Elections, Political Transitions and Foreign Policy in East Asia: A Conference Report

By Jacques deLisle

Foreign Policy Research Institute, Jun. 20 2008

The  U.S.   elections  in   November  2008  will  bring  new leadership and  reconsideration of  policies toward Asia. In China, the  Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership, which began its second and  final  five-year  term  in  2007-08,  faces  new leaders in  its key  diplomatic partners  in the  region. In Japan, July  2007 elections  for the upper house of the Diet brought defeat  for the  ruling Liberal Democratic Party; in September, Prime Minister Abe, under mounting criticism, was replaced by Fukuda Yasuo. In Taiwan and Korea, both of which held legislative  and presidential  elections  between  late 2007  and   spring  2008,   voters  backed  candidates  from relatively  conservative  parties  that  had  not  held  the presidency for  two  terms  and  gave  the  new  presidents' parties parliamentary majorities.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD ASIA

Lowell Dittmer (University of California, Berkeley) examined the Asia policy the next U.S. president will inherit and the impact of  the 2008  election on  Asia policy.  Asia  is  an increasingly  coherent  entity  in  terms  of  intraregional economic ties,  institutional structures, diplomacy, foreign policy coordination,  and identity.  An "Asia" policy, thus, is  possible  and  imperative.  But  recent  dissipation  of bipartisanship has made it more difficult to craft coherent, effective U.S. Asia policy.

In  Asian   security  affairs,  U.S.  policy  has  reflected lingering  Eurocentricity,  a  weak  hub-and-spoke  alliance structure in  Asia, and  the Cold  War's slow  end in  Asia. Early on,  the Bush  administration signaled readjustment of Asia  policy,   casting  a  rising  China  as  a  "strategic competitor," seemingly  strengthening  support  for  Taiwan, rejecting the  Clinton administration's Agreed Framework and engagement  approach   toward  North  Korea,  expanding  and shifting U.S.  military resources to Asia, reemphasizing old alliance structures,  and flirting with a new unilateralism. With 9/11,  the U.S.  deemphasized frictions  with China and sought Beijing's  cooperation in  a global war on terror and on North  Korea, producing  a positive security relationship with the PRC.

Although the Bush administration's emphasis is on terrorism- strained relations  with Muslim  states,  the  U.S.  pursued reengagement with Southeast, Southern and Central Asia. This succeeded somewhat because some regional states saw the U.S. as a  means to  hedge  against  China's  rise.  U.S.  policy stressed non-proliferation  and endorsed  preemptive war and regime change;  the later Bush years brought uneven progress through reengagement  with  North  Korea  in  the  Six-Party Talks. Overall,  U.S. behavior continued to show ". la carte instrumentalism," reinvigoration  of  a  "rimland  strategy" (cooperating with states on the region's periphery), and the desire to  check the  emergence of  a peer  competitor. U.S. policy toward Asia also increasingly includes nontraditional security issues such as public health and pollution.

U.S. economic  relations with  Asia were  long dominated  by East Asia's  striking growth,  fueled by Japanese investment and access  to American  markets. After  the Asian Financial Crisis of  1997-98 and  with increasingly  integrated global supply chains, China was the region's big winner. It avoided significant  harm   from  the  regional  economic  meltdown; claimed a lion's share of manufacturing, international trade and foreign investment; displaced Southeast Asian exports of low-end goods;  became a  prodigious exporter  of higher-end goods; and  tamed inflation. China's ascension has presented Asian states with three alternatives to the losing option of continued  export  competition  with  China:  exploit  trade complementarities  by   exporting   higher-end   components, equipment or  capital to  China; shift to higher value-added exports in  sectors where  China is  not yet competitive; or export raw  materials to  satisfy China's burgeoning demand. East Asia's most developed states (especially Japan and also Korea and  Singapore) have  followed the  first  and  second paths, as have middle-tier states such as Malaysia, Thailand and  the   Philippines,  to  a  more  limited  extent.  Less developed  countries  in  Southeast  Asia  have  had  little alternative to  the third  path. India  has increased  trade with China,  become concerned  with China's growing clout in Asia, and sought to deepen connections with ASEAN.

China's rise has complicated its regional relations. Beijing has worked hard to allay fears: insisting that its rise will be peaceful,  cultivating soft  power,  seeking  free  trade agreements that promise economic gains for China's partners, and building  regional  organizations  such  as  the  ASEAN+ frameworks and  the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. These efforts  face  significant  difficulties.  China's  regional economic relations  are widely  misperceived as asymmetrical and  redolent   of  the   late  dynastic  tributary  system. International supply chains for China and other Asian states remain  global,  not  regional,  and  heavily  dependent  on multinational corporations. In much of Asia, China is blamed for trade  deficits and  other economic woes. China needs to manage  its   currency's  rise   well  to   avoid  worsening resentments. ASEAN  is reluctant  to cede its role as leader in the  region's  weak  international  institutional  order. China's soft  power has suffered setbacks in Tibet and along the Olympic  torch route.  Other political issues, including territorial disputes, can disrupt China's foreign relations.

While China's difficulties may serve U.S. interests, China's influence and  agendas and  other regional developments pose ongoing challenges  for Washington.  The era  of Asia policy based on U.S.-provided hegemonic stability, development aid, and market  access has  given way to a difficult disjunction between the  U.S.'s persisting  near  hegemony  in  security matters and  its much-diminished economic role, minimal aid, and limited,  negotiated access  to American  markets.  U.S. Asia policy  remains prone to unsettling cycles of interest- based realism  and idealism.  The latter  has meant  damning rhetoric  toward   China  followed   by  more  accommodating practice,  including   by  presidents   who  attacked  their predecessors for being soft on China. Commentators Robert Sutter (Georgetown) and Harvey Sicherman (FPRI) explored  with Dittmer  the likely impact of the 2008 elections.  Sutter   stressed  the  importance  of  interest groups.  Many,  including  labor  unions  and  human  rights organizations,   press    agendas   critical    of    China. Traditionally   "pro-China"   groups,   including   foreign- investing  businesses,   seemed  less  influential  in  this electoral cycle.  Popular attitudes blame China for American economic woes and are suspicious of China's growing presence in the  U.S. economy.  Sicherman noted  that  such  American views collide  with China's sharpening nationalism, which is reflected in  China's reaction  to criticism of its handling of Tibetan  unrest, popular  boycotts of  Carrefour and  CNN after French  and American  comments offended  Chinese,  and China's continuing ideology of victimhood. He suggested that an American  consensus was  forming, almost  unnoticed, on a "hedging" strategy  that bolsters  U.S. military  power  and regional alliances  even as Washington seeks to sustain good relations with  China.  All  panelists  noted  the  relative absence  of   China  as   a  contentious  point  during  the presidential campaign  thus far, although this could change. Sutter noted  potential  for  increased  post-election  U.S. attention to  North Korea's human rights record and friction with China  over arms sales to Taiwan. Panelists agreed that a  new  administration  likely  would  focus  on  rebuilding American soft  power in  Asia, a reorientation that would be more dramatic  if there  is a  change in  which party  is in power. On  the  other  hand,  Sutter  argued,  a  Democratic administration  likely  would  take  months  longer  than  a Republican one to determine its Asia policy.

CHINA

In China,  President Hu and Premier Wen predictably received second terms  at a  Party Congress  in October  2007 and the National  People's  Congress  meeting  in  March  2008.  Sam Suisheng Zhao  (University of Denver) assessed the prospects for Chinese  foreign policy  in their  final five  years  in office. Zhao  argued that China's foreign policy has been in transition from the approach, laid down under Deng Xiaoping, of "hiding  brightness and  nourishing obscurity"--keeping a low profile, seeking cooperation, and avoiding confrontation while building national strength. With growing international engagements and capacity to influence international affairs, China has  had to  adopt a  more active,  assertive  foreign policy. The shift remains incomplete.

Although its  self-image is  increasingly that  of  a  great power, China  still correctly  sees itself  as a  developing country that  must focus on economic development in order to build  national   power  and   on   maintaining   a   stable international  environment   in  order   to  facilitate  its development. It is in China's interest to avoid creating the impression of  a more  aggressive  foreign  policy  lest  it
exacerbate concerns  about its  rise. To these ends, Beijing has adopted  the  concepts  of  "peaceful  rise,"  "peaceful development," and "harmonious society."

Zhao identified  China's frustrations: the stress inevitably produced by  one power's rise and another's relative decline and creating  a risk  that the U.S. will try to slow China's ascension;  China's  rapidly  growing  economy  has  brought vulnerability  from   dependence  on   imported   resources, including from  problematic sources;  the  Olympics  subject China to  heightened scrutiny  and pressure  to take  active roles on  Darfur and  other  global  problems;  and  popular Chinese  nationalism   pressures  leaders   to   take   more confrontational stands than serve the national interest.

China under Hu has embraced a three-pronged strategy: 1.  Building   strong  partnerships   with   major   powers, especially the  U.S., and  promoting multipolarity.  Chinese policymakers  believe   that  long-term   trends   favor   a multipolar world,  which is in China's interest. In the near term, however, the U.S. will remain the sole superpower. For China, this dictates strategies of cooperating with the U.S. where it serves China's interests (as in the Six Party Talks and deterring  Taiwan independence);  accepting  the  U.S.'s invitation  to   be  a   "responsible  stakeholder"  in  the international system  or a  "strategic  partner";  welcoming Washington's preoccupation  with Iraq  as a distraction from conflicts in  bilateral relations;  and  building  a  united front (or  acting alone)  to  thwart  U.S.  aims  that  harm China's interests.

2. Adjusting  relations with  developing countries.  China's hard-line defense  of sovereignty  and opposition to foreign pressure to  change has  given way  to greater  tolerance of multilateral approaches to problems of weapons proliferation (including North Korea), human rights (including Darfur) and unconventional security  threats; and promoting changes that foster long-term  political  stability  in  partner  states. Beijing also  has to  balance  its  need  to  secure  energy resources with  other goals  in  relations  with  developing countries. The quest for oil has entailed entanglements with Sudan,  Venezuela,   Iran  and   other  regimes  that  alarm Washington.

3. Maintaining  good relations  with "periphery  countries." China faces  territorial disputes  with  neighbors,  several irritants in relations with Japan, rising power rivalry with India, wariness  about Chinese  influence  in  Russia's  Far East,  and  concern  about  the  political  implications  of China's economic  rise in  Southeast Asia.  China has coped, generally effectively,  by pursuing  consultations and using international institutions  or ad  hoc arrangements, a "code of conduct"  for disputed  areas in the South China Sea, and Six-Party Talks  on North Korea. In East and Southeast Asia, China has  benefited from  contributions its economic growth has made  to regional  states  and  from  its  comparatively benign image.

Richard Baum  (UCLA) largely agreed with Zhao. He pointed to China's thirty-year  record of  accommodating and converging with international  norms and  rules, especially  economics. Baum pointed  to a  long period of cooperative approaches to issues such  as WTO  membership, Security Council votes, the war on  terror, and  territorial disputes.  He noted  recent cooperation  on   tough  issues   in  U.S.-China  relations, including currency  appreciation  and  Taiwan.  Nonetheless, structural tensions accompanying China's rise and the U.S.'s relative decline  may disrupt  bilateral relations more than Zhao suggests.  China's  capacity  to  rival  the  U.S.  and frustrate important  U.S. interests  will continue  to grow. Whether China's intent is or remains benign cannot be known. The U.S.'s  distrust may be heightened by its badly strained hard power and greatly diminished soft power.

Baum and  June Dreyer  (FPRI and  University of Miami) noted areas where  friction  with  the  U.S.  is  significant  and unlikely  to   diminish,  including   Taiwan  (and   China's acquisition  of   means  to   deter  independence  or  force unification); acquiring  natural  resources  from  rogue  or human rights-violating  states; international cooperation on Darfur,  Zimbabwe   and  kindred  issues;  veto  threats  to frustrate U.S. initiatives in the Security Council; virulent Chinese  nationalism;   resentment  of   U.S.  pressure  for democratic  change   and  human   rights;   and   unforeseen consequences of  the U.S.'s  impending leadership  change or China's domestic  governance challenges.  China's  neighbors and partners  in the  developing world  also have  interests that conflict  with  Beijing's.  They  fear  rising  China's political  influence  and  the  "hollowing  out"  effect  of Chinese  trade  on  their  economies.  Demonizing  China  or expecting  it   to  acquiesce   in  American  agendas,  Baum cautioned, would  be counterproductive and show a failure of positive  diplomacy,   which  seeks   ways  to   live   with conflicting interests and aims.

JAPAN

Jun  Saito  (Franklin  and  Marshall  College)  argued  that changes to  the  electoral  system  for  the  Diet  in  1994 fostered a  stable, centrist  Japanese foreign  policy  that includes more liberal approaches to economic issues and more modest  and   moderate  approaches   to   security   issues. Commentators Jennifer  Amyx (University of Pennsylvania) and Robert  Kane   (Niagara University)  concluded  that  other factors better explained Japan's foreign policy.

The 1994 electoral reforms eliminated a system in which each voter cast  a single non-transferable vote for one candidate in a multi-seat district. This was replaced with a system of single-member districts  in which the candidate who receives the  most   votes  wins   the  sole   seat.   Reforms   also reapportioned districts  to bring Japan's legislature closer to equal  representation. Saito  argued that  these  reforms induced parties  to develop  centrist  policy  positions  to compete for  moderate,  median  voters.  Conversely,  highly differentiated  ideological   appeals  that   sought  ardent support  from  smaller  groups,  whose  backing  might  have secured seats under the old system, would decline. Saito saw this at  work in  the sharp  decline of  the Japan Socialist Party,  the   Democratic  Party   of  Japan's  emergence  as principal  opposition   party,  and   the   ruling   Liberal Democratic Party's co-opting moderate DPJ positions.

While  panelists  agreed  that  politics  currently  favored stability and  moderation in  Japanese foreign  policy, Amyx countered that  comparative data  show only weak connections between electoral  rules and  party alignment. Other factors likely  were   more  important,  including  the  JSP's  poor political tactics  in attempting an electoral coalition with the DPJ,  the luck  and skill  of several  prime  ministers, factionalism  and  change  within  the  LDP,  and  exogenous factors. Amyx  and Kane questioned whether domestic politics generally had  a decisive  impact on Japan's foreign policy, given durable  national interests,  international structural constraints, strongly  held foreign views about Japan's role in the  region, unpredictable  foreign policy  shocks, prime ministers' ability to shape public opinion, and changes that strengthened the prime minister's office.

Saito argued that electoral reforms facilitated cuts in farm subsidies and  acceptance of  greater  international  market competition in  agriculture.  This  reflected  the  need  to appeal to  the median,  non-farmer voter and reapportionment away from  low-population  rural  constituencies.  Electoral reforms made  it harder  to win  elections  by  distributing economic benefits  to farmers  and other  small groups. Amyx responded that  non-electoral factors,  including changes by financial sector  regulators, had made relevant agricultural policies less  appealing. Participants  noted Japan's  large foreign exchange  holdings and sovereign wealth funds. While these might  pose foreign  policy problems,  they  were  not likely  to   resonate  with  or  be  affected  by  electoral politics.

Saito argued  that electoral  reform's imperative to woo the median voter  also  reinforced  moderation  and  modesty  in Japan's security  policy. According  to polls  and anecdotal evidence, median  voters' preferences  include support for a more active  international  role  for  Japan's  Self-Defense Force; ambivalence toward legitimating that role by amending (rather  than   interpreting)  the  constitution's  pacifist clause  (article   IX);  accepting   the  constraints   that historical legacies  impose on  active  security  roles  for Japan; and  eschewing the  militant nationalism some fear is growing  in   Japan.  The   LDP  government's  positions  on constitutional revision  have tracked  these preferences, as has its  approach to  Japan's key  bilateral  relationships. Thus, the  Fukuda government has continued its predecessors' emphasis on  good relations with Washington; backed off from initiatives  toward   China  that  public  opinion  did  not support; sought  improved relations  with  South  Korea  and warmed toward Taiwan; and has let the media-saturating issue of Japanese  abducted to  North Korea  shape  policy  toward Pyongyang.

Kane   and   Amyx   doubted   whether   domestic   political developments strongly  shaped adjustments in Japan's foreign policy. The  article IX  debate and  occasional high-profile stories notwithstanding,  foreign  policy  does  not  figure prominently  in   Japan's  elections.   Amyx  saw   virulent nationalism as  a peripheral phenomenon under the pre-reform electoral system. Differences in foreign policy among recent LDP premiers  suggest that leaders enjoy room to maneuver on security matters.

Finally, Saito  pointed to other dimensions of Japan's post- reform politics  that promoted  stability but  also  impeded innovation. Despite  its victory  in the  last  lower  house election, the  LDP still  governed  in  coalition  with  the ideologically quite  different Komei. A grand coalition with the fellow  centrist DPJ foundered and is unlikely to recur. Calling elections  in an attempt to increase the LDP's share in the  Diet is risky. The LDP's very success in adapting to new rules  for lower  house elections helped throw the upper house  to  the  DPJ,  which  used  traditional  vote-seeking tactics in  contending for seats in that less reformed body. Attempts to  use a two-thirds majority in the lower house to override the upper would violate norms and prompt backlash.

KOREA AND TAIWAN

David Steinberg  (Georgetown) addressed  the foreign  policy implications of  Lee Myung-bak's sweeping victory in Korea's December 2007  presidential election  and the  solid win  by Lee's Grand  National Party  in the  April 2008  legislative balloting. Lee's  victory reflected a repudiation of Kim Dae Jung's  liberal   regime  and   Roh  Moo   Hyun's   populist administration. The  political  shift  is  likely  to  bring change to  major external  relationships. Under  Kim,  U.S.- Korea relations  were strained by "alliance fatigue," rising Korean  nationalism   (with  the  U.S.'s  military  presence providing a  focal point),  divergent views  on how  to deal with North  Korea, and  a badly  failed presidential summit. Although Roh  ran on a bruisingly anti-American platform and disagreements remain between the two states over North Korea policy, relations  recovered somewhat  as the  two pursued a free trade agreement and Roh committed a small contingent to U.S. efforts  in Iraq.  Under Lee, prospects for improvement are strong,  given his  emphasis on  restoring trust  in the U.S.-ROK  relationship,   strong  signals  of  support  from Washington (including  a Camp  David visit),  and  toughened terms for  Seoul's engagement  with North  Korea.  The  FTA, which Washington  might accept  for security reasons, is far from  certain,   but  would  be  a  milestone  in  bilateral relations.

Seoul's policies  toward North  Korea are  likely to  change somewhat. Within  the U.S.-ROK  alliance, leadership  on the issue is  likely to  be balanced,  in contrast  to a tilt to Korea under  Kim before  the North  Korean  nuclear  weapons crisis of  the 1990s  and the  tilt  toward  the  U.S.  that followed Pyongyang's  breach of  the Agreed  Framework. Lee, who flirted  with eliminating  the Ministry  of Unification, promised to  supersede Kim's  "sunshine  policy"  and  Roh's "nordpolitik" with  a tougher line of "flexible reciprocity" but no  "unilateral appeasement." Pyongyang criticized Lee's election, but more moderately than many expected. Changes in U.S. policy  from the early Bush years have helped close the gap between  Seoul's and  Washington's North Korea policies. Still, disagreements  will remain  as Washington  emphasizes nonproliferation while  Seoul's agenda includes economic and social engagement.

North Korea's  willingness to  end weapons  programs remains questionable,  given   their  importance  to  North  Korea's nationalism and the stature and, perhaps, security Pyongyang has derived  from them.  Gilbert Rozman  (FPRI and Princeton University) added that instability and incoherence in recent U.S. approaches complicated matters. Despite some impressive recent successes,  the Six-Party  process remains  at  risk. Still,  Rozman  remained  hopeful  that  coordination  among interested parties had limited Pyongyang's options and given it reasons to implement commitments.

Improved Korean  relations with Japan and expanded ties with China and  Russia are  likely under  Lee, Steinberg  argued. Although territorial  disputes and  history issues still can sour relations  with Tokyo,  relations should  improve  amid abandonment  of   Roh's  targeting   Koreans  for   long-ago "collaboration" with  Japanese rulers  and demanding further apologies for  Japan's past  wrongs. Japan-Korea  ties  also will benefit  from parallel  interests in  addressing  North Korean  weapons  and  balancing  China.  Rozman  noted  that difficulties could  arise in ROK-Japan ties if Sino-Japanese relations fell  into crisis,  China grew too wary of growing Korea-Japan  ties,   or  Japan   underwent   a   nationalist resurgence.

Steinberg added  that Seoul's  quest for  energy  and  other resources could expand relations with Moscow. Imperatives to good relations  with Beijing stem from a burgeoning economic relationship. It  remains uncertain  how Korea  will  choose among strengthening  ties  to  China  (Korea's  top  trading partner and  foreign investment destination), reinvigorating the U.S.-ROK  relationship  (with  its  emphasis  on  shared democratic values  and potential  for balancing  China)  and pursuing greater  ties  with  ASEAN  (which  shares  Korea's concerns about China's rise).

Lee faces significant domestic constraints on foreign policy choices. The  former Hyundai chief must fulfill expectations that he can steer the economy to stronger growth. Lee enjoys a slimmer  than expected legislative majority, faces a press liberated  from   Roh-era   restrictions,   and   needs   to accommodate nationalism,  pressure from  the political right and divisions within his own weakly institutionalized party. Lee must define his foreign policy vision--an alternative to
Roh's "nordpolitik"  and conception  of Korea  as a regional balancer or  Kim's "sunshine  policy"  and  drive  for  OECD membership. Rozman  suggested that  Lee could use the powers of the  Korean presidency  and South  Korea's potential as a multilateralist facilitator in the region to forge a foreign policy  that   is  positive   but  more  modest  than  Roh's overreaching one.

Shelley Rigger  (FPRI and  Davidson  College)  assessed  the implications  of   Kuomintang  victories  in  Taiwan's  2008 elections for  cross-Strait relations  and U.S.-Taiwan ties. In the January legislative elections, the KMT took 81 of 113 seats. In  the March  presidential balloting,  the KMT's  Ma Ying-jeou won 58.5 percent of the vote. The KMT scored these victories even as candidates from the Democratic Progressive Party  (DPP)   distanced  themselves   from  their   party's unpopular incumbent President Chen Shui-bian.

Ma's cross-Strait  policy was stable throughout the campaign and likely  predicts his  agenda as  president.  It  entails expanded economic  ties, including  a  cross-Strait  "common market" initially  proposed  by  his  running-mate,  Vincent Siew; relaxed  restrictions on  Taiwanese investment  in the mainland and mainland exports to Taiwan; direct cross-Strait transportation links  (especially  passenger  flights);  and opening Taiwan  to more  mainland  tourists.  All  of  these promise  to   improve  Taiwan's   economy,  which  has  been struggling when  measured against high historical baselines. In Ma's  view,  China's  deeper  economic  integration  with Taiwan and the global economy can be "win-win," making China more supportive of the cross-Strait and international status quo.

In cross-Strait  political relations, Ma pledges to preserve Taiwan's   fundamental   interests,   including   de   facto independence. Ma  embraced the  "1992 consensus" under which the ROC and the PRC agree that there is one China but accept that each  side has  its own  interpretation  of  what  that means. In  the campaign, Ma cast this as a policy of "mutual non-denial." Ma  also addressed political relations with the PRC in  his "three  noes": no  war, no  independence and  no unification (more  specifically, no  discussion of it during his first  term). A  cross-Strait "peace accord" and greater "international  space"   for  Taiwan   (including   possible participation in  the World Health Organization) are also on the agenda.

Although opponents and critics have doubts, Ma's seriousness is reflected  in potentially  politically costly commitments made during  the campaign.  The  DPP  attacked  the  "common market" idea as a "one-China market" that would mean a flood of  mainland   immigrants,  falling  wages,  lost  jobs  and deteriorating  public  services  to  Taiwan.  The  DPP  also renewed its  long-standing assault  on the "1992 consensus," denying that  it existed  and  warning  that  accepting  any version  of   "one  China"   was  a  dangerous  step  toward compromising Taiwan's autonomy.

Ma's commitment  to protecting  Taiwan's core interests (and satisfying constituent  demands  that  he  do  so)  also  is reflected in campaign statements that took a tough line with Beijing.  Ma  insisted  that  the  ROC  is  an  independent, sovereign, democratic  country, and that reunification could occur only  with a truly democratic China and the democratic consent of  the people of Taiwan. He dismissed as "arrogant" and "stupid"  Wen's statement implying that this was not the case. Responding  to China's  handling  of  disturbances  in Tibet, Ma  raised the  possibility of boycotting the Beijing Olympics.

Rigger and  other participants  identified four  sources  of support Ma  needs to  implement his  agenda. First, Ma needs popular support.  He has  this,  as  reflected  in  decisive electoral  victories,  low  levels  of  support  for  formal independence and  rising support  for  greater  cross-Strait engagement.  Second,   he  must  keep  his  party  in  line, especially  in  the  legislature.  The  KMT  is  notoriously fractious, may  become more  unruly with  its  parliamentary super-majority, and  still contains  "old KMT"  elements who have not  moved with  Ma to the political center or embraced the post-ethnic  and democracy-centered  politics of  former President Lee's  civic-nationalist "New Taiwanese." Although as party  leader Ma  had not exercised a firm hand, he might well do  so as a president with a popular mandate and strong determination    to    corral    not-very-ideological    KMT legislators.

Third, Beijing  must be  forthcoming, giving  Ma much better than  the  cold  shoulder  of  the  Chen  years.  There  are promising  signs,  including  a  post-election  conversation between Hu  and Siew  at China's  Baoao Forum;  both  sides' support  for  the  Hu-Lien  joint  statement  and  the  1992 consensus; contemplation  of a  "peace  accord"  as  a  step between negotiating  concrete policy issues and tackling the volatile sovereignty  question; and Beijing's broader Hu-era emphasis  on  preventing  Taiwan  independence  rather  than moving toward unification.

Fourth, Ma  needs improved  relations with the U.S., to deal with Beijing from a position of relative strength. Here too, signs are  promising. Most  in American  Asia policy circles welcomed Ma's  election. President Bush offered notably warm congratulations  on   Taiwan's  successful   election.  Most observers expect  significant improvement  from the nadir in bilateral ties  reached in  recent years when Chen's "policy surprises"  repeatedly   pushed  the  envelope  on  Taiwan's international  status   and  rattled   Beijing,  Bush   grew frustrated with  Chen, and  Washington became impatient with the divided  Taiwanese government's  failure to approve arms purchases.

Jacques deLisle (FPRI and University of Pennsylvania) agreed with Rigger's analysis, but pointed to areas where prospects for improved cross-Strait and U.S.-Taiwan relations remained questionable. Ma  faces challenges  in winning  the trust of the 40  percent of Taiwan's electorate that votes DPP. Doing so might  entail moves  that risk harmony within the KMT and feed fears  in Beijing. Beijing might not be willing or able to  offer   enough  immediate   progress   in   cross-Strait relations. Although  decisions on  Taiwan policy are made at the topmost  level and Hu appears to have forged a consensus to be  more accommodating,  Chinese policy on such sensitive matters turns  slowly and  Ma's campaign  rhetoric  provided fodder to  intransigent elements  in China.  Some in Beijing may not  fully understand how much Ma differs from the older guard KMT  leaders in  his commitment to preserving Taiwan's autonomy and seeking international space. The election cycle complicates   Washington's    role.   The   lame-duck   Bush administration appears  unwilling to  anger China  (by,  for example, going  forward with  F-16  sales  to  Taiwan).  Key Taiwan matters  will be  left for  the  new  administration, which Beijing  will pressure  not to  lead  off  with  "pro- Taiwan" gestures.

Finally, deLisle  compared Taiwan's  and Korea's  elections. The  relatively  conservative  party  won  presidential  and legislative elections  in both  countries and  reclaimed the presidency after  two terms  in more  liberal hands. In both cases, voters  appear  to  have  treated  the  elections  as referenda on  unpopular incumbents.  Former mayors  of their countries'  largest   cities,   the   winning   presidential candidates also  appealed to  voters' desire  for  competent government.  Although   the  victorious   parties  both  had problems  of   internal  coherence,   they  otherwise  faced strikingly different  challenges. While  the KMT  secured  a supermajority in  parliament, Korea's  legislative elections were a  disappointingly narrow  win for  Lee's party. On the other  hand,   unlike  its   Korean  counterpart,   the  KMT confronted distrust  born of  its role  as the  ruling party during decades of authoritarian government.

In both  countries, policies  to address  declining economic growth  figured  prominently  in  the  elections;  deepening economic ties to China loomed large, and hoped-for FTAs with the U.S.  held  a  more  speculative  place  among  proposed solutions. Both  new presidents  endorsed modest  reform  of government   structures    that   were    widely   seen   as dysfunctional. Ma  and Lee  also pledged  new approaches  to their countries'  perennially central foreign policy issues. Each faces  a difficult  and threatening  neighbor with whom reunification remains  a long-term  possibility.  Each  must maintain good  relations with  Washington despite  bilateral friction over security issues, FTAs, and U.S. policy's heavy focus  on   China  and   North  Korea.  Contrasts  are  also significant, however.  Although  the  Korea-U.S.  FTA  faces election-year  political  trouble,  a  Taiwan-U.S.  FTA  has dimmer prospects.  While Ma  pledges greater engagement with China, Lee has talked a tougher line on North Korea than his predecessors. Where  Washington's solicitude  for  Beijing's concerns about  Taiwan constrains  the ROC's  president, the ROK's president  faces very different challenges from a U.S. policy  toward  North  Korea  that  during  the  Bush  years sometimes  rejected   engagement  and  flirted  with  regime change.

Jacques deLisle  is Director  of FPRI's Asia Program and the Stephen  Cozen   Professor  of  Law  at  the  University  of Pennsylvania