signed between Moscow and Tokyo in 1969 was perceived as evidence that "Soviet-Japan collusion [had] intensified" simply because the agreement allowed Japanese aircraft unrestricted flights over Siberia.³⁴ In Beijing's eyes, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and others were forming "a ring of encirclement around China.”³⁵ A Beijing Review article alleged that “[t]he U.S. capitalism and Soviet revisionism are working hand in glove in opposing China” with the United States directing Japan to establish a crescent of anti-China encirclement and the Soviet Union instructing India to establish a system of collective security.³⁶

Third, what upset Beijing most was the "automatic extension" of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. In October 1969, the Japanese government decided that the U.S.-Japan security treaty would be automatically extended when it expired in June 1970. One month later, Japanese prime minister Eisaku Sato paid a visit to Washington. In Sato's talks with Nixon, both sides agreed to further strengthen their security ties. The joint communiqué between Sato and Nixon was perceived as a manifesto of a new stage of U.S.-Japanese military collaboration.

First, China still took the U.S.-Japan security treaty as an "unequal treaty imposed on the Japanese people" by the United States. The United States was carrying out the quasi-occupation of Japan, turning the country into its biggest military and nuclear base.³⁷ During the U.S.-Japan summit, the United States agreed to return the "administrative rights" of Okinawa to Japan. Beijing viewed this as a cheap trick. Since the United States could still freely use the military bases on Okinawa and keep nuclear weapons there after the island was "returned" to Japan and became a part of Japan proper, what would stop the United States from doing the same in the whole of Japan? Therefore the net result was not the conversion of Okinawa into part of Japan proper but rather the "Okinawanization" of Japan proper.³⁸

What China saw was the intensification of U.S. military activities in both Okinawa and Japan proper. The United States further reinforced its military bases in March 1969 when it engineered the coup d'etat in Cambodia and extended its war of aggression to the whole of Indochina. U.S. B-52 bombers from the Kadena base in Okinawa wantonly bombed the Indochina region twice a day. Warships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet participating in the Indochina war kept moving in and out of Yokosuka, Sasebo, and other naval bases. The number of U.S. warships stationed at the Sasebo naval base had increased by 50 percent in two years. The U.S. Defense Department announced on June 5, 1970, that U.S. logistics departments in the Far East would move from Hawaii to Okinawa to concentrate supplies for all the U.S. troops stationed in Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia. The United States also turned the whole of Japan into its biggest communication and radar base in Asia. It set up thirty-two communications and radar bases there for carrying out espionage activities and directing missile attacks.³⁹ Overall the United States established 126 military bases and establishments in Japan proper, occupying an area of more than 300 square kilometers.⁴⁰

Second, the automatic extension of the U.S.-Japan security treaty was designed to serve Nixon's “new Asia policy" or "Nixon Doctrine." While China recognized that this new Asia policy reflected that "the U.S. strength cannot meet its ambitions to some extent,"⁴¹ its essence was to use "Asians to fight Asians." What bothered Beijing most was the prospect that Japan would be assigned a greater role in U.S. strategy in East Asia. The intent of the United States in expanding the alliance, Beijing charged, was to create a U.S.-backed and Japan-headed Asian "counterreactionary military coalition."⁴² In other words, the United States intended to "let loose” Japanese militarism.⁴³ It was placing "greater reliance on the Japanese reactionaries and making them serve as its shock troops against the people of the Asian countries."⁴⁴ Consequently Japan would become "a gendarme in Asia and the fugleman in opposition to the Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and all the other peoples of Asia."⁴⁵

Third, Japan was seen as more than willing and eager to serve the strategic interests of the United States with its own evil scheme in mind. In Beijing's words, the Japanese reactionaries "eagerly throw themselves into the arms of U.S. imperialism” and tie "the whole of Japan to the war chariot of U.S. imperialism."⁴⁶ The government of Eisaku Sato was referred to as "the most reactionary and aggressive Japanese government since the end of World War II."⁴⁷ Its foreign policy was described as "subservience to U.S. imperialism, collaboration with Soviet revisionism, and opposition to China, communism, and revolution."⁴⁸ Under the Sato government, "the revival of Japanese militarism is no longer a question of a so-called existing danger, but is, beyond all doubt, a matter of reality."⁴⁹ The Chinese media assailed the Japanese "national defense white paper” and its third and fourth military buildup programs, regarding them as concrete steps to turn Japan from an "economic power" into a "military power."⁵⁰

Here again China saw linkages between the U.S.-Japan security treaty and other U.S. security arrangements in the region. China was very nervous about the "Taiwan factor" in the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. A People's Daily editorial related Sato's visit to the United States to Nobusuke Kishi's provocative comment that Japan should support Chiang Kai-shek's "counteroffensive against the mainland." It asserted that "the Japanese reactionaries' wolfish ambition to obstruct by armed force the Chinese people's liberation of Taiwan and to support the attempt of the Chiang Kai-shek bandit gang to make inroads into the mainland in exchange for their annexation of Taiwan is all too obvious."⁵³ The connection between the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S.-ROK alliance was also explored. Here Japan was seen as helping and backing the Park Chung-hee regime in South Korea against North Korea. Militarily South Korea was being turned into a base of aggression against the DPRK. Economically South Korea became a colony of both U.S. imperialism and Japanese militarism.⁵⁴ The Japanese willingness to dispatch "self -defense forces" to South Korea under the pretext of "protecting” its "rights and interests" was considered particularly offensive.⁵⁵ As in the case of Taiwan, this revealed that Japan wanted to annex South Korea and turn it into a Japanese colony.⁵⁶ The Japanese were described as "leaving no stone unturned in stretching their tentacles of aggression into South Korea and energetically girding for active participation in U.S. imperialism's plots of new war adventures in Korea."⁵⁷

Chinese premier Zhou Enlai summarized in April 1970 China's position on the extension of the U.S.-Japan pact: "Our policy is to resolutely oppose the collusion of the American and Japanese reactionaries and the revival of Japanese militarism, the further development of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the formation of the Northeastern Asia military alliance, and the conspiracy of creating two ‘Chinas.’”⁵⁸ In part to counteract the further strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, Zhou Enlai paid an official visit to the DPRK in April 1970, following a long period of uneasiness in the relationship. The joint communiqué issued in the wake of the visit attacked the United States but even more vehemently attacked Japan. Both sides concluded that the United States was actively pursuing a tactic of "using Asians to fight Asians' by "mobilizing the Japanese militarist forces and [America's] other vassals and puppets."⁵⁹ Therefore "the struggle against Japanese militarism is a part of the struggle against U.S. imperialism."⁶⁰

On July 11, 1971, three major Chinese official publications, the People's Daily, PLA Daily, and Red Flag, jointly issued an editorial titled "Firm Alliance against Imperialist Aggression' to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Korean Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance. In the article China again charged that "Japanese militarism, which is being revived under the aegis of U.S. imperialism, is burning with ambition to renew its fond dream of annexing Korea, invading China, and dominating Asia." It accused the United States of trying to bring Japanese military forces into South Korea to strengthen the U.S.-Japan-Park joint operation system and conducting provocative U.S.-Japan joint military exercises in the sea east of Korea.⁶¹

As late as July 1971, therefore, China continued to hold very negative views of the two security alliances. While both the United State and Japan were targeted for criticism, Beijing's main concern was the revival of Japanese militarism. One People's Daily editorial alleged:

China's worry over Japanese militarism remained, however, irrespective of the thaw in Sino-U.S. relations. While Beijing refrained from directly attacking the U.S.-Japan alliance, it continued to express its concerns to Japanese visitors over the revival of Japanese militarism.⁶⁵ Such a mentality was also reflected in the Shanghai communiqué signed following Nixon's visit in 1972. In the document, China once again declared that it "firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan."⁶⁶ In his talk with the Chinese, Nixon had to assure the Chinese leaders that Japan would not replace the United States in East Asia as it withdrew its military forces from Taiwan.⁶⁷

Nixon's China initiative, carried out without advance consultation with Tokyo, shocked Japan and dealt a setback to the American-Japanese alliance. Partially as a result of the "Nixon shock," the Sato government lost popular support and had to step down in July 1972. Kakuei Tanaka formed a new cabinet. To offset the aftermath of the "overhead" diplomacy of the United States, Tanaka decided to employ "catch up" diplomacy. In his first press conference in July, Tanaka defined China as "the biggest diplomatic question.” He believed that the time was ripe for the two countries to normalize their relations.⁶⁸ China immediately noticed Tanaka's different attitude and responded swiftly and positively. Zhou Enlai told a Japanese guest in the same month that normalization of relations between China and Japan was not intended to oppose a particularly country, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union. The Beijing airport, he said, would welcome Prime Minister Tanaka with open arms if he wished to visit China.⁶⁹ Sino-Japanese rapprochement moved at a staggering pace. just two months after Tanaka took office, he was in Beijing to sign a joint statement with China to establish diplomatic relations. In the joint statement, just like the Shanghai communiqué, both sides pledged not to seek hegemony in the Asia Pacific region and to oppose efforts by any country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. Both sides also agreed to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship. In the meantime, China renounced its demand for war indemnities from Japan.⁷⁰

So, although the United States took the lead in rapprochement with China, Japan came from behind and took only 82 days to finish the course of normalization that had taken the United States more than six years to accomplish. Suddenly the Sino-Japanese relationship was closer than the Sino-U.S. relationship. Travel and trade between China and Japan soon surpassed that between China and the United States. Naturally China's perception of the U.S.-Japan alliance was affected by this dramatic development. With Tanaka's visit, the image of the vicious "Japanese militarism" almost completely disappeared from the Chinese press, along with criticism of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance. While Beijing did not publicly endorse the U.S.-Japan security pact, in private conversations Chinese officials expressed the opinion that it was for the Japanese and American people to define their own security relationships, hence sanctioning the U.S.-Japanese security pact.⁷¹

After the signing in April 1973 of the Paris agreement on Vietnam and the consequent withdrawal of U.S. troops from Indochina, China's perception of the U.S.-Japanese threat to its national security further diminished. Instead the Soviet threat loomed larger and larger in its eyes. The Chinese media was flooded with articles about the ruthless Soviet expansion and the U.S.-Soviet contention.⁷² Détente between the United States and the Soviet Union was labeled a "hoax."⁷³ In 1974, Deng Xiaoping in his only speech at the United Nations described the two superpowers as "vainly seeking world hegemony" and as "the source of a new world war." The contradiction between them is irreconcilable, he said: "Their compromise and collusion can only be partial, temporary, and relative, while their contention is all-embracing, permanent, and absolute."⁷⁴ By 1975 or so, China had concluded that the Soviet Union was more dangerous than the United States since the former was on the offensive while the latter was on the defensive. Deng Xiaoping pointed out in his toast to welcome President Ford in 1975 that "Today it is the country which most zealously preaches peace that is the most dangerous source of war."⁷⁵ This perception was formalized in a long essay on Mao's theory of "the three worlds" by the editors of the People's Daily in 1977. While it declared that "the two hegemonist powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, are the common enemies of the people of the world," it clearly defined the Soviet Union as "the most dangerous source of world war."⁷⁶

In the Asia Pacific region, China saw the Soviet Union "taking advantage of the reduced U.S. presence in Asia after defeat in the war of aggression against Vietnam" and "intensifying expansion in the region to fill the ‘vacuum.’”⁷⁷ Based on this judgment, China for the first time wished to see the continuation of the American military presence in the region. Zhou Enlai reportedly told two American congressmen that the United States should retain military forces in Asia to maintain a stable balance of power. Interestingly, Japan became the main beneficiary of China's new perception of the structure of the international balance of power.⁷⁸ Not only was Japan exempted from the Chinese assaults, but its image in the Chinese media was transformed from an accomplice of the two superpowers against China to a victim of Soviet hegemony and the U.S.-Soviet rivalry in East Asia; from that of a reckless and ambitious "Japanese militarism" to that of a Japan bullied and pushed around by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was seen as "handling Japan with both kid gloves and a mailed fist in an attempt to put Japan into its orbit of hegemony";⁷⁹ it used both "cajolery and coercion, the carrot and the stick, in an attempt to control Japan."⁸⁰ The conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union was categorized as "the Japanese people fighting Soviet hegemony."⁸¹

China backed Japan on almost every issue in its dealings with the USSR. During most of the 1970s, Beijing strongly supported Japan's claim to the Northern Territories. These four islands, Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu, were said to have been Japanese territory since ancient times. They were occupied by the Soviet Union, which refused to return them to Japan.⁸² The "struggle" of the Japanese people for the return of these islands was regularly reported and praised by the Chinese media. It described how the Soviet Union militarized the four islands to integrate them into the Soviet Union's Far East and Pacific strategic system by linking the military bases on the islands with those in Vladivostok and other places in the Far East so that the Soviet Pacific fleet and military aircraft could control the Soya and Tsugaru straits and the Japan Sea and roam the north and west Pacific. This was directed first and foremost against the U.S. Seventh Fleet and at the same time threatened Japanese security.⁸³ In the meantime, Japan's territorial air space and territorial waters were subjected to frequent violations by Soviet military forces.⁸⁴

China was also sympathetic to Japan in its fishery disputes with the Soviet Union. According to a Chinese report, Soviet fishing fleets not only conducted reconnaissance activities around the main Japanese islands but also intensively drained Japan's offshore resources.⁸⁵ The unilateral Soviet declaration of its establishment of a "200-mile exclusive fishing zone" in March 1977 to incorporate Japan's four northern islands was interpreted by Beijing as a hostile action against Japan. The Soviet Union tried to compel Japan to recognize its occupation of the Northern Territories as "legal" by accepting its 200-mile exclusive fishing zone. Beijing called this "the new tsar's fresh blackmail of Japan.”⁸⁶

According to Beijing, "One of the Soviet aims in coaxing and coercing Japan is to put it in the orbit of a Soviet 'Asian collective security system.'”⁸⁷ Opposition to the "Asian collective system" therefore formed "an important part of the Japanese people's struggle against Soviet hegemony."⁸⁸ The Kremlin's calculation, as Beijing saw it, was that as soon as "Japan bites the hook of this so-called 'Asian security system,' the Soviet Union will gain the upper hand in its rivalry with the United States in Asia."⁸⁹ In 1976, the Chinese declared that the struggle of the Japanese for the return of the Northern Territories, for safety in fishing operations, and against the "Asian collective security system" "has grown into a nationwide mass campaign.”⁹⁰

The Soviet Union and China competed to influence Japan. Each side saw the other's effort as sabotaging its relations with Japan. The negotiations over the China-Japan peace and friendship treaty best illustrate this interaction among the three countries. The negotiations started soon after the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations, but dragged on for many years. The main roadblock was China's insistence on including a so-called "antihegemony” clause in the treaty. Japan, unwilling to take sides in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, worried that inclusion of the clause would unnecessarily offend the Soviet Union. The United States, however, supported China's demand and sent this message directly to the Japanese government.⁹² In the meantime China noted that the Soviet Union was exerting a lot of pressure on the Japanese government not to give in. It issued a TASS statement to threaten Japan.⁹³ It attacked by name and tried to intimidate certain Diet members and leaders of Japanese political parties and even applied crude pressure on the Japanese government.⁹⁴ The Soviet foreign minister was reported to have threatened the Japanese prime minister that the Soviet Union might "have to review its relations with Japan if the Japanese government agreed to inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the projected Japan-China peace and friendship treaty. Prime Minister Miki retorted, "The conclusion of the Japan-China peace and friendship treaty is a matter between the two countries of Japan and China and the talks on the treaty have nothing to do with the Soviet Union."⁹⁵ This time it was China that denounced the Soviet attempt to "interfere in Japan's internal affairs."⁹⁶ The Chinese media described the Japanese people as taking "a firm stand against the despicable Soviet attempt to sow discord in Japan-China relations and thus undermine the friendship between the two countries."⁹⁷ In early 1976, Chinese media reported a campaign in Japan for the early conclusion of the Japan-China treaty of peace and friendship, including the anti-hegemony clause.⁹⁸

Therefore, by the end of 1978 China had established a parallel strategic partnership with both the United States and Japan. The interests of this partnership coincided with the interests of the two security alliances in terms of outbalancing the Soviet position in the region. At his first press conference after issuing the communiqué on U.S.-China normalization, Chinese premier Hua Guofeng defined the nature of this triangular relationship: "We think that the normalization of relations between China and the United States and the signing of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship between China and Japan are conducive to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and the world as a whole. Does this mean the formation of an axis or alliance of China, Japan, and the United States? We say that it is neither an alliance nor an axis."¹⁰⁴ For the moment, China's perception of the two security alliance was conditioned by this new geopolitical structure and overshadowed by its overriding concern with the Soviet threat.

This quasi-alliance was soon put to the test by a series of events that seemed to validate the point made repeatedly by Chinese leaders during those years that a new world war was inevitable and that the Soviet Union was the most dangerous source of war. In January 1978, Vietnam signed a security treaty with the Soviet Union and in December its troops marched into Cambodia. In February 1979, China launched a limited border war to punish the Vietnamese. At the end of 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Deng Xiaoping had predicted that the 1980s were going to be a particularly dangerous decade.¹⁰⁵ The top priority for China's diplomacy in the late 1970s and early 1980s therefore was to form a united front, including the United States and Japan, to thwart Soviet expansion.

U.S.-China relations entered a stage of quasi-alliance in January 1980 when U.S. secretary of defense Harold Brown arrived in Beijing to discuss possible military cooperation between the two countries. This was the first formal contact between military leaders of the two countries. Both sides held that the Soviet Union's pursuit of hegemony and expansion abroad constituted the main danger to the world and expressed the desire to strengthen their own defense capabilities and take parallel actions on the basis of equality and mutual benefit in order to safeguard world peace.¹¹⁰ In early April, the Chinese National People's Conference decided not to extend the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the PRC and USSR, which was due to expire on April 11.¹¹¹ China reasoned that with the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations and the signing of the peace treaty, the main anti-Japanese clause in the treaty was out of date.¹¹² These developments indicated that China's alliance structure, established in the 1950s and 1960s to counteract the United States and Japan, had largely disintegrated. The former ally had become an enemy while the former adversaries had become quasi-allies. Consequently the two security alliances, particularly the U.S.-Japan alliance, were regarded as an integral part of the anti-Soviet united front. By the same token, China no longer perceived the increase in Japanese defense capacity in negative terms. Instead China both publicly and privately encouraged the Japanese to develop their independent military force.

For a while the Chinese media reported Japan's efforts to enhance its security and its defense capability uncritically. The Beijing Review reported in 1980 that four days after Zenko Suzuki took office as prime minister he established a comprehensive national security council to study the question of Japan's security from a wider perspective which included diplomacy, energy, and food in addition to defense. It also reported that Japan's finance ministry and defense agency agreed that defense expenditure in fiscal 1981 should be increased by 9.7 percent over the current outlay to a record 10.97 billion U.S. dollars. The need to increase defense spending to cope with the changing world was stressed in the 1980 Japanese Defense White Paper. According to it the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Territories and the activities of the Soviet Far East forces had begun to "to pose an increased potential threat to Japan's security."¹¹⁶ Beijing also noticed the increase in the so-called "defense consciousness" in Japan. According to one article in Beijing Review, "Defense is now very much on the minds of the Japanese people... For the first time since World War II, leading Japanese political figures have publicly expressed their determination to strengthen the country's defense." It went on to say that "[m]any Japanese have expressed the fear that should a crisis occur, the self-defense forces would not be able to fulfill their role. They feel that it is important to maintain an independent defense capability which can stand up to the Soviet military threat..."¹¹⁷ China also viewed with favor the efforts by Japan and the United States to strengthen their military alliance. One analyst commented on the summit meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan in 1981 thus:

The change in China's perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance was not as dramatic as that regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance. China seldom explicitly addressed the U.S.-Korean alliance; the modification of its attitude was reflected more in its views of the situation on the Korean peninsula and in its relations with North Korea. One important change was that with the improvement in Sino-American and Sino-Japanese relations, Beijing preferred to see a decrease in tensions on the Korean peninsula and the reconciliation of North and South. Beginning in the 1970s, limited contact and dialogue between the North and South was initiated. China actively supported every peace proposal put forward by Kim II Sung and endorsed any progress in this regard.¹²⁴ In 1984, Hu Yaobang declared in Tokyo that "China genuinely and unswervingly favors enduring stability on the Korean peninsula and holds that whatever actions likely to aggravate tension there, no matter where they originate, should be avoided,"¹²⁵ clearly implying that China would not endorse any military adventures by the North. After 1985, Beijing saw the international environment as favorable for reconciliation between the two sides in Korea since major power relations between the United States, Japan, the USSR, and China were in much better shape.¹²⁶

Another noticeable change in China's handling of the Korean issue was that China no longer automatically lumped the two security alliances together, which was traditionally the practice in the 1950s and 1960s. Beginning in the early 1970s, the issue of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty and Japanese militarism disappeared from the official joint communiqués and statements between China and the DPRK.¹²⁷ They were not mentioned in the People's Daily editorial celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the China-Korea Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance.¹²⁸ Rhetorically Beijing had reduced the importance it attached to the China-DPRK treaty.

Nevertheless, due both to historical reasons and the constraints imposed by China's treaty with North Korea China's position on the U.S. military presence in South Korea remained fairly consistent. Publicly China held that the main obstacle to the reunification of the two Koreas was the American troops in South Korea and that the United States should withdraw them.¹²⁹ To a large extent the U.S.-ROK treaty was not the issue here, since the American troops had long been stationed in South Korea under the banner of the United Nations. China supported various UN resolutions proposed by other countries requesting "withdrawal of all the foreign troops stationed in South Korea under the flag of the United Nations." ¹³⁰ In response to the U.S. argument that most American troops were stationed in South Korea under the terms of the U.S.-ROK security treaty rather than under the flag of the UN, Huang Hua, China's permanent representative to the UN Security Council, rebutted, "Who does not know that the U.S. troops invaded Korea under the flag of the United Nations at the outset? Over the past two decades and more, it has never dropped that UN flag. And now all of a sudden, it invokes the bilateral 'US-ROK treaty,' asserting that the tens of thousands of U.S. troops do not belong to the so-called 'UN command' and are not UN troops in the first place. There are two labels, but no matter how it changes the label, from one to the other, its purpose remains the same-that is, to prolong its stay in Korea, continue its interference in the internal affairs of Korea, and perpetuate the division of that country.¹³¹ Whatever the label and pretext, China asserted that the U.S. troops had no reason whatsoever to hang on in South Korea any longer.¹³² Senior Chinese leaders aired this criticism personally to American leaders during the Reagan years when signs of strain surfaced in the relationship. In 1984, Hu Yaobang told a visiting Reagan that China opposed the stationing of American troops in South Korea. "That does no good to your reputation,” Hu said.¹³³ In his meeting with Zbigniew Brzezinski in March 1984, Deng Xiaoping said that unless the United States stepped out of its mindset of regarding South Korea, Taiwan, Israel, and South Africa as four “aircraft carriers," it would be impossible for the United States to "gain the initiative in global strategy."¹³⁴ China also facilitated the U.S.-DPRK dialogue on the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal by passing messages from the DPRK to the U.S. government.¹³⁵ As a result, low-level contacts between American and North Korean diplomats took place in the mid 1980s in Beijing.¹³⁶

U.S.-China relations were soon haunted by the Taiwan issue. From the outset, Beijing was unhappy with the Taiwan Relations Act passed by the U.S. Congress at the same time diplomatic relations with China were established.¹³⁷ Presidential candidate Ronald Reagan's advocacy of restoring official relations with Taiwan put the Chinese on alert.¹³⁸ The remark of his senior advisor Raymond Cline that China was too weak militarily to serve as a useful ally in dealing with the Soviet Union hurt China even more.¹³⁹ The Chinese were fed up with the American "arrogance."¹⁴⁰ In the early years of the Reagan administration, Sino-U.S. relations were torpedoed by a series of incidents such as the intended sale of a new fighter jet to Taiwan, trade disputes, financial claims against the PRC for bonds issued under previous Chinese regimes, and the defection of Chinese tennis player Hu Na. The issue of arms sales to Taiwan was particularly acute during 1981 and 1982.¹⁴¹

While Sino-American relations showed signs of trouble, China noticed some lightening in its relations with the Soviet Union. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China expected that the USSR would engineer more international incidents. This did not happen, however. In 1981, the Chinese media had already begun to question whether the Soviet Union was declining. The various economic and political difficulties in the Soviet Union were noted although China concluded that the Soviet Union had not yet declined and the Chinese should remain vigilant.¹⁴² just as the discussion of declining American power in the early 1970s signaled a change in China's foreign policy, the discussion of the decline of Soviet power also pointed to a possible policy adjustment. On March 24, 1982, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev announced in Tashkent that the USSR was ready to improve Sino-Soviet relations. The spokesman for the Chinese ministry of foreign affairs immediately “noted” the remarks.¹⁴³ The Chinese press also observed that Brezhnev chose a troubled moment in Sino-U.S. relations (resulting from U.S. arms sales to Taiwan) to state the Soviet opposition to the "concept of two Chinas,' and commented that "this provides food for thought."¹⁴⁴ The result of China's "thinking" was the declaration by Hu Yaobang of China's "independent foreign policy" at the 12th CCP Congress in September 1982, meaning the pursuit of a more "equidistant” policy toward the two superpowers. China would not align with any other country nor attach itself to any country or bloc of countries. In 1985, Hu further refined this foreign policy: China would never attach itself to, nor foster strategic relations nor an alliance with, any big power or bloc of powers.¹⁴⁵

This new policy resulted from the combined effect of China's reassessment of the world balance of power and its frustration with the United States. First, China noticed that after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 the United States began expanding its armaments and seeking military superiority over the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union found itself facing an onslaught of U.S. offensives and repeatedly lost to the United States. So "the strategic situations were transformed from Soviet offensives into bilateral confrontation."¹⁴⁶ Since the two superpowers were now on an equal footing power-wise, China lacked objective grounds on which to unite with one against the other.

Under the guidance of its "independent foreign policy," China slowly started its détente with the Soviet Union. With the consultations between the vice foreign ministers under way in 1982, bilateral trade and personal contacts began to pick up. After Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the pace of improvement accelerated. In October 1985, Deng Xiaoping offered to visit Moscow to hold a summit meeting with Gorbachev. In July 1986, Gorbachev responded in Vladivostok that the Soviet Union was willing to discuss its relationship with China at any level.¹⁴⁹ Although normalization did not come until 1989, China's perception of the Soviet threat was diminishing.

Misfortunes never arrive singly; Sino-Japanese relations also ran aground. To begin with, the "textbook issue" in 1982 saw the emergence of the bitter history of Japan's wartime aggression in China emerge as a sensitive issue for the first time since normalization in 1972. The Japanese Education Ministry revised parts of a high school textbook concerning the Japanese invasion of China and the World War II massacre in Nanjing. The revision was rejected by China. Beijing declared that "the censorship of textbooks by the Japanese Education Ministry is indeed Japan's internal affair, but Japan's invasion of China and Southeast Asia certainly was not its internal affair, nor is its distortion of the history of Japanese aggression."¹⁵⁰ Even worse, Beijing saw the episode as a "serious signal that there exists the danger of a revival of Japanese militarism."¹⁵¹

The flood of Japanese goods into China in the early 1980s reminded many Chinese of the Japanese aggression of the 1930s. They talked about "the second invasion by Japan" and “the economic aggression."¹⁵² The uncoordinated expansion of imports from Japan brought the problem of trade deficits to the fore. In 1985, China's trade deficit with Japan reached a peak of U.S. $5.9 billion.¹⁵³ Chinese leaders began to express serious concerns about these issues when they met Japanese guests. News reports about the poor quality of some Japanese products and the resulting demand for compensation further embittered the Chinese.¹⁵⁴ Against this backdrop, in September 1985 an anti-Japanese student demonstration broke out in Beijing and other cities in response to Japanese prime minister Nakasone's official visit to the Yasukuni Shrine to honor the Japanese war dead of World War II. The students shouted slogans such as "Oppose the revival of Japanese militarism,” "Oppose economic aggression," "Down with Nakasone," and “Boycott Japanese goods." They also accused Beijing of being too soft in response to the provocative actions of Japan.¹⁵⁵ Hu’s lavish invitation to Japanese youth to visit China was widely criticized by students as a stupid emotional gesture which did not take into account the real interests of the Chinese people.¹⁵⁶ The student demonstrations were the first public anti-Japanese event since diplomatic normalization with Japan in 1972. A similar demonstration of discontent was carried out by Japanese in Tokyo outside the Chinese embassy.¹⁵⁷ Sino-Japanese relations in the following several years never completely recovered from the wave of mutual hostility experienced at the end of 1985. On January 16, 1987, Hu Yaobang was forced to resign as party general secretary. Among his political mistakes was his "pro-Japan" foreign policy and a "too close" personal relationship with Nakasone.¹⁵⁸

The Taiwan issue also came to irritate the relationship. For instance, on February 7, 1987, the Japanese government sent a special plane with officials from its ministry of foreign affairs to escort eleven North Korean defectors from the ship Qingiin to Taiwan. Chinese diplomatic officials called the action a "Pearl Harbor" in Sino-Japanese relations: by the time Chinese diplomatic officials in Tokyo were informed of the Japanese action, the military airplane was already on its way to Taiwan. Beijing sharply criticized the incident as a serious violation of the Sino-Japanese agreement limiting Japanese relations with Taiwan to the private sector.¹⁵⁹ More detrimental was the case of the Kokario dormitory. The dormitory was purchased in 1950 by the KMT government in Taiwan for Chinese students in Japan. After the normalization of relations between Japan and China, the local court in Kyoto decided that ownership of Kokario should be transferred to the PRC. Taiwan refused to accept the ruling and appealed to the Osaka Higher Court. In 1982, the Osaka Higher Court returned the case to the Kyoto local court for reconsideration. In February 1986, the Kyoto local court rescinded its original ruling and decided that Kokario belonged to the Taiwanese authorities. On February 26, 1987, the Osaka Higher Court upheld the ruling by rejecting China's claim to Kokario, awarding it instead to Taiwan. From Beijing's perspective, this decision was nothing but an intentional provocation. The Chinese foreign minister presented a strong protest to the Japanese government, declaring that the ruling was wrong both politically and legally and aimed at openly creating "two Chinas."¹⁶⁰ Japan argued that given its adherence to the principle of separation of powers in its three branches of government, Tokyo had no right to interfere in a judiciary matter.¹⁶¹ But China did not accept this explanation, replying that "no country should make use of the provisions of its domestic law to justify its violation of international law."¹⁶² Even Deng Xiaoping joined the fray by denouncing the Kokario decision and asking Japan not to follow the U.S. example on Taiwan.¹⁶³ He declared that unless Taiwan was reunited with China, it might be "taken away" by other powers such as the United States or Japan.¹⁶⁴

Nineteen eighty-seven marked the fifteenth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan. At the fifth meeting of cabinet members representing the Chinese and Japanese governments, Chinese state councilor and foreign minister Wu Xueqian, while characterizing the relationship over the previous fifteen years as on the whole "normal and good," pointed out that "some problems have cropped up, especially those that involve major principles of bilateral relations and that have nothing to do with social systems." These problems fell roughly into two categories: how to correctly approach the unfortunate evens of the past, and how to properly handle relations between Japan and Taiwan. He warned that these issues demanded immediate attention and should be dealt with seriously.¹⁶⁵

These squabbles nurtured some bad feelings between the Chinese and Japanese. Referring in his meeting with Japanese officials in 1987 to past hitches in Sino-Japanese relations, Deng Xiaoping said, "Frankly speaking, the responsibility was never China's. Not one of the past and present troubles was caused by China."¹⁶⁶ He also reminded the Japanese that "Japan is the country in world that is most indebted to China. But we are close neighbors. Considering the long-term interest of both peoples, we decided not to ask for reparation. But we Orientals appreciate feelings and reason (qingli). Based on these two words, Japan should make contributions to help China's development."¹⁶⁷ In Japan his remarks were taken as reclaiming reparation from Japan. A senior official in the Japanese foreign ministry asserted that Deng Xiaoping was "in the clouds” and "does not understand the real situation of SinoJapanese relations." He declared that "the need for restoring diplomatic relations has reached a saturation point."¹⁶⁸ Beijing was furious with these "unfriendly" remarks. The Chinese foreign ministry protested the "malicious attacks" upon China's top leader. Under pressure from Beijing, Tokyo eventually apologized for the "discourteous” remarks about Deng.¹⁶⁹ This sequence of actions and reactions brought the political relationship between the two countries to its lowest point since 1972.

The souring of Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japan bilateral relations, coupled with China's reassessment of the international situation, caused China to retreat from its perceptions of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and Japan's role in the alliance in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

First of all, China once again picked up the theme of the revival of Japanese militarism. As noted earlier, after the "textbook incident" in 1982 Chinese leaders warned in their meetings with Japanese leaders that there were indeed some in Japan who wanted to revive Japanese militarism. They hoped, they said, that the Japanese people would not let those individuals prevail. They also mentioned that because of history Asian countries were quite sensitive to the Japanese military. The increase in the Japanese military force should have limits, should not be more than required by the need for defense, and should not pose threats to its neighbors.¹⁷⁰ China was also bothered by several political events in Japan, including proposals to amend Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, the visit of the prime minister and cabinet members to the Yasukuni Shrine, and the provision of military technology to the United States. The Chinese were particularly sickened by the so-called "war-responsibility-phobia," referring to the frequent speeches made by Japanese politicians to deny Japan's wartime aggression and atrocities against China and other countries.¹⁷¹ According to one article, "The peoples in Asia and the Pacific region, including the Chinese, have not forgotten the sufferings brought by Japanese militarism in the past. They are closely following developments in Japan. They would be worried by any sign of a revival of militarism in Japan. They hope that Japan will contribute to the stability and prosperity of the region and avoid any return to militarism."¹⁷² In his meeting with Japanese special envoy Masayoshi Ito in April 1988, Deng Xiaoping mentioned that "several troubling incidents have cropped up in recent years."¹⁷³ He advised the Japanese government to pay more attention and to take tougher measures to deal with the "right-wing forces" in Japan. "Dealing with them too leniently might encourage their arrogance," he advised. The incidents, considered separately, were not major, Deng said. But when seen together, they represented a kind of tendency and a force which could easily sabotage Sino-Japanese friendship and almost certainly arouse a strong reaction from the Chinese people.¹⁷⁴

At the regional level, as it witnessed Reagan's effort to rebuild the U.S. predominance in East Asia China was no longer worried that the United States might withdraw from the Asia Pacific. While Carter had considered a reduction in U.S. troops stationed in South Korea, Reagan increased the U.S. military presence in the Pacific Ocean, strengthening the Seventh Fleet with nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines equipped with cruise missiles. U.S. troops in the area had been increased to 150,000 and more combat aircraft were sent to Asia. It also strengthened its intelligence forces and reconnaissance to keep a close watch on Soviet air and naval movements in the northwestern Pacific.¹⁷⁵ By 1985-1986, China noted a reduction in tension among the major powers in the region, including U.S.-USSR and USSR-Japan relations.¹⁷⁶ After Gorbachev came to power, China viewed him as making major adjustments in Soviet Asia-Pacific policy by improving relations with the United States, Japan, and China.¹⁷⁷ Since there was no imminent Soviet threat to the security of Japan and China, it was less imperative to strengthen the U.S.-Japan security alliance as well as Sino-Japanese strategic coordination against the USSR. By the same logic, the further increase of Japanese military capability was deemed unnecessary if not immediately harmful.

Therefore Beijing viewed with apprehension Tokyo's energetic adoption of several measures to increase defense spending. In 1982, its military spending reached its highest postwar level and would increase by 7 percent annually for the next five years. In 1983, Chinese foreign minister Wu Xueqian told Japanese special envoy Susumu Nikaido that national defense was Japan's internal affair. As an independent and sovereign country, Japan was entitled to maintain an armed force for defense against external threats. "But such an armed force should be defense-oriented and of appropriate size so it does not constitute a threat to its friendly neighbors."¹⁷⁸

At the end of 1986, the Japanese government decided to abandon its limit on defense spending of 1 percent of GNP by allocating $22 billion for military expenditure for fiscal 1987. This made up 1.004 percent of Japan's GNP. Chinese analysts cited many reasons for this decision, such as increasing U.S. pressure on Japan to shoulder more of Asia's defense burden and a conservative trend in Japan for the rebuilding of the country's military forces and its regrowth as a strong power. The Chinese government expressed its concern. A spokesman said on January 2 that "there has to be a limit to the growth of Japanese defense forces, which should not exceed its defense needs and make its neighbors feel uneasy."¹⁷⁹

During the Kokario crisis in 1987, Deng Xiaoping complained to Japanese visitors of Japan's "chauvinism" and "mounting militarism." To keep distance from the Japanese military, he refused to meet Yuko Kurihara, the first director-general of Japan's defense agency to visit China since normalization. At the same time, he met with Junya Yano, the chief of Japan's opposition Komei party, for a long talk. He expressed great concern over the trend in Japan toward a revival of militarism, stating that there was no need for Tokyo to increase its defense spending beyond the decade-long ceiling of 1 percent of GNP. He feared that "such a precedent will be repeated twice or three times."¹⁸⁰

In 1988, China called the decision by Japan's cabinet to keep its military budget above the ceiling of 1 percent of GNP "a strike against world hopes for peace and development." Japan's budget allocated about $28 billion for defense spending, a 5.2 percent increase over the 1987 figure and 1.013 percent of Japan's estimated GNP. Chinese analysts noted that Japanese defense spending had doubled in the past decade. One article quoted the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo, Mike Mansfield, as saying that "no other country has shown such a large increase in defense spending." It went on to declare that Japan's continued increases in defense spending had aroused concern and vigilance among neighboring Asian countries. Japan's defense spending was just below that of the Soviet Union and the United States. If this level of spending were to continue without restraint, Japan would undoubtedly become one of the world's major military powers. It concluded that Japan's defense programs already far exceeded Japan's need to defend its territory.¹⁸¹

In conjunction with military spending, Beijing also worried about Japan's projection of military power within and beyond the U.S.-Japanese security alliance and its tendency to "seek an independent big power status.¹⁸² Commenting on the Nakasone-Reagan summit in 1983, a Chinese analyst pointed out that "[w]hat is noteworthy is that Nakasone went a step further than his predecessors on the topic of the Japan-U.S. alliance. While former prime minister Masayoshi Ohira mentioned the Japan-U.S. alliance during his trip to Washington in 1980 and former prime minister Zenko Suzuki referred to the "relations of alliance” in a 1981 visit to the United States, Nakasone stressed that the two countries are "a community of destiny on both sides of the Pacific." He also said in unequivocal terms that Japan-U.S. alliance relations involve military aspects. The analyst wondered "whether the military element in the Japan-U.S. alliance will be expanded, how much it will be expanded, and what impact it will have on the Asian and Pacific region."¹⁸³

For Beijing, some answers to these questions were already to be found in the change in Japan's defense policy. Since World War II, Japan had adhered to the principle of self-defense and had strictly limited the range of defense to its own territory. The prevention of enemy attacks on its territory and occupation of its key areas were its guiding principle. Beijing noted, however, that in recent years this policy had undergone major changes. The Nakasone government was willing to turn the territory of Japan into an unsinkable aircraft carrier and safeguard the security of its transportation lanes for 1,000 nautical miles. At the same time, to blockade the straits of Soya Kaikyo, Tsugaru Kaikyo, and Tsushima Kaikyo in time of war had become a target of defense. The Nakasone government further stated that "self-defense actions" beyond 1,000 nautical miles were now considered constitutional. This would not only expand the range of Japanese defense but would also overstep the protective boundaries designated by the Japanese-U.S. security treaty. In other words, Japan's guiding ideology of passive defense had transformed itself into one of active prewar preparations to defeat an enemy at first blow. The strategy of wiping out the enemy at the beachhead had become one of attacking the enemy in the distant sea.¹⁸⁴ In addition, Japan's decision in 1983 to transfer military technology to the United States and to formally participate in the research work of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative was also considered a departure from its traditional principle of shunning collective defense and its three principles on prohibiting the export of arms.¹⁸⁵ In short, although the Japanese constitution had not been formally revised, in practice the constitution and related laws and policies gradually became null and void.

By 1988 China had begun to worry about the possibility that Japan would send troops overseas. Beijing noted a report submitted by the Strategic Research Center in Japan that called on the Japanese government to dispatch minesweeper and escort vessels to the Persian Gulf. It perceived that "Japan has been steadily escalating its efforts to mobilize public opinion for dispatching troops overseas." Beijing felt that this could be traced to Japan's strategic aim of continuously expanding its influence and the scope of the Self-Defense Forces.¹⁸⁶

All in all, as the 1980s drew to an end China viewed as unnecessary and undesirable Japan's effort to increase its military strength and enhance its military function in the framework of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. In particular, as the international situation eased in the wake of the 1987 signing of the treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles, any boost of the U.S.-Japan military alliance, such as Japan's promise to finance the labor allowances for U.S. troops stationed in Japan, was viewed negatively by Beijing.¹⁸⁷ Although Beijing often attributed the Japanese military buildup to American pressure, it was also seen as a reflection of Tokyo's desire to political and military power. Therefore, from the Chinese perspective, if the U.S.-Japanese alliance was able to play any positive role it was to constrain Japan from moving too far and too fast on the road toward militarization. After all, in the early 1970s China dropped its opposition to the U.S.-Japan alliance after the Americans told Beijing that the Japanese-American alliance could prevent Tokyo from developing its own nuclear weapons.¹⁸⁸ China wanted to see this function of the U.S.-Japan alliance enhanced. The Chinese media reported that Japan's trend toward developing its armed forces had aroused anxieties not only in Asian countries but also in the United States. The U.S. leadership was "keeping a close watch on Japan's military expansion."¹⁸⁹ One article reported that Japan was under repeated U.S. pressure to increase its foreign aid programs instead of its military program. As Washington saw it, Japan had profited from the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States, under which it had been able to devote itself to its postwar reconstruction. Now that Japan was among the top economic powers, it ought to share more international responsibility for economic assistance. U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz was reported to have testified before Congress in January 1986 that since some Asian countries were worried about Japan's militarization, it would be better for Japan to replace the United States in filling the aid gap than to increase its military spending.¹⁹⁰ The American wariness over the growing trend toward militarism in Japan was indicated by a report that the U.S. Defense Department had conducted a trial exercise, in an extremely secret manner, targeted against Japan.¹⁹¹ In a 1989 analysis in Beijing Review of Bush's strategy in the Asia Pacific, the author summarized the two dimensions of the U.S. attitude toward Japan:

The Chinese perspective on the redefinition of the U.S.-Japan alliance was informed by a number of factors. First, the strained Sino-U.S. relations during Clinton's first term fueled Beijing's suspicion of the strengthening of Washington-Tokyo security ties. Beginning in 1993 Beijing and Washington clashed over a number of issues, including China's human rights behaviors, its most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status, and Taiwan president Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in 1995. The diplomatic tensions between the two countries were further complicated by the hot debate in the United States over the policy options available to cope with a strengthening and seemingly more "assertive" China. In China, scholars and strategists tried to understand the tenet of America's China policy: containment, engagement, soft containment, selective containment, conditioned engagement, or a combination of containment and engagement. A consensus was reached that the United States would alternate between containment and engagement with the aim of preventing a full-fledged China from challenging the U.S. interests and position in the Asia Pacific and bringing it into a U.S.-dominated international system. The U.S. diplomatic and security policies in the Asia Pacific were viewed in China through this macro lens.

Coinciding with the persistent strains in Sino-U.S. relations, China-Japan relations also entered a difficult period in 1994. China's nuclear tests, Tokyo's attempt to develop closer official relations with Taipei, the rhetoric of Japanese conservative politicians defending Japan's aggressive past, and the sovereignty dispute over Diaoyu Island highlighted by the construction of a lighthouse there by a group of Japanese rightists all cast shadows on the bilateral ties. Since normalization, Japan, out of a "sense of guilt” toward China, had been keeping a relatively low profile in dealing with its huge but poor neighbor. As China grew in wealth and power, however, Japan began to worry about the implications of its rise and hence toughen its China policy. This, combined with the increasing influence of conservative forces in Japanese politics, has caused Beijing much concern. It believes that Japan, unwilling to see China getting stronger, is intentionally spreading the notion of a "China threat" so as to form an environment unfavorable to the growth of China's power. Against this backdrop, Japan's efforts in strengthening its security ties with the United States are viewed as an attempt to tighten the strategic noose on a rising China.

The Taiwan issue always figures prominently in the security thinking of the leaders of the PRC. In recent years, Beijing has been increasingly concerned with the internal dynamics on the island of declining support for unification and rising preference for independence. This concern has been aggravated by the fact that international society in general and the United States and Japan in particular are more willing to accommodate Taiwan's desire for increased international stature. Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell in 1995 alarmed Beijing and caused a series of crises in cross-strait as well as Sino-U.S. relations. Beijing accused Washington, driven by "Cold War thinking," of continuing to view Taiwan as America's "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in the Western Pacific and wishing to see the island permanently separated from the mainland. Chinese analysts hold that the U.S. attempts to use the Taiwan card as leverage in bilateral dealings and a strategic check on an ascending China.

On the other hand, the Chinese observed that both Japan and the United States have their respective rationales in jointly taking this step.¹⁹⁶ Japan, for its part, continues to need the U.S. security umbrella even though it has developed advanced conventional forces. Alliance with the United States has been providing Japan with low-cost, low-risk security. Besides, U.S. support is indispensable to Japan's bid for permanent membership in the UN Security Council, which is essential to the materialization of Japan's long-standing dream of becoming a major political power. Furthermore, a strengthened U.S.-Japan alliance will provide more legitimacy to Japan's military buildup. As far as the United States is concerned, the alliance allows it to maintain a military presence in Japan which is crucial to the preservation of U.S. political, economic, and strategic interests in East Asia. Redefinition of the security arrangements with Tokyo was also expected to elicit more assistance from the Japanese when the United States comes to respond to contingencies on the Korean peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. In a broad context, a robust Japan-U.S. alliance will enhance cooperation between Washington and Tokyo on the global level and hence strengthen the U.S. "leadership” in the post-Cold War era. Last but not least, a strong U.S.-Japan alliance will keep Japan from pursuing an independent security policy and becoming a major military power to the detriment of the U.S. position in the region.