Prolonging East Asia’s Surprising Peace—Can It Be Managed?

By Avery Goldstein

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Aug. 14 2009

News of  the first  Strategic  and  Economic  Dialogue  held between the  U.S. and  China dominated headlines last month. The Dialogue   was focused on "addressing the challenges and opportunities that  both countries  face on  a wide range of bilateral, regional  and global areas of immediate and long-term strategic  and economic  interests," according  to  the U.S. Treasury  website. Putting this Dialogue in perspective may prove helpful, as  it builds  on more  than a decade of mainly constructive  Sino-American relations  and  peace  in East Asia.

Over the past fifteen years, prudent choices by leaders in Washington and Beijing have prevented inevitable disagreements and conflicts from undermining regional stability.   East Asia's  surprising  post-Cold  War  peace, defying the  pessimistic predictions  many  offered  in  the early  1990s,  has  prevailed  in  large  part  due  to  the statesmanship exhibited  by Chinese  Presidents Jiang and Hu and American  Presidents Clinton  and Bush.   But leaders in both countries continue to face formidable challenges that will try their ability  to manage  bilateral  relations  as China rises within a fluid regional and international order. The list  of substantive  issues that  pose  challenges  for Washington and  Beijing is  by now  familiar,  and  includes policy disagreements  about currency,  Taiwan, human rights, Darfur,   North Korea,  and  the  global  environment.    In addition,  however,  contemporary  Sino-American  ties  face strains  that   reflect  underlying,  perhaps  more  vexing, challenges.   Three challenges, in particular, are likely to persist for the foreseeable future.   How well Chinese and American leaders  cope with  them will  go  a  long  way  to determining whether  the recent  era  of  East  Asian  peace endures.

Transparency and the "Security Dilemma"

Experts often note the lack of any international authority above states to enforce pledges they might make to reassure one another.  This condition  of anarchy creates uncertainty about the  future  that  drives  a  pattern  of  action  and reaction known  as "the security dilemma."  Such uncertainty about the implications of China's military modernization has already had this predicted effect and, in response, led to calls for greater transparency to clarify a rising China's intentions.   Though it might mitigate the intensity of this security dilemma, however, increased transparency would not eliminate the underlying challenge it poses for U.S.-China relations and East Asian stability in the 21st century.

Greater transparency  would clarify the increasingly diverse and  sophisticated   military  forces  China  is  deploying; however, it  would not eliminate the uncertainty that drives debates about  how China  might use  these forces.   Weapons characteristics, after all, rarely limit their uses to only defensive or offensive purposes.    Even  if  the  weapons deployed today  were believed  to reflect China's repeatedly professed defensive  intentions, a  change in  international circumstances or domestic preferences could prompt Beijing's current leaders,  or their  successors,  to  redefine  their goals, rethink  the uses  for  existing  forces,  or  deploy different forces.   Nor can this troubling possibility be eliminated by crafting international agreements designed to boost confidence  in assessments  of intentions that greater transparency might  suggest.   Because there  is no reliable mechanism for  enforcing such  agreements, even  states that bind themselves  to reassuring  commitments today  will have the option  of behaving  as they  see fit  tomorrow.  Simply put, transparency  cannot eliminate  worries whose source is not a  shortage of  information but rather uncertainty about the future  that  is  inherent  in  the  anarchic  realm  of international politics.

Nevertheless, this readily understood limit on the value of increased transparency does not negate the benefits it can provide.  In at least two related ways, greater transparency can help lessen the severity  of  the  security  dilemma. First, it can reduce the incentives for adversaries to rely on worst-case estimates which may seem only prudent when lacking good   information about   a   potential   rival's capabilities.     The consequences   of underestimating a prospective foe's strength are likely to appear more dire than the consequences of overestimation.   Overestimation, however, feeds a cycle of action  and reaction that drives arms races.   Leaders may anticipate that the result of this kind  of  competitive  arms  buildup  driven  by  worst-case hedging  will  ultimately  fail  to  enhance,  or  may  even undermine, their  country's security.   If so,  they could argue for  self-restraint.   But that  argument will rest on assertions about  the strategic interdependence of choices a state and  its adversary will make in future years, a stance likely to  be  a  tough  sell  in  policy  debates  when  it confronts the  more  straightforward  argument  that  it  is "better to  be safe  than sorry."    Increased  transparency alone won't guarantee that proponents of restraint carry the day. However,  it can  provide information  that reduces the likelihood  that   unrealistically  exaggerated   worst-case estimates of  a rival's  capabilities will  drive an intense arms competition.

Second, greater  transparency, especially when reinforced by verifiable international agreements, can establish baselines and expectations about future capabilities and behavior that reduces the  risk of  overreacting to a rival's new military deployments and  actions. Without this information, surprise at the  discovery that  a prospective  adversary  has  more, better, or  more forward  deployed weapons  than  previously known or expected often adds a subjective fillip of alarm to assessments about  the rival's  capabilities and  intentions that aggravates the security dilemma.

Where do  leaders in Beijing and Washington come down on the matter of  transparency?   The United States demands greater transparency,  arguing   it  is   essential   to   alleviate suspicions about what the Chinese are up to.  But, as noted, even if  transparency  increases,  it  will  not  decisively deflate the anxiety reflected in variations of the questions that former  Defense Secretary  Donald Rumsfeld  asked about China's military  modernization: "Since  no nation threatens China, one  must wonder:  Why this  growing investment?  Why these continuing  large and  expanding arms  purchases?  Why these continuing  robust deployments?"   China's position on
transparency is  quite different.   While making modest nods to clarification  in its  recent defense white papers, China resists revealing  information that  it believes  would  add enhanced intelligence to the substantial military advantages the United States enjoys.  Because China must rely on clever tactics and  strategies to offset U.S. military superiority, it already  worries about  U.S. reconnaissance  technologies and forward  based  intelligence  assets  that  monitor  PLA capabilities.     Consequently,  it  sometimes  takes  risky actions to  signal unhappiness  about  U.S.  naval  and  air forces gathering  information close to the Chinese homeland. In short,  China values  opacity over transparency.  Opacity complicates U.S.  contingency planning;  and China  does not need  increased   transparency  to   clearly   discern   the superiority of American forces it would engage.

These contrasting  Chinese and  American  perspectives  seem irreconcilable.   Leaders in  Beijing and  Washington could, however, recast  their  discussions  about  transparency  by focusing on  the mutual benefits available to both countries through reducing  the intensity  of a  security dilemma that threatens to  cast a  pall over  East Asia.     The starting point is  recognizing that  the United States overstates and China  understates   the   real   payoffs   from   increased transparency.   U.S. rhetoric  exaggerates the benefits when it  suggests   that  transparency   can  somehow   eliminate suspicions about  China's intentions.   China,  in contrast, underestimates the benefits of transparency and the costs it pays for  continued opacity-especially  the nervous reaction by the  United  States  and  others  who  harbor  Rumsfeld's concerns.   Leaders in  both countries  who articulate  more measured views  about transparency's benefits will be better positioned to  explain how it enhances national interests by reducing the likelihood of unintended provocation. They will also be  in a  stronger  position  to  respond  to  domestic critics  who   otherwise  can  seize  upon  high  levels  of uncertainty  to   demand  the  greater  military  investment justified by worst-case planning.

China's Rise and America's Preponderance

Current economic  difficulties in  the United States,  rapid development by China over the last three decades, and limits to U.S.  military power  revealed in  Iraq and  Afghanistan, feed speculation  about possible  future U.S.  decline.  The reality  of   the  early  21st  century,  however,  is  that unipolarity-especially U.S.  military preponderance-endures. Yet the  expectation  that  China's  rise  could  eventually herald  the  end  of  unipolarity  poses  another  long-term challenge to  leaders in  Beijing and  Washington.   So far, their responses  provide reason  for both  hope and  concern about continued peace in East Asia.

In two  broadly different  ways, Beijing  has  been  hedging against the  possibility that the United States might try to jeopardize China's  vital interests  or frustrate its desire to play  a larger  regional and  international role.  On the one hand,  American preponderance  has  led  an  "outgunned" China  to   invest  in   military  capabilities  that  serve asymmetric strategies.  Thus, Beijing invests in modernizing a still  small, and vulnerable, nuclear arsenal that poses a risk  of   unacceptable  punishment   for  any   prospective adversary endangering China's vital interests.  Beijing also continues  with  its  selective  development,  testing,  and deployment of  advanced nonnuclear  weapons that  complicate U.S. planning  for contingencies  in which it might confront China,  and  increase  the  costs  that  the  superior  U.S. military would  pay even  in conflicts  that China  would be likely to  lose.  Such responses to the unfavorable military reality Beijing  faces in  a world  where the  United States remains the  sole superpower  may reflect  nothing more than prudent planning  by a  cautious  and  conservative  regime. Nevertheless, because  others, even if only out of prudence, question what  such  steps  might  portend  about  Beijing's future intentions,  their predictable  effect is  to  deepen concerns about  a more  powerful China.    As  noted  above, leaders can  try to manage, but cannot fully eliminate these concerns.

On the  other hand,  the daunting  challenge of  coping with remarkably robust  American preponderance  has also  induced Beijing to  embrace proactive  diplomacy as  a way to reduce the likelihood that a concerned United States and its allies might act  to isolate  or contain  China.   China  tries  to encourage  them  instead  to  recognize  the  advantages  of partnering with China, despite uncertainty about the future. The enticement  of trade  and  investment  opportunities  in China,  Beijing's   cooperation  in   the  struggle  against terrorism, help  in dealing  with the  North Korean  nuclear problem, and  joint efforts to address global environmental, public  health,  and  economic  concerns  are  some  of  the familiar ways in which China has sought to build a favorable international  environment   for  its   continued  "peaceful development," as it rises in the shadow of a dominant United States.   Beijing acts out of self-interest, to be sure, but its diplomacy  benefits others  as well.    Indeed,  China's approach since  the late  1990s has  been largely consistent with the  U.S. interest,  as articulated by Robert Zoellick, that  China   become  a  "responsible  stakeholder"  in  the international system.

However, Beijing's  new diplomacy  is only  one facet  of  a rising China's  response to  American preponderance, and the prospects for its continuation are far from assured.  On the contrary, it  is easy to see pitfalls ahead.  It is unlikely that Beijing  will sustain its commitment to act in the ways expected of  a responsible stakeholder on the world stage if it becomes  clear that doing so means indefinitely accepting the lesser  stake  it  presently  holds,  one  that  entails deference  to   U.S.  leadership   of   the   regional   and international order.   As important, it is unclear that that the United  States  will  be  prepared  to  satisfy  China's aspirations for  significantly  greater  influence  if  that entails a reduction in America's dominant position.

A smooth  transition to  a world  in which  a more  powerful China wields  greater  influence  will  require  the  United States (and  others) to  embrace new  and unfamiliar  roles. Such an  adjustment is  conceivable.    After  all,  it  has happened before.   The  process was  managed rather smoothly when Britain  gradually yielded  its  leading  role  to  the United States  in the  first half  of the twentieth century. In that  case, however, shared political values and culture, a clear  recognition of  the emerging  asymmetry in  the two countries' capabilities,  and a  common interest  in  coping with dangerous  common adversaries  (first Germany, then the Soviet Union)  facilitated Anglo-American  cooperation.   In the Sino-American  case, there  are differences in political values and  culture, uncertainty about the future balance of capabilities, and  no  compelling  common  threat  requiring close cooperation.  Consequently, without creative thinking, dedication, and  flexibility from  leaders on  both sides of the Pacific,  it is  hard to  imagine a smooth adjustment to the greater  international role  China will  expect to play. Hard work  may make  it possible  to discover solutions that satisfy both  Beijing's and  Washington's interests.    Even with such  hard work,  however, the  process  of  adjustment undoubtedly will be difficult.

Domestic Political Constraints

A rising  China's foreign policy is being shaped not just by the anarchic,  unipolar international  system  in  which  it operates, but also by domestic political constraints.  Among these, one  of the  most  consequential  facing  leaders  in Beijing is  the deep-seated  nationalism that has taken root in contemporary  China.      Popular  expectations  that  an increasingly  powerful   China  should   be  able   to  more effectively defend  its interests  contribute to  heightened sensitivity about  other countries'  statements and  actions that  can   be  construed   as  an  affront  to  nationalist sensibilities.   Leaders in Beijing have, as a result, found themselves constrained  by domestic political considerations in ways  that one  might  have  thought  irrelevant  for  an authoritarian  regime.     These  constraints  can  make  it difficult to  strike the  compromises necessary if diplomacy is to  serve as  a buffer against military conflict.   Where contemporary challenges  are intermingled  with the legacies of an earlier era when a weak China was unable to defend its sovereignty, attempts  at pragmatism  are complicated by the need to  satisfy nationalist expectations.  Although China's communist  leaders  are  not  accountable  to  a  democratic electorate, insensitivity  to nationalist sentiment, some of which has  been nurtured  by the  regime's  educational  and propaganda organs, risks disruptive popular protests as well as challenges  from like-minded elements in the civilian and military elite.

The constraints that resurgent nationalism places on China's foreign policy  have been  most clearly evident in relations with Japan.   But the challenges that these passions present for policymakers in Beijing have also played an increasingly important role  in the  management of  U.S.-China  relations after the  Cold War.   A mostly stable era of bilateral ties has been  periodically punctuated  by tense  confrontations. Resolution, in  these cases, has been complicated by popular Chinese outrage  about alleged  affronts  to  the  country's sovereignty, interests, or pride.  Although the specifics in each episode  have varied  (the rejection  of China's bid to host the  2000 Olympics,  the bombing of the Chinese embassy in  Belgrade,  the  EP-3  spyplane  incident,  criticism  of China's handling  of ethnic  tensions and  violence in Tibet and Xinjiang),  the  general  theme  among  China's  loudest nationalist voices  has remained  constant.   They  call  on Beijing to  stand up  to Washington, whose words and actions allegedly reveal an insensitivity to the country's sovereign rights  and  territorial  integrity,  not  to  mention  "the feelings of  the Chinese  people."    The  advent of  a less centrally controlled,  if  still  not  free,  Chinese  media combined with the variety of information sources and outlets for the  masses to  express their  views that  the  internet provides, have  magnified the political pressure confronting China's leaders  when they  must respond  to foreign  policy challenges that  capture a more attentive public's eye.  And because the  regime has  typically  been  more  thorough  in censoring the  expression of  views  that  question  China's international claims  and interests,  the sample  of popular expression that  emerges during  these episodes is typically skewed.   This selection effect reinforces the perception of support for  strongly nationalist  foreign policy  positions which can,  of course, provide the regime with a pretext for digging in  its heels  when it  wants to stand firm.  But it also limits  flexibility when Beijing prefers to defuse such confrontations before they undermine its overriding interest in a  sound working  relationship with  Washington  that  is required  to   preserve  the  stable  international  setting essential for China's continued rise.

Can leaders  in Beijing  and Washington limit the risks that follow  from   the   consequences   of   resurgent   Chinese nationalism?   Meeting this  challenge  will  be  especially tough not  only because  of the  constraints China's leaders face, but  also because it is unrealistic to expect American leaders to  give priority  to making  life  easier  for  the rulers in  Beijing.  American leaders conduct foreign policy to  serve   U.S.  interests  and  face  their  own  domestic political constraints.   Public  opinion and the voice given to it  through Congress  and the mass media require American leaders, no  less than  their Chinese  counterparts,  to  be responsive to  popular pressures.   Perhaps  even more  than other challenges, then, surging Chinese nationalism is not a problem that  can be  solved, but  rather a vexing challenge that can  only  be  managed  more  or  less  effectively  to minimize  its  explosive  dangers.    However  unsatisfying, leaders in  Beijing and Washington can probably do no better than  to   commit  themselves   to  refrain   from   stoking nationalist passions  and to recognize that neither side can fully control their effects.

Realistic Optimism

Will Chinese  and U.S.  leaders be  able to prolong what has been a  surprising era  of peace in East Asia after the Cold War by continuing to successfully cope with the consequences of the  three broad challenges described above?  Given their intractability, pessimistic scenarios are certainly not hard to envision.   Nevertheless,  there are  reasons to  believe that tempered  optimism is  more than  wishful  thinking  or naivet,.

For the  foreseeable future, China's leaders will have their hands full  dealing with  major domestic  problems.    These include the  need to  ensure a brisk pace of economic growth while  reducing  stark  inequalities  in  income,  improving environmental protection,  and  providing  adequate  health, education, and  welfare services  for an  aging  population. Moreover, it  must do  this while preserving stability in an anachronistic one-party  political system  that  governs  an increasingly complex  society with many competing interests. These daunting domestic challenges will continue to impose a burden  on  Beijing  that  limits  its  ability  to  swiftly translate even  impressive economic growth into the military power that  would enable  China to  play a  more  disruptive international role.   A  much more  assertive foreign policy would require  investing in military capabilities and paying opportunity costs  in terms  of  economic  development  that would jeopardize the political viability of a Chinese regime that has  struggled for  decades to  get its  own  house  in order.   That does  not preclude  Beijing from making such a dangerously foolish  choice.   China wouldn't  be the  first country to  do so.  The Soviet  Union  provides  a  dramatic example of  a regime  that underappreciated the need to face up to  the "guns vs. butter" tradeoff.  However, the clarity of the  tradeoffs for China (and the lessons that leaders in Beijing have drawn from the Soviet failure) do argue against expecting that it is likely, let alone inevitable, that they will opt  for a  recklessly  aggressive  and  self-defeating foreign policy.

It is  far more plausible, then, that Beijing's leaders will continue their pursuit of a gradually expanded international role.  And as they do, relations with the United States will continue to  be characterized  by  a  mix  of  conflict  and cooperation conditioned  by the  challenges described above. It is unlikely that Chinese and U.S. leaders will be able to eliminate these  deeply rooted, chronic sources of friction. That is  almost certainly  an unrealistic  goal.   But it is also unnecessary  for prolonging  the era  of peace  in East Asia.   Instead, the  standard for success should be whether Chinese and  U.S. leaders can extend their so far impressive record  of  discovering  satisfactory  ways  to  manage  the enduring challenges  to bilateral  relations so that they do not  decisively   undermine   cooperation   and   exacerbate conflict.     Continuing  to  manage  challenges  that  defy resolution would  be an impressive achievement-the handiwork of statesmen  who recognize  that the  best need  not be the enemy of the good.

Avery Goldstein  is a  Senior Fellow  at FPRI  and David  M. Knott  Professor   of  Global   Politics  and  International Relations, Professor  of Political  Science,  University  of Pennsylvania.